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## INTRODUCTION

1 The Buddha's preaching is characterised as moderate path avoiding the two extremes viz indulgence in sensual pleasures and taking to the habitual practice of self mortification. When attempts were made to interpret and find out the true import of the Master's teachings in the days of the past Ācārya Nāgārjuna claimed to have struck at the depth of the Master's utterances and styled his interpretation as moderate *Madhyamaka* and accordingly his treatise in verses was designated *Madhyamakāśāstra* or *kārikā*. Nāgārjuna's main contribution to the evolution of Buddhist thought is an emphasis on Prajñā the ultimate knowledge derived from understanding the true nature of things in their real perspective viz *Sūnyatā*. This *Sūnyatā* in his opinion is only a synonym for dependant origination *Pratīya samutpāda*. The *Sūnyatā* doctrine is not quite unfamiliar with the earlier Buddhists. They take it for *śūnyatā* *Sūnyatā* as an equivalent for dependant origination is quite an innovation of Nāgārjuna.

The *Sūnyatā* doctrine he says has been introduced by Buddhas as an antidote for all wrong views and beliefs (M. II XIII 8). It appears that Nāgārjuna is quite right in so saying since it can appropriately corroborated from some earlier utterances of the Buddha. When Dighanakha a Perivrajaka e.g. conveys his conviction to the Buddha not to entertain any view the latter remarks that many persons professing not to entertain any view instead of giving up that view entertain a new one and there are a few persons who having given up that view do not at all entertain a new one. The Buddha further points out that a man sticking himself to any one of the three views

( १ सद्य मे न खमति २ सद्य मे खमति, ३ एकच मे एमति एकच मे न खमति )

would give rise to a quarrel and in order to avoid any quarrel he should give up that view and not entertain a new one. Note the passage in conclusion

विमुक्तचित्तो न केन चि खवदति न केन चि विरदति । ये च लोके इत तेन बोद्धवति  
अपममसति । M I p 500

## INTRODUCTION

1 The Buddha's preaching is characterised as "moderate path" avoiding the two extremes, viz, indulgence in sensual pleasures and taking to the habitual practice of self mortification. When attempts were made to interpret and find out the true import of the Master's teachings in the days of the past Ācārya Nāgārjuna claimed to have struck at the depth of the Master's utterances and styled his interpretation as 'moderate' *Madhyamaka*, and accordingly his treatise in verses was designated "*Madhyamakāśāstra*" or *kārikā*. Nāgārjuna's main contribution to the evolution of Buddhist thought is an emphasis on *Prajñā* the ultimate knowledge derived from understanding the true nature of things in their real perspective viz *Sūnyatā*. This *Sūnyatā*, in his opinion, is only a synonym for "dependant origination", *Pratiya samutpāda*. The *Sūnyatā* doctrine is not quite unfamiliar with the earlier Buddhists. They take it for *nairātmya* *Sūnyatā* as an equivalent for "dependant origination" is quite an innovation of Nāgārjuna.

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अपरामसं ति । M. I. p. ५००

Here we may rest fully convinced of the fact that Nāgārjuna's stand is fittingly and antecedently endorsed by the Master. The instance of Dīghanakha is also cited by Bhāvanivēka on p 48.

Moreover we find many verses collected in the Suttanipāṭa which beyond any shadow of doubt lend support to the negative attitude advocated by Nāgārjuna. Some of such verses are deserved to be cited here.

न कल्पयन्ति न पुरेस्त्रयन्ति अच्यन्तमुद्धोति न ते यदग्निः ।

आदित्यमग्नयं ययितुं विमज्ज आस न कुड्बन्ति बुद्धिं चि लोके ॥ 794

याणे पि सो निस्सय नो करोति । . 800

न कल्पयन्ति न पुरेस्त्रयन्ति धम्मा पि तेस न पडिच्छितासे ।

न आद्वयो सीलवतेन नेय्यो पारगतो न पच्चेति सादोति ॥ 803

सम्बन्धं मुनि अनिस्सितो न पियं कुड्बति नो वि अण्णियम् । ॥ 811

विसेनिक्त्वा पन वे चरन्ति दिट्ठोहि दिट्ठि अविरुज्झमाना । 833

The conversation between the Buddha and Māgandiya is very interesting where the Master says

न दिट्ठिया न सुत्तिया न याणेन सीलवतेनापि न मुद्धिमाह ।

अदिट्ठिया अस्सुत्तिया अज्जाण्यं असीलता अन्वता नो वि सेन ।

एते च निस्सज्ज अनुग्गहाय सन्तो अनिस्साय भवं न जप्पे ॥ 839

स सम्बन्धमेसु विसेनिभूतो यं किं चि दिट्ठि व सुत्त सुत्त वा ।

स पन्नभारो मुनि विण्णयुत्तो न कण्णियो नूपरतो न पत्तिथो ॥ 914

From these citations it appears that Nāgārjuna's absolute negativism is not without its counterpart in the earlier canonical literature. According to the Mādhyamika Prāsāngikas a man of spiritual career should not adhere to any proposition of his own but may refute the other's one reducing it to an absurdity. The non-adherence to any view by an ascetic is sufficiently stressed in the verses of the same book. Read e.g. verses 832 874 876 883 892 894 903 904 913. It may incidentally be pointed out that he should not engage himself on debate

with any body with a view to establishing any thesis of his own. The reason for this is fully demonstrated in verses 824—833, of *Dighanikhaṣuttā* M I 74 p 499. Almost the same attitude is advocated by the *Mādhyamika Prāsāṅgikas*. Absolute negativism therefore is not a whimsical creation of Nāgārjuna though he has made it into a grand system that would stand every scrutiny of critics.

A candidate for Bodhi should view things as devoid of any substantiality and get himself detached from all sorts of discriminative thoughts and assertions. When the mind is thus made completely aloof, then it is stated that the non dualistic and undivided principle shines forth. Thus the doctrine of Śānyatā helps a candidate to achieve that goal. Hence it is only a means to the end and not the end itself, of M K XIII, 8 c d, as also well stressed in the present treatise. This position of the system quite accords with the Buddha's repeated warning in different discourses :

युक्तीनां धम्मा.....निर्धारयाम, न गदहयाम ..धम्मा पि पहातव्या पायेन अभम्मा :

( Maj. I, 22 Agaladdūpamasuttā 39 Mahātāñhāsāṅkhasuttā )  
It is interesting to note that some such idea is also stressed in the other school of thought, of *Suvarṇasaptati*, pp 26, 101

येन ह्यजसि तरयज ॥

2 There are two methods to uphold the non substantiality of things as advocated by Nāgārjuna. The first method, viz *prasaṅga* was started by Ācārya Buddhapaṇita in the first half of the 6th century A D. and successfully maintained by Ācārya Candrakīrti in the first half of the 7th century A D. The Second one namely the *svatantra anumāna* method was founded by Bhāvaviveka, 550 600 A D. the author of the present treatise. The advocates of the former method maintain that Śānyatā could be established only by means of *prasaṅga*, i.e. *reductio ad absurdum* of all theses arguments and examples of the opponents, and hold that no thesis argument or example of their own is possible ( M. Vṛtti, pp 16, 18, 34 ) for the reason that absolute truth could not be asserted by any of the discursive thoughts. The latter school, on the other hand, criticising the *prasaṅga* method, pleads that Śānyatā may also be established by means of an independent inference in spite of the indescribable character of the absolute truth, hence the school goes under the name of *Svātantrika*. This method of inference has not won

favour with Candrakīrti, the celebrated interpreter of Nāgārjuna who attacks vehemently Bhāvaviveka and upholds Buddhapaṇḍita's standpoint.

3 Buddhist logicians claim that their logical theories have, of course in a caricature form, been endorsed by their Master himself. In support of this some scriptural passages are also cited and elucidated.<sup>1</sup> The logical tradition, preserved in Chinese Buddhist literature also supports the above claim.<sup>2</sup> It is well-known that the Buddha was a Hetuvādin. One of his foremost disciples chanted a song in his praise

1. See Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārtika*, I, 286, d

वृत्तिः—“नीलसमग्रा पुष्पो नील जानाति नो तु नीलमिति । इति प्रवृत्ता प्रत्यक्षं दर्शितम् । अनुमान नोक्तम् । . . . शून्याः परप्रकाशा इत्यादिना शब्दादेरेव नियेधात् प्रयोगस्य परार्थानुमानरूपस्य दर्शनाद्व्यपदेश्यानुमानस्य निर्देशः कृत एव भगवता । तमेव प्रयोगमाह ।

.....यद्विचिदुदयमवकाशम् ।

निरोधधर्मकं सत्त्वं तदित्यादावनेकधा । 287 a-b.

अनुमानाधयो लिङ्गमविनाभावलक्षणम् ।

व्याप्तिप्रदर्शनात् हेतोः साध्येनोक्तं तत् स्फुटम् ॥ 287 c-f.

पृ.....हेतोरुदयधर्मकत्वस्य साध्येन निरोधधर्मकत्वेन

व्याप्तेः प्रदर्शनात् यद्विचिदुदयधर्मकं तत् सर्वं निरोधधर्मक- (महावग I, 1.8)

मित्यादिना स्फुटः प्रत्यक्षो दर्शितः ।

The first passage quoted above is attributed to some Abhidharma book of *Pram vārtika*, *Parīṣadā*, p 518 (J. B. O. R. S Vol X\VI).

The definition of *kāryānumāna* is given in this āgamaic verse :

धुमेन ज्ञायते वह्निः सलिलस्य बलाकया ।

निमित्तैर्ज्ञायते गोत्रं बोधिसत्त्वस्य च धीमताः ॥ *Id*

The *Doṭhisattvanimittas* are given by Candrakīrti, see *Madhya mahāvātara* VI 4-5 with references thereto. The following āgama gives the definition of *Svabhāvābheta*

अनित्यं भूतं सस्कारा उत्पादय्ययधमिणः ।

उत्पद्यते हि निरुध्यन्ते तेषां व्युत्पन्नमः सुखम् ॥ *Id*

Some similar treatment is also made by Kamalaśīla, see *Tattvas Pañjikā*

proclaiming to the world that his Master's unique contribution lies in his discovery of an ultimate *hetu* cause for all evil things (*dharmāḥ*) that are produced by causes. The universe in his view is merely a series of causes and effects (*idampaccayaṭṭha*). One may witness in all his Discourses the argumentative and persuasive character of his speech. His art of debate and logical thinking are fully exhibited when his opponents are equally equipped. Once Saecaka a follower of Nighanṭa doctrine comes to conduct a debate<sup>2</sup> (*vāda*) with the Buddha to combat the latter's views on impermanence and non-substantiality of things (*sabbe saṃkhārā aniccā sabbe dhammā anattā* Maṃ 1, 85 p 227). He is reported to have held the view that *rūpa* is the soul and so also *vedanā* *vyākāṇa*. The Buddha refutes it by pointing out its glaring fallacies and sequences with his usual method of illustrations and similes. Again Upālī a house holder disciple of Nighanṭa goes to the Buddha for debate on relative strength of the bodily vocal and mental actions. Nighanṭa's contention is that the bodily action is more sinful than the others two. Upālī wanted to establish it refuting the Buddha's view. The Buddha remarkably vindicates the obvious inconsistencies with Nighanṭa's standpoint and makes Upālī convinced of them. A

2 From the Buddha downward broadly speaking five stages may be mentioned in the evolution of Buddhist logical theories.

- 1 Buddha—Aśvaghoṣa upto 600 A N (=after Nirvāṇa) Works: Four Āgamas and Hinayāna Sūtras.
- 2 Nāgārjuna—Piṅgala upto 800 A N  
Works: *Mādhyamaka Sūtra* (Vignahavyākartant) *Satasūtra* and *Dvādasamukha* (or—*N kāya*).
- 3 Maitreya—Vasubandhu—Guṇamati upto 1000 A N  
Works: *Prakaranāyavācīsūtra* *Upāyabhidaya* and *Tarkaśūtra*.
- 4 Diṇḍiṅga—Bandhuprabha Agotra (?) upto 1100 A N  
Works: *Nyāyamukha* *Nyāyapraveśa* *Vaipulya* *Satasūtravyākhyā* and *Prasāngapradīpa* (of *Bhāvanivēka*).
- 5 Dharmakīrti—Devananda (?) upto 1500 A N  
Numerous works  
(Cited from Lu Chang's work on *Hetuvidyā* as supplied by Mr Hsu Hu a devoted Chinese scholar Chinabbayan).

3 Saecaka's pride in debate is nicely described at the beginning of the Sutta p 227 ll 5—12 and on p 228 l 80—p 229 l 6 *etam attākam Samanānam Gotamam vādena vādena ākaṇḍhiṣṣam* *seyyathā* with three similes.



man cannot destroy with a sword the whole population of Nālandā within a moment, but a Śramaṇa can do so with *manoḍanda* mental deed. Then the Buddha proves that *manoḍanda* is greater in effect than *kayaḍanda*, bodily deed (Maj. S 56). Similarly a prince, Abbaya by name was urged by Nighanṭa Nāthaputta to conduct a debate with the Buddha on whether or not the Tathāgata would utter unpleasant word. If the Buddha replies to this question in negative, ask : why did Devaputta become enraged ? The prince carried out the plot by inviting the Buddha to his house. The question was really crucial. The Buddha won over him by giving an example of the child who hurts himself foolishly (Maj. S 59).

All the above and other conversations would certainly testify to us the Buddha's acquaintance with the art of debate, of course, in a time-honoured fashion. His theory of *dharmaśakṣus* is always put in a form of concomitance.

यदिद्वि एमुदयम्म, सव्वं त निरोधम्म ति ।

Much more interesting point is that the concomitance is used together with *upanaya* sentence :

सो इति पटिसचिक्खति : इदं पि खो पन अभिसखत्त अभिसंचेतयित्त्त, य खो पन द्विच अभिसखत्त, अभिसंचेतयित्त्त, तदन्विच, निरोधम्म ति पजानाति ।

*Idam* in the first sentence, refers to four dhyānas, four Brahma-vihāras and three ārūpyādhyānas. One may note that *vyūpāṭi* and *upanaya* sentences are used in an order just reverse of the later days' usage. Or it may be a *pratyūṭṭh* sentence expressing the presence of *probans* in the *pakṣa* and suggesting thereby the necessary presence of *probandum* by showing the positive concomitance afterwards (Maj. 1, S 52). A Bhikkhu named Sāti entertained a wrong view of *viññāna* and thought that only one *viññāna* runs and transmigrates from one birth to another. The Buddha having heard it from his disciples persuaded Sāti to give it up and exhorted his disciples that *viññāna* is *paṭiccasamuppanna*, i. e. produced due to causes and conditions. He further elucidates the idea by saying that when *viññāna* arises depending on the eye, etc. it is styled as eye consciousness, and so also the other, ear consciousness etc. The fire, e. g. being produced on account of wood, is termed wood fire (*kaṭṭhagga*), so also *sakalagga*, *tinagga*, *thusagga*, *sankhāragga*. Then this concomitance is also shown : *bhūtaṃ*

*idam āhārasambhavam, āhāranirodhā nirodhadhammam* He further exhorts one should not cling to this statement because dhamma has been preached as a boat to reach the goal and not the goal by itself. It is quite probable that the later logicians like Vasubandhu and Dinnāga taking the above example as a specimen explain the term *pratyakṣa* with more appropriate examples.

Therefore it appears that the days of Buddha were fully rife with logical, philosophical speculations and debates. It has also been recognised that there were many other philosophical schools, such as Ājivakas, Nighanṭas and Parivṛājakas, etc who were fully adept in such an art. I may add one more instance in this period, viz Yaska, the renowned author of the Nirukta ( c 500 B C ) He uses a formal logic just like a good logician of later days to disprove the whole structure of the argument set out by Kautsa, who argues that the Vedic hymns are meaningless with sufficient proofs. Yaska refutes all one by one putting his own view in a syllogistic form : *Mantrā arthavantaḥ, śabdāsamānyat* etc. So it is not proper to contend that the period of Buddha was not familiar with formal logic or some such method of logic.

Now it becomes evident that the tradition fathering upon the Buddha the logical theories of Buddhists is not without foundation. It is also stated that until the time of Vasubandhu logical theories and rules of debate were uncertain ( cf Kwel-cl, Comment on N Praveśa, p 2b ) Then Dinnāga systematized every thing connected with logic and made it a scientific system. Of course he took his stand on *Vijñāna* as the basic principle so much so his school came to be known as Nyāyānusāri *Vijñānavāda*. It does not, however follow that he propounded that system for the first time because we have already in Vasubandhu's *Vimśikā* the system, ably discussed and established.

4. What Dinnāga did for the *Vijñānavāda* Bhāvaviveka did in the cause of the *Mādhyamaka* doctrine. He is as much reputed in the field of logic as Dinnāga. Little is known about his personal history except what the Chinese travellers speak of him. Yuang Chuaug tells us that he was a native of South India and a junior contemporary of Dharmapāla ( Watters, II, p 222 ) According to Hual's Life, in a great stone mountain not far to the South of the capital of the Dharmakapaka kingdom Bhāvaviveka rests in the palace of Asuras awaiting

the time when Maitreya Bodhisattva shall reach perfect wisdom and explain some difficulties in his way (Life of Yuang Chuang Beal, trans p 137) I ching also mentions him as one of the Ācāryas in the middle age (Record, p 181) His name is variously pronounced. He is known in Chinese as Po pi fi-cia—Bhāvaviveka and in Tibetan as Bhavya or Bhavyakara. The following informations are gathered by Prof L V Poussin —

a Divākara Indian monk translator in the convent of Ta-Yuan, gives this account. Recently in India in the convent of Nālanda, there are two masters Silabhadra and Jñānaprabha by name. The first follows the tradition of Maitreya and Asaṅga at distance and of Dharmapāla and Nanda immediately which asserts that only the Dharmalakṣaṇa Mahāyāna is the ultimate and definite teaching<sup>4</sup> (nirvārtha). The second tradition supports the views of Mañjuśrī and Nāgārjuna at distance and of Pingala and Bhāvaviveka directly. It considers the *niralakṣaṇa Mahāyāna* as nirvārtha<sup>5</sup> (This view is fully demonstrated in the *M vṛtti Prajñāpradīpa* of Jñānaprabha. Note the same title as that of Bhāvaviveka's comment.)

4 According to Sūtras like the Sandhinirmocana and Sāstras like the Yoga sūtra of Asaṅga Silabhadra establishes three teachings: 1 Little Vehicle, against Ātman of Tīrthikas, 2 Prajñā school recognizes that the imaginary is void of its proper nature but does not pose the being of dependant perfect. 3 Sandhinirmocana etc real doctrine of Mahāyāna three lakṣaṇas three absences of proper nature. To affirm reality of things produced by causes is to fall in the extremity of existence to say that all things are void is to fall in the extremity of the void. In fine to say at the same time vacancy of imaginary and the existence of dependant and perfect is the middle path = nirvārtha.

5 Jñānaprabha establishes three teachings in this order —

1 For those gazelles, thought and object are real, 2 Dharmalakṣaṇa Mahāyāna the object is void but thought is real the system of Viśiṣṭadvaita, because bearers of still feeble faculty are not capable entering into equal true void. 3 In the third per of Mahāyāna without Lakṣaṇas thought and object all the two are void equally of the same savour. In other words the Buddha broke at first the proper nature, substantialism of Tīrthikas in teaching the existence of things produced by causes. Then he broke adhesion to the existence of these things teaching that they have only existence of designation (prajñaptisattva). In fine he says these things are void of proper nature equal of unique savour. The second system admits one perceptible (upalabhya) it is not really of definite sense.

b According to Fa tsang treatise on *Lañkāvatāra* Taisho 1790 p 430 3 7 24 there have been four systems Diarmatrāta Nāgārjuna and Deva Asaṅga and Vasubandhu Aśvaghoṣa and Śāramatī These masters of the South and the North of the country admit some things void and others existence and are not capable to harmonize In the country of West the master Bhāvaviveka according to the Sūtras of Prajñā supports himself on the system of Nāgārjuna etc and makes treatise *Prajñāpradīpa* and *Karatalaratna*, and establishes one reasoning showing the *paratantra* void The master Dharmapāla relying upon the system of Asaṅga etc makes the treatise *Vijñaptimātrā* [ *siddhi* ] and establishes one reasoning showing the dependent (*paratantra*) not void Their disciples Jñānaprabhā and Śīlabhadra adopt these systems and the tradition is not interrupted The account goes further that there is no conflict in fact between the two systems because Asaṅga<sup>6</sup> has interpreted Nāgārjuna ( Nanjo 1243 ) and Vasu ( = Vasubandhu ) has commented on Āryadeva's *Śataśāstra* ( Nanjo 1188 ) But men of posterior days do not understand the intention and they attach themselves to those words and contradict themselves ( v Joyau Introductory )

5 As previously stated Bhāvaviveka has pleaded for a new method the method of independent reasoning to prove vacancy as against the *prasaṅga* method of Buddhapaṇita which falls well in line with Nāgārjuna's thinking For the reason of this innovation he is put above the Mādhyamikas by certain Tibetan authors It is stated that the Svātantrikas are classified by certain Tibetan writers into two branches the Svātantrika Sautrāntika and Svātantrika Yogācāras Bhāvaviveka is said to be of the former group and Śāntarakṣita of the latter The distinction<sup>7</sup> rests not on the conception of absolute truth but on the theories of relative truth The first branch adopts in relative truth the position of Sautrāntikas ( the existence of the exterior world and the negation of *saṃskṛta* ) while the second the Yogācāra position ( inexistence of exterior world ) ( v Obermüller Sublime Science p 83 Stecherbatsky Short treatises 31 §§ 293 328 370 cited by L V

6 However he sometimes criticises that the Mādhyamika ill comprehends vacancy

7 This distinction though it is claimed to be highly authoritative cannot be taken to be an accurate one

Poussin *op cit* ) Poussin in support of the statement says that Bhāvaviveka teaches the doctrine of intellect receptacle reservoir of seeds ( cf. below, text p 75 ) which doctrine distinguishes the Yogācāras from the Sautrāntikas. So his metaphysics is Mādhyamika and his psychology is Yogācāra. Poussin is wrong in saying that his psychology is Yogācāra. It may not be far from truth if Bhāvaviveka is styled as Svātantrika Sautrāntika. For the Sautrāntikas are credited to have postulated a subtle consciousness which survives in Nirvāṇa ( Th Stcherbatsky Nirvāṇa p 30 J Masuda Vasumitra's Bud Saets p 68 No 3 of the Sautrāntika school and n 1 ) The author of the present treatise seems to echo the same view when he says ( on pp 29 87 ) that ' after effecting the elimination process in a prescribed manner the Yogin enters finally into the flow of knowledge which is now in its own self nature ' It may be evident from this passage that the author distinctly sides with the view that there is a pure knowledge flowing inwardly and immune from contamination of any sort and which shines forth in the ultimate state of Yogic Career. So it is quite apt to call him a Sautrāntika in his psychology.

I may incidentally add here that the forerunners of the subtle knowledge theory of the Sautrāntikas are the Māhāsaṅghikas who have likewise entertained some ' original consciousness ' ( *Mūlavijñāna* ). The Sautrāntikas have given it the designation of *ālayavijñāna* which is more or less similar to the purified Jñānasvalakṣaṇa of Bhāvaviveka. According to the Sautrāntikas it is the substance of transmigration from which the current five skandhas are evolved ( Masuda Vasumitra p 68 n 1 ) The same view is held by Sāri Bhikkhu amongst the earlier Buddhists. He professes that the Master has taught that one consciousness runs from birth to birth. There are very many clear indications in the Pali Nikāya works to prove that the Master has assigned some prominence to Vijñāna though it is placed on a par with other skandhas. In his discourse to Kassapa the Master speaks of three possessions ( *sampadā* ) in order *āyassampadā citta* ( = samādhi on later occasions ) and *paññā*. This last possession is explained thus :

माण्डस्सनाय चित्तं अभिनोहरति, अभिनिष्सामेति । सो एव पञ्जरति ' भय मे कायो रूपी चातुम्महाभूतिको... ' इदं पन मे विज्याण एत्थं सित्तं एत्थं पटिबद्धं ति ।

The passage goes further that this is *paññā*, and there is nothing more to gain in this life. According to this discourse, *ñānadassana*, insight into knowledge is the final *sampadā* for monkhood, i. e. *Sāmañña*. This *ñānadassana* has been gradually relegated to the background, and *cetovimutti*, mind-deliverance has instead come to the forefront, cp Maj 1, Sutta 29, p 197.

इदं ब्रह्मचरियं न यत्तद्वद्वन्नानिमित्तं, या च ह्येवमिदं ब्रह्मचर्यं भवत्युपायेति विमुक्तिः,  
एतदर्थः..... ।

Sometimes four dhyānas and four ārūpyadhyānas are said to be of greater importance than *ñānadassana*. So this insight into knowledge, which has been eclipsed in the course of centuries is duly insisted on several times and the precise process to retrace it is also proscribed by Bhāṣaviveka by devoting his present entire work to this subject. He is even inclined to remark that if a yogin attains a perfect insight (*samyakdarśana*) into adamantine knowledge in its true perspective, he may be taken to have fulfilled all other six perfections and eight constituents of the Āryan path, even though he is not engaged in their actual performances, see p 98 where he relies for this view on the Bodhisattvapitaka and Brahmaṇḍaśāstra. The attitude of our author is quite in contrast with some perhaps later Mādhyamika Ācāryas like Mañjūśrī who emphasise both *prajñā* and *pāramitās* as equally important (c. Bhavasankrānti, Introduction XXV, XXXVI). Some similar balanced attitude appears to have been maintained by earlier Buddhists. Śāradāṅga, for example argues on behalf of the Master Śīla and *Prajñā* are mutually purifying and make one a true Brahman. Dig Śāradāṅgasūtra.

संयथा वि गोतम इत्येव वा इत्य धोषेय्य पादेन वा पाद धोषेय्य एवमेव  
धीलपरिधोता पन्ना, पन्नापरिधोत सोल .... ।

to which position the Master accords his consent. One may take notice here of a Brahmanical parallelism in the idea of *ñānakarmasamuccaya* in Pre Sāṅkhya Vedantic thought. We should not however, mistake that Bhāṣaviveka desires there is discord all the preliminary acts. What he seems to hint is that a correct grasping of things in accordance with the true ultimate knowledge is more fundamental than anything else.

has succumbed to the error condemned by the *Laṅkāvatāra* ( 154, 155 ) of taking to the letters ( *pañhāruta* ) this declaration "which does not wish to say what it says" He has created *Mahāyāna* alakṣaṇa ( devoid of three lakṣaṇas ) admitting *paratantra* and *pariṇiṣpanna* in the relative truth, considering them void in the absolute truth . ( *Siddhi*, 188 189 ) He is "a total negator", he mistakes *Sūnyatā* and destroyed scripture and reason ( *Siddhi*, 432 ) He thinks that all dharmas are only one existence of designation ( *prajñaptisat* )—an untenable opinion ( *Siddhi*, 554 555 ). However his doctrine is not in contradiction with "Middle Path", for he admits existence in relative truth ( *Siddhi*, 4 ). Yogācāras' middle path on p 419 of the *Siddhi* Koue ki condemns that Bhāṣaviveka has pushed Mādhyamika towards Nihilism which Nāgārjuna ignored ( Joyau, Introductory )

7. There are numerous works claiming Bhāṣaviveka's authorship, of which the following are noteworthy .

- 1 *Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, comm on *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* of Nāgārjuna, Chinese translation, Nanjio, 1185, Tibetan, Mdo 18 Cordier 399 The first part of Tib version is published by Walleser, *Bibliotheca Indica* 1913
- 2 *Jewel in Hand*, *Karatālaratna* Nanjio, 1237 No Tibetan translation is known
- 3 *Mādhyamakabhūdayakārikā* with auto comment, *Tarkajyotiḥ* Mdo 10, Cordier 300 is an independent work, very valuable for historical studies of his contemporary philosophical thoughts Its Sanskrit original is recently brought from Tibet by Rahnula Sankrītyayana
- 4 *Mādhyamakaratnapradīpa*, Mdo 18 Cordier 299
- 5 *Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyā* is a description of the 18 schools of Buddhism translated into English from the Tibetan, Mdo 90 Cordier 414 by Rockhill in his *Life of Buddha* Its authenticity is doubted by L V Poussin
- 6 *Mādhyamakārthanugraha* is a short treatise in 10 verses on double truth and its sub truths translated into Sanskrit and English and published with Tibetan version by N Ariyaswami Sastrī in the *Journal of Or Reas Madras Vol V pp 41 ff*
7. *Tattvāmr̥ṣāvātāra* twice referred to in the present treatise,

pp 58 76, and the Siddhānta of Mañjunahāṣavyaśra speaks of it as the comment on Madhyamakahrdaya ( v p 58, n 112 )

The exact title of the present treatise is not ascertained it has been translated into Chinese *Chang Cheng lun*, *Chang* means 'palm' and *Cheng* jewel', 'gem', etc So I have put into Sanskrit *Karatālaratna* Karatāla for palm is quite familiar in the expression like *Karatālā-malaka*, etc The simple word *kara* is also sometimes used for palm for the sake of metro in the expression like *karabadara samānam* etc I have, however, retained the form *Karatāla* having in view the Sūtra passages like *Karatālasamsthānam* cited in the M vṛtti p 476 ll 11, 13 Cp also the expression *arīḥmalakam karatālagatam* in the Kalpa nūmanḍatikā p 149 ( xxvii )

The *raison d'être* of the treatise as the author says, is to provide persons of keen intellect with proper guides to enter into the Truth (Dharma) for which purpose some persons persistently take to the codes of traditional interpretations of much complicated scriptures Listening reasoning and concentrating are the three main factors to achieve the goal After listening to the scripture one should concentrate on the true nature of things with the aid of proper reasoning *yuktinidhyānti* which is the same as *anumāna* according to Bhavya He has also instructed the man of Bodhi career how he should reply to all objections he may confront with in the course of his reasoning This gives the author an opportunity to review all the possible arguments that his opponents both contemporary and ancient could offer against the proposition The treatise is therefore doubly interesting to us Almost all philosophers of his opposite camp are given a place in it to pronounce their views on the proposition A majority of them are mentioned by name Yet there are many others who are mentioned in vague terms as *anye kecit*, etc whom we can hardly identify The most interesting one of such references is that he distinguishes the advocates of Prakṛti and Puruṣa from proper classical Sāṅkhyas Their main differences appear to be that Prakṛti and Puruṣa are imperceptible for the latter while they are otherwise for the former We know that Aśvaghoṣa has described a form of Sāṅkhya system which may be very nearer to the Prakṛti-Puruṣavāda of Bhavya Prakṛti of Aśvaghoṣa's account ( Bud carita XII, 18 ) is the same as the five great elements,



etc and hence it is perceptible. It has been well pointed out elsewhere that the *Suvarnasaptati* the standard text of the classical Sankhya system must have been familiar with *Bhāṣaviveka* ( v pp 79 80 no 77 79 80 and my Further Notes on the *Suvarnasaptati* in the Jour of S V O Institute Tirupati Vol VI No 2 p 84 85 )

8 It was in 1933 1939 when I was appointed Professor of Buddhist Studies Chinabhadra that I undertook to study this work of Bhavya a brief account of which I presented to All India Oriental Conference Tirupati 1939 under the title *Bhāṣaviveka* and his Method of Exposition. When I was again appointed in 1945 Chinese Research Fellow under a new scheme of studies sponsored by the National Government of China I took opportunity to revise and publish the work in the *Visvabharati Annals* newly started under aforementioned scheme. Meanwhile I came to know that the work has been translated into French and published by Prof Louis de la Vallée Poussin in his *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques* Vol II a copy of which I procured on loan from the University of Bombay by the kind office of the Director Chinabhadra. In revising I compared Poussin's French translation with my Sanskrit rendering and improved where he left doubtful. The work being of technical character requires a handling specially trained in the technical branch of Indian Studies. I have also made an endeavour to incorporate all his useful references and notes into my present publication in order that mine may serve to be an up-to-date one. Besides I have also consulted an anonymous commentary in Chinese which is unfortunately incomplete and available only on the second chapter. My foot notes and additional notes will testify to what extent I have improved and interpreted the text and succeeded in my task. I hope that the learned readers will themselves see how lucid and elucidative Bhavya's method of argument is even in the translation of so linguistically unfamiliar language as Chinese and how much more useful purpose would have been served if the Sanskrit original of the work were recovered. The Chinese text I have made use of for my Sanskrit rendering is that published along with incomplete commentary aforementioned by The Sutra Engraving Institute Nanking 9th year of the Chinese Republic *gan shen* first month of autumn preserved in the Chinese Library of Chinabhadra, Santi niketan.

Now it behoves me to offer my sincere thanks to the authorities of the Visvabharati, more specially to *Sri* Rāhmadranath Tagore, General Secretary, Visvabharati and Prof Tan Yun Shan Director Ch nabhavana who were responsible for giving me an opportunity to make my work complete and accessible to the learned public. My thanks are due to Dr P C Bagchi Director, Research Studies, Visvabharati for his kind suggestion to issue the book separately as *Vistabharati Memoir*. Our Press at Santiniketan also deserves our thanks for speedy execution of the printing work of the book. As no Chinese types are available in our Press I have all the Chinese words cited in the foot notes printed elsewhere and added as Appendix for the convenience of Scholars' references. I have also prepared a Chinese Index of all the technical and other authorized terms with their Sanskrit equivalents, with a hope that I may have occasion to publish it in future.

1st Feb 1948  
Santiniketan

N Ariswami Sastri

# KARATALARATNA OF BHAVYA

## SUMMARY OF THE TREATISE

### CHAPTER I

The author, at the outset of his treatise, narrates the main purpose of his composition as follows . When one ( Bodhisattva ) realises the supermundane and indiscriminating knowledge, he can conceive the moral faculties of all living beings which are varied in regard to aspiration, temperament and conduct, and can destroy all the passions that are operating either in one's own self or in the self of others which may be latent or potent, and which would cause a great number of miseries . And he can take up for the benefit of others the vow of practising the secret duties of a holy man . In order to realise such supermundane knowledge, one ought to apply constantly the collyrium of unperverted view of *Sūnyata* which destroys the film ( or eye disease ) of all the wrong views . In order to have it one should resort to *Prajñā*, supreme knowledge consisting of learning which expels the objective nature of all objects .

Now some persons by dint of right interpretation determining the sense of the wider and complicated texts, enter into the Truth ( *dharma* ), and practise constantly and diligently the meditation followed by progress , but in such interpretation they get very much tired mentally . There are other persons who are of very keen intellect, although they have not entered into the Truth . In order to offer facilities to the latter for entering into the Truth by realising the *sūnyatā*, the author says that he composed in brief this *Sāstra*, *Karatalaratna*

As this treatise is intended for the most part to prove the validity of inference for establishing the Madhyamaka Truth, *śūnyatā* independently, and to reply to all objections to it put forth by opponents, the author sets forth in this verse his main thesis in a formal syllogism

- I a Thesis The composite (*samskṛta*) elements are void from the standpoint of Absolute Truth
- b Reason Because they are originated through causes and conditions
- c Example Just like things magically created (*māyavat*)
- II a Thesis Uncomposite (*asamskṛta*) elements are unreal from the viewpoint of Absolute Truth
- b Reason Because they are non products
- c Example Just like flower in the sky

Now the author offers the following remarks by way of explaining the first thesis

I There are number of speculations regarding the classification of things both in the Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical systems, they are to be divided in brief into two categories, viz composite and non composite. The worldlings without understanding their real nature attribute some reality to them and entertain manifold wrong views. An ignorant painter, for example, paints some terrible forms of Yakṣas and Piśacas, or paints an image of a beautiful lady or person and imagining that those forms exist in reality becomes either terrified or attracted. But when men realise the real nature of the composite and uncomposite things according to Absolute Truth, they just like a wise painter do not imagine that the objects so painted do really exist, and not being caught into the net of wrong views like a silk worm which is envelopped itself in

its cocoon, are capable of entering into the supermundane knowledge

In order to elucidate this meaning ( the real nature ) of the composite element which is already disputed, the author sets forth the first thesis Further, he says that all men in the world equally accept it as *bhava* , he also admits it as such empirically In the worldly experience the origination through causes and conditions is accepted as real and hence all the people including shepherd and cowherd know that the composite elements, eye, etc that are brought under category of the Empirical Truth are as substantially existant ( *dravyasat* ) The author therefore qualifies his proposition as "from the standpoint of Absolute Truth", lest it should contradict the actual experience of the world What is real and proper character is called real nature ( *tattva* ) , it is only the Absolute Truth The above proposition is made from the viewpoint of this Absolute Truth, not of the Empirical Truth

Things that are produced through concatenation of conditions are called composite elements, 1 ■ twelve bases omitting some parts of the *dharmāyatana* Things magically created and illusory in appearance are also accepted ■ such by opponents , the author says that if his proposition relates to those illusory things, it will incur a logical defect called *niddha-saḍbhava* So his proposition is directed to those composite things which are accepted by opponents ■ really and substantially existent , e g the composite element , in regard to the base of eye it is discussed whether it is really substantial or void It is void The term void is a synonym of what is bereft of its own nature and is 'illusory in appearance' such is the proposition of the author

Things that originate through causes and conditions,

which are empirically true, my statement does not go against the experiences current amongst common people

Again three kinds of contradiction are raised and answered (3) It does not contradict our sacred texts, because it has been accepted by our scriptures (4) It does not contradict the sacred text of other philosophers since all the systems of thought are intended to criticise others' systems and to establish their own (5) Nor does it contradict the experiences of the ordinary folk because no philosophical discussions and investigations will follow closely the experiences of the worldlings in determining the true natures of things, e g Buddhists hold things to be momentary and of no soul, Vaiśeṣikas, *rūpa*, etc are other than *dravya* etc, and Sāṅkhyas, *buddhi* is *acetara*, what is extinguished and what is not yet originated are all real This is why I qualified my proposition as "from the standpoint of Absolute Truth"

2 To an objection that there is no subject (*dharmin*) for him who maintains that the eye basis is really void and hence it is a logical defect called *paksadosa*, and also it is *hetudosa*, there being no receptacle of the reason, the author replies that the eye, etc in general as current amongst common people are accepted as subject, and some attribute pertaining to it as reason, so the defect that you stated is only an apparent and fallacious one

3 The crooked (Brahmanic) logicians raise an objection of mutual contradiction of the proposition and reason in this syllogism If eye, etc are void, how can they be produced by causes and conditions? If they are so produced, how can they be void? If however that objection is removed, then your proposition involves either absence of a parallel example or unproving of the reason, e g sound is eternal,

because all things are non-eternal. This syllogism exhibits the reason 'because the sound is not all things' and hence indicates the defect of the reason since the sound is also included in the category of all things. There is no parallel example. How can a thing be eternal and non-all? The author replies that the reason and example are well proved as they are very well understood by every ordinary man.

4. Svabhāvavādins say : the organ of eye is endowed with its own nature, because it discharges its own function. Things devoid of *svabhāva* do not discharge the function just like a son of barren woman. Bhavya says : If you establish thereby the apparent nature of the eye, etc. known to all common people, conventionally, then it will incur the defect of *siddhasādhana*. If you do so from the view-point of reality, there will be no parallel example. Nor may your object be proved from the absence of non-parallel example ; e. g. the advocate of the eternal sound says : sound is eternal, because it is audible ; pot, etc. are non-eternal and not audible ; sound on the other hand is audible and hence eternal. Your reason has been contradicted by its opposite reason, viz. *krtakatva*, being a product, which exists in all parallel examples known to the world. This contradictory reason proves that all things, eye, etc. including sound are to be brought under the category of common parlance of the world ; because they all possess the same false nature. So far the author replies to some fallacies relating the subject ( *pakṣa* ).

III. Now some fallacies relating to the reason are met with. 1. Some ( logicians ) object that the proposition : all composite elements are void, includes also your reason and example, as they all are of the same category ; so your inference is imperfect. The author replies that if his propo-

which are empirically true, my statement does not go against the experiences current amongst common people

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sition goes : the eye is void because it is void of its nature, then it may entail an *asiddhidoṣa* for reason. *Māyā*, etc. are given as example, not as subject for demonstrating therein our *probandum* in which case there will be an unnecessary attempt on author's part of proving a thing which is already admitted ( *siddhasādhana-gaurava* ).

2. Some low-witted (logicians) pass the following criticism : The proposition proving non-substantiality of the composite things also proves the same for the reason which becomes therefore *asiddha*, non-existent. This criticism, says the author, is only apparent and not valid ; because similar defect may be pointed out with all other logicians. For example, (ancient) followers of Jina establish that all *samskāras* are of no soul, because they are products of causes ( *sabhetuka* ). Though this reason also comes under *samskāra*, yet it was admitted as a valid reason. Sāṅkhyas hold the evolutes ( *vyakta* ) as constituted of three *gunas*, because they are different from *śūnā*. This reason too is *vyakta*, but not considered to be invalid. Vaiśeṣikas also maintain that the sound is non-eternal, because it is produced. The formulation of this reason is constituted of words and so it becomes non-eternal. No dialectician would admit this kind of objection as valid. If they do so, nobody can establish any proposition.

3. Some other (logicians) say that your reason, *pratitya-samutpannatva*, will not prove your *probandum*, as it is itself devoid of its own nature just like the word uttered by the son of barren woman. The author answers : The reason in your syllogism is *asiddha* for you ; if you formulate it as accepted by your opponent, you should explain it in more definite terms. If it means total non-existence, there will be no reason at all. Or if it means a false appearance, then

it lacks a parallel example ; since the word uttered by the son of barren woman is absolutely non-existent. Further it becomes inconclusive with *nirmitatābda*, word of Buddha's created persons because it educates and does benefit to innumerable beings even if it lacks its own nature. And ■ reason that is accepted only by one party, will not at all prove *probandum*. And again your reason is made invalid by contradictory reference, and involves also a logical defect called *atiprasaṅga*. Here the author gives some illustrations to demonstrate that reason would be valid only when it is accepted by both parties.

4. Some crooked logician again says : If *svabhāva śūnya* is *probandum*, no *probans* will be established just like the word uttered by the son of barren woman. *Probans* is also included into the *śamskrta* category, so it becomes *sādhyasama*, equal to *probandum*, i. e. devoid of its own nature. Author's reply goes : This so-called defect in thesis has been pointed out by the implied argument of the previous opponent the futility of which has been fully demonstrated.

IV. Some more fallacies of proposition are answered : some ( ancient Buddhist logicians ) say, that the meaning of your proposition is not clear. (1) All the composite elements are in reality non-existent substance ; if that is the sense of the thesis, this sentence itself destroys your *probandum*, and incurs a defect of *pakṣa*, called *svavacananirodha*, contradiction by one's own word, just like a proposition establishing that all words are false. (2) If the sense of your proposition is that all composite elements are totally non-existent, then you, denying every thing completely, fall into the wrong view of *aparādhā*.

(1) With regard to the first alternative, the author

remarks that Buddha has freely used in the verse, e. g. *ātma hi ātmano nātha*, etc. the word *ātma*, soul, which is nothing but *mind*, *citta*. However, in reality no-soul theory is established ; his utterances are not blamed as *svavacananirodha*. Similarly I also accept the eye etc. as existent in the worldly activities ; however I establish it as void from the view-angle of reality of saints. The author has cited some three more utterances of the Buddha which may be charged with similar logical fallacy ; yet they are accepted by our opponents as quite valid and logical. The Sāṅkhyas also have to adopt the same procedure. They maintain that the evolutes are endowed with three *guṇas*. This formulation of proposition too falls into the category of *vyakta* and is constituted of three *guṇas*. If it is not of three *guṇas*, *vyakta* also will not be of that nature. Though there is such defect, yet their proposition is not at all regarded as blame-worthy.

Our disputant, without making his own thesis free from the said fallacy, tries to frame some more charges, such as : all the composite elements being in reality non-substances, the sentence of this proposition becomes non-substance. The disputant who directs such charge against other's proposition without removing his own defect is just like a man who, when he is charged by you as a thief, replies that you are also a thief. This procedure of discussion should not be adopted in a critical and logical investigation.

(2) As to the second alternative, my meaning of the proposition has already been explained ; void does not mean a total non-existence, but it is only a synonym of non-substantial, and illusory appearance. And I do not deny that all things never exist in all aspects. So your objection is no more valid.

2. Some other Ācāryas raise this objection : If things as you said, are non-substantial like the *māyā*, etc. they are non-existent, hence you fall into the wrong idea of non-existence. This objection, says the author, is raised lest only the desired object of the *Sūnyavāda* should be accomplished, though both parties are confronted with the same fallacy. To deny the Absolute Truth evolves a greater sin. This negative expression denies what is current in the world. However you attach greater importance to its injunctive aspect. But I stress more on its negative aspect. This negative expression could indicate only one idea—the negation of the existences ; its force of expressing the idea is fulfilled and nothing more comes out into operation to express another idea, e. g. the expression “there does not exist a piece of white cloth” would denote only the absence of white cloth and not necessarily the existence of red cloth, or blue cloth.

In this branch of science we disprove the supposed real nature of all things in order to remove the wrong idea of Eternalism ; we also deny the unreal nature, in order to shun the wrong belief of Nihilism. Again both these natures, real and unreal combined, are also disproved so that these two beliefs combined may be avoided. With a view to put an end to all other false beliefs, all the mental phenomena are negated. All such phenomena being stopped, the mind automatically ceases to operate any longer. An utterance of Buddha has been cited to this effect.

3. Somebody else says that the advocate of the *Sūnyatā* doctrine, although he is desirous of acquiring discriminative wisdom, always discriminates things composite and uncomposite as void, and thus he nullifies this cherished object. This objection too is not valid as I have already replied to it fully and fittingly.

V. One more objection relating to the argument. Some other (logicians) say: the reason for proving *sūnyatā* is unproved either conventionally or in reality both from the viewpoint of one's own system or that of others'. The author meets this remark thus: All the logicians have agreed on the fact that a reason is to be employed which is valid for both parties and with general attributes, not taking into account all other particulars. For example, (1) The Vaiśeṣikas prove that sound is non-eternal because it is product of effort. 'The advocate of the eternal sound' with a view to disprove the reason, questions whether it is produced by throb, etc. or by stick, etc. (2) So also the Sāṅkhyas prove that five organs of living beings are not products of matter, because they are faculties (*indriyatvāt*) like the faculty of mind. The opponent who advocates that human organs are material products, criticises whether the reason (*indriyatta*) is endowed with the nature of great elements, or with three *gunas*. All such criticisms are futile and indicate only a false disproving of reasons. The same is the case with your criticism.

VI (1) Some objections on the example are met with. Some Ācāryas who are self-posed as very intelligent, blind of love for their own system, and incapable of assessing the value of the gem, like scriptures—raise objection as to the example: Things such as flower, fruit, lump of clay, etc. which by force of magic power turn into different objects like elephant, house, etc. are devoid of their own natures. This we do not accept. There is no parallel example, because your example lacks *probandum*. If you say that those magically created things are spoken of as void in so far as they lack the nature of the real elephant, etc. then the eye, etc. are said to be void only in the sense they lack the

nature of others. In this case your thesis becomes *siddha-sādhana* proving what is already proved.

The author replies : The objects like elephant, etc. which are created depending upon things like lump of clay, etc. are devoid of their natures, as accepted even by you, hence my example is proved and *probandum* also proved. If you say again that those magically created things, though they are devoid of the nature of such other real things, are not however devoid of their own nature, you must then explain satisfactorily why they lack the form and character in which they appear. But you have accepted that things like fruits, flower, and others do not lack the form and character in which they appear. So you must admit that those magically created things, elephant, etc. are also possessed of the nature of such real things, since they appear in such forms. But in fact they are not real. So it follows that all magically created things are devoid of their own nature. Thus my example is proved correct and my *probandum* is also accomplished.

(2) Some others having a different view of *Sāhya*, argue that the magically created persons are not real persons and are hence void ; yet they are not devoid of their own nature since they exist in the form of a person of illusory appearance. So your example is again unproved. The author retorts whether those illusory persons are dependent products or otherwise ; if they are dependent products, why do you call them illusory ? Is it for the reason that they do not exist as they appear to us ? Do you not see that the eye etc. are dependent products not existing as they appear to us ? Therefore they are proved as devoid of their nature.

Again they argue that it is alright with illusory persons, but the case with eye, etc. is different. Because there is no

manifest in one and the same place. Nor can it be possible by way of unmanifesting ( hiding ) process, because when one process of pot is hidden, other process of basin will also be hidden. So your thesis that everything is in the nature of everything is absurd.

(3) You also must admit that the place where the manifestation of illusory person is at work, is devoid of the manifestation of real person. Therefore my example is proved and my proposition is also established. Your theory of omnipresence of sense organs is not admissible, because each of them is always assigned to and associated with a fixed place.

VIII. The Yogācāras argue the following : (1) If your proposition is meant to express that all composite elements are void in as much as they originate through causes and conditions, not by selves, and hence are devoid of the nature of origination, we do not dispute it and it falls in line with our opinion. (2) So says our Master—"that aspect of which a thing is devoid is unreal ; this aspect which serves as a receptacle of the false imputation is real". Intention of the saying is this : the imputed aspect of the dependent aspect is non-existent. There is nothing speakable corresponding to our speeches and there is no speech corresponding to the speakable. Therefore the imputed aspect that abides in the dependent aspect is originally unreal. What is void ( of the imputed aspect ) and is of dependent origination is existent in its nature. All the worldly conventional talks as to the matter, feeling, ideation and others are based upon and emanated from this *paratantra* aspect. If this aspect also is said to be non-existent, all the said conventional talks would be baseless and senseless. You will then deserve to be excommunicated from the fold of co-religionists.



other real eye, in contrast with which you may say this eye is illusory Bhavya says—Yes, it is so, yet we experience in the world that the absence of one's own nature and dependent origination—always behave as *probandum* and *probans*. This fact has been illustrated by the said example simply as a sort of pointer to the general principle. If you again analyse the particulars of example and argue on that basis, you will fall into the pit of a logical fallacy called *vikalpasa majati*, which shows clearly your light mindedness. This fallacy is further illustrated by some disputes between Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṃsakas regarding eternity of the sound.

VII The Sankhyas object to the validity of the reason and example. They hold (1) that things are evolved and transformed from Mahat, etc. and so the reason the dependent of origination is unproved, (2) that everything may be possessed thenature (*triguṇa*) of everything, and (3) that the sense organs may be present everywhere, even in the illusory person its nature is present and so your example also is unproved. Bhavya replies (1) You must admit that a cognition of visual object is produced by causes, but not manifested. Things like pot, etc. are produced by different causes, lump of clay, wheel etc. Manifesting factors are not material causes, e.g. a lamp, etc. are not the material causes for the ornaments like bangle, etc. just as the cognition is produced by different causes not manifested so also are the eye, etc. Hence there is no question of reason being unproved.

(2) Your second proposition that everything is in the nature of everything is untenable. It cannot be possible by way of manifesting process for the following reason. Since there is present a manifesting process of pot in a place where a basin exists. Again one and the same pot may extend to so many leagues of space. A pot and a basin would

manifest in one and the same place. Nor can it be possible by way of unmanifesting ( hiding ) process, because when one process of pot is hidden, other process of basin will also be hidden. So your thesis that everything is in the nature of everything is absurd.

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Now the author retorts on the above remarks : (1) If you hold that composite elements like the eye, etc. are void because there does not exist in the *paratantra* any nature like the eye, etc. which is not originated by causes and remains always unextinguished, then you are proving what is already proved. You are no better theorists than the Sāṅkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas who also maintain similar theories (viz. absence of the nature that we actually perceive). You said that the eye etc. are non-products and devoid of their natures, because they are void by themselves. So you must state that they are void by absence of the nature of non-origination (*anutpattinibhāvāt*), not by absence of the nature of origination as you stated. If composite things while in the process of origination, have really the nature of origination, how can you say that they are devoid of the nature of origination? If they do not have it really, their nature does not at all exist; so you need not proclaim that there is nothing but mind. If you however adhere to it, you will have a defect of proposition. If the *paratantra* aspect is devoid by itself of the nature of origination and is non-existent, it is said to be void; then you will be proving what is already proved. Similarly what is originated through causes and conditions is in reality not void for you and it will be deprived of the term *Sūnya*. As regards my contention, you cannot frame any such charge. Therefore your remark that my proposition falls in line with your (*Yogācāra*) opinion is only a delusion.

(2) As to the passage above quoted, *jena sūnyam*, etc. I may say that if you accept as real entity things like the eye, etc. which are originated by virtue of causes and conditions and which all people know as such, even ordinary men will be in possession of knowledge of the enlightened men

(Buddha) Worldly things appear to us as if they are created, from the viewpoint of knowledge of the enlightened persons who have realised the Absolute Truth. Therefore it is declared that, that which is devoid of this dependent aspect is unreal in order to guard against falling into extremity of eternalism. Similarly this dependent aspect is said to be real in order to guard against falling into another extremity of Nihilism. Things like the eye, etc. which are originated by virtue of causes and conditions, and which are included into the category of the empirical truth, are real and not totally unreal like the flower in the sky. We, however, prove them to be void only from the standpoint of the Absolute Truth. It is therefore said that this aspect which serves as basis of false imputation is real. In this manner non substantiality of things has been proclaimed in conformity with Truth by the Leader of men and gods. Being granted that the dependent aspect is real in this sense, your words become a good doctrine and I also accept this kind of reality. As two kinds of accumulations of virtue and wisdom are brought under the principle of *lokānūvartana*, following the world, and as the basic principle upon which all false things are imagined is established to be real by way of worldly convention (*samvṛty-upasāra*), all things that are talked of in the world (*prajñāptidharma*) are empirically real. That I do not dispute. Therefore there is no room for the charge you made against me that I deserve to be excommunicated from the fold of co religionists.

If you say that the magically created things are of indescribable nature, they cannot prove your thesis, I do not see any reason why they should be of indescribable nature. If you adhere to it again, no intelligent person can

disprove the soul and others that are styled to be of indescribable nature by Tīrthikas

If you accept all dependently originated things as real, objects like magically created persons will be all real. Nor is it possible to say that one thing is in the possession of the nature of some thing else, e.g. a cow does not possess the characteristics of an ass.

Nor do we dispute with you with regard to your remark that there is nothing speakable corresponding to our speeches, etc., so your negation on this account incurs a *siddhasādhana* *adosa*. If you insist that the negation is necessary because many defilements become operative by virtue of one's attachment towards the aspects imagined on account of speeches and the speakable, you are thoroughly mistaken. No animal kingdom is in the possession of speeches. The main factor for defilement is only the absence of correctly grasping things in their right aspects. There are many arguments and principles that may be quite pleasing and satisfactory and there are many varied, holy and subtle teachings. Amongst them the teaching relating to the imputed aspect is only partly profitable, not universally. Therefore there is no need of further arguing the imputed aspect as void.

IX. Some other Ācāryas offer the following criticism. If the eye is for you real substantially, then follows a loss of your proposition and the reasoning becomes inconclusive. If it is unreal, it would be devoid of its nature and your negation becomes baseless. The author observes in replying. It is not so. According to Buddha's saying there is nothing that is true and there is nothing that is false. I have nothing in reality to establish whether true or untrue. As there is nothing to be denied in your opinion by the said reasoning there is no necessity for negation. But my

negation points out after investigation *pros* and *cons* that the thing to be negated is originally devoid of its own nature, but does not destroy its nature into pieces. It is not proper to argue that because there do not exist things to be illuminated, the illuminating factor also does not exist. Nor is it possible to state that things that are illuminated are created by illuminating factor. Therefore even in the absence of things that are to be negated, my own negation may exist. According to my conception *probandum*, *probans*, deniable, denial, criticism and all other means of logic may exist empirically. I accept the inference as a proving factor because you have accepted its validity. I for one admit that every thing is possible empirically. Thus my proposition has been proved quite logical and reasonable as there is no room for any criticism against my syllogism stated above.

Then the author in conclusion points out that the *pratityasamutpannatva* is not the only reason to prove our proposition. There are also other reasons, such as perishability, etc. and they are to be employed as the case may require. After meeting an objection raised by somebody that the eye is substantially real on account of its having definite function and profit, by saying that such reasoning could not be provided with parallel example, the author instructs a yogin as follows :

X. Yogin should meditate that all the other eleven bases, ear, etc. are devoid of their own nature just like the eye-basis and penetrate and enter into the non-substantially of all their natures. Then he should repeat the same process of meditation over all other dhatmas, skandha, dhātu, doctrine of dependent origination, *smṛtyupasthāna*, *samyak-pradhāna*, *radhipāda* upto *sarvajñajñāna*, and enter into the non-

substantiality of their natures By virtue of meditation in this manner, the meditator, though entered into non substantiality of all natures, is still deficient in Bhavana, force of meditation So he should repeatedly practice it and acquire the power of meditation Having acquired it in a short time he dispells all impurities, doubts, and ill conceived ideas about the composite elements

A yogin, at the moment of entering into *Adhimukti*, the sixth of ten stages of a Bodhisattva, feels immense joy As he is far away from any attachment towards the characteristic marks of all the separate composite elements of existence and as he is far from conceiving any idea, during the performance of charity, (1) of the object, donor and receiver, and also (2) of the donor, receiver and the result of charity, he becomes purified in respect of two fold three spheres and acquires immeasurable accumulations of virtues and wisdom Furthermore not being resolved towards any fruit of this world or of that world, worshipping his desired, virtuous and honoured gods, not having any wrong ideas regarding agency of gunas, Ātman, Maheśvara or atoms, he performs charities on a grand scale It has been pointed out here by giving citations that only the person that is absolutely free from any wrong idea of entities (*bhavadharma*) is capable of walking along the path of Bodhisattvas

Now he should meditate that what is devoid of its own nature is unborn what is unborn is not bound by three limitations of past, present and future, having meditated in a manner that is pure for all three times, and being pure in respect of two fold three spheres, he walks into the Maha Bodhi which is not bound by any limitations of past, present and future

## CHAPTER II

I. The author in this chapter seeks to establish non-substantiality of uncomposite things, ether, etc. and therefore takes up the discussion of the second proposition set forth in the second half of the first verse, viz. -

Thesis . Uncomposite (*asamskṛta*) things are unreal  
(from the viewpoint of Absolute Truth).

Reason : Because they are non-products,

Example . Just like flower in the sky

After explaining the import of each term in this proposition, the author points out that the above-mentioned argument is not only one ; there are also many others, *akṛtakatva*, *akāśratva*, etc ; but the *anupāda* 'non production' is mentioned as argument by way of particularisation (*upalakṣana*)—just as one says 'Guard these curds from crows' with the intention that it should be guarded also from others, cats, rats, etc , because the curds are to be protected in all events.

II. Now Bhāvaviveka commences to meet one by one the objections raised by his opponents, the Vaibhāsikas, Sautrāntikas, Yogācāras, Sāṅkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas and others

1. The following is the objection made by the Vaibhāsikas : The uncomposite thing is non-substantial, i.e. a non-entity ; such being your proposition, the ether-base-attainment (*ākāśāyatanaśamāpatti*) becomes objectless , in the absence of its object, the ether, how is it possible to say that it exists ? And it has been defined as *anāvṛtti*, absence of any obstructing element.

The author replies . If you formulate this syllogism : the ether-base-attainment is endowed with a real object, or with a substantial entity, because of this attainment, or



because this attainment has something as its object, just like other attainments or their objects. This syllogism is defective in respect of the homogeneous example, because all other attainments and their objects are declared to be void in as much as they are composite things.

We examined the nature of ether from the standpoint of Absolute Truth. My proposition can be established empirically also. Therefore the positive character of the ether held by the opponent cannot be maintained, since the argument : 'because the attainment has something as the object' has invariably been met with its opposite argument just mentioned.

2. The followers of our sect and of others' sect say this : It follows from your syllogism that whichever is originated is substance. If you contend that a thing originated is also non-substance, then your argument loses its value, as it does not pervade all the homogeneous subjects. This is only an apparent objection, says the author. It may be taken for certain that all non-originated things are non-substances, and not that all the non-substances are non-originated. The reason, *prajānānantarijākatva*, is accepted as a valid argument, though it is not present in all homogeneous subjects.

3. Some realistic thinker argues : The ether and flower are both well-known in the world ; hence they are not non-substances though they are not experienced as being associated together. So the proposition cannot be proved with the aid of the example, sky-flower. The author replies that the word, *kbāpūpa*, should be taken as, a genitive compound, meaning 'a flower pertaining to the ether'. The flower as such being non-existent, the example is not lacking.

The Yogin, by these reasonings, should enter into the

non-substantiality of the ether. The same method of reasoning is to be applied to the non-substantiality of other three uncomposite things, *Pratisankhyānirodha*, etc.

4. The Vaibhāṣikas say : Buddha has declared that there is ■ destruction by means of knowledge which serves as antedote to the removal of the idea of composite things. If you deny that, you will fall in the contradiction to your own doctrine. The author says : This is not right. The Master has declared so empirically in order to instil in the mind of disciples a feeling of disgust for the composite things and also to kindle a feeling of joy for the uncomposite things. The Master stated the unconditioned Nirvāṇa as existent just in the same manner as he stated that appurthional beings exist. The denial of *Pratisankhyānirodha* is made from the absolute standpoint. The Master has also declared to this effect : I declare as ignorant those who consider the Nirvāṇa as something of a real entity. Thus my denial does not incur any contradiction.

5. The wicked logicians put the objection : Because an uncomposite thing is non-entity, your proposition lacks the subject ; because the sky-flower is also a non-entity, there is no parallel example. Thus your *probandum*, *prohans* and instance become defective. This objection is not admissible ; for, the uncomposite things, ether, etc. are empirically accepted as existent by virtue of their talks current in the world.

6. The Vaibhāṣikas again say that *Pratisankhyānirodha* is a real entity, as it serves as object for the path and an antedote to defiling things. No non-entity would do this act. This is also not admissible. If you hold that having a function and being ■ real entity are concomittant, that concomittance is vitiated in the case

of an apparitional being which possess some specific function even though it is a non-entity.

7. The Sautrāntikas remark that this syllogism is defective and proving what is already proved. If we say that it is characterised by the absence of some obstructing elements, the said defect will be removed because this character is disputed as such. However, my proposition disproves not only the current notion of its substantiality, but its non-substantiality also.

8. The Tāmraśāṭīyas say that the ether is constituted of some matter in the intermediate space, and it is a composite thing. So your denial of uncomposite thing evolves the defect called *Siddhasādhana*. This theory is incorrect and has already been refuted in the previous chapter.

9. The Vātsīputriyas agree in many points with the Vaibhāsikas and need not be taken for refutation.

10. The Yogācāras remark that there does not exist another truth upon one truth. Suchness is only the ultimate truth of all things (*dharma*), hence it is proper to say that suchness is truly void, but it is improper to say that it is non-substantial. How can the supramundane and indiscriminative knowledge be reasonably stated to be endowed with an object which is non-substantial? It is not indeed reasonable, says the author. Just as you hold that the supramundane knowledge cannot be stated to be endowed with a non-composite object, so also it cannot be of a composite object. Nor is it logical to conceive suchness as substance. It is hard to prove the substantiality of suchness. If you adhere to it, knowledge with it as object cannot be supramundane, because it becomes conditioned in as much as it is endowed with some object just like any other ordinary knowledge. The author cites passages to this effect from some sūtras.

He further points out that suchness is not an ultimate truth in so far as it becomes an object of some knowledge. If you explain it as *Sūnya*, because it is devoid of something else, its knowledge will be only an ordinary one. So suchness is an end to and suppression of all discriminations, and it is not substantially existing. If you say that suchness is substantially existing, even though it is beyond our common parlance, then you are advocating only the soul theory of Tirthikas in the modified name of suchness.

II. Some co-religionists and followers of the Small Vehicle remark that all the elements that are brought under twelve bases, both composite and non-composite are indeed substances ; because a man realising the four noble truths with sixteen aspects and training himself in the two paths of *darśana* and *bhāvanā*, removes all the defiling elements of three spheres of existence that are removable by means of the path of insight and the path of meditation, and thus becomes free from all kinds of ills. If one does not elucidate that all the elements of existence are only non-substantial, who would give up this delusion and gain this benefit. If you do not accept non-substantiality of all the separate elements of existence, there will be no scope for removing the veil of knowable things, and then our master would have been only partly released.

III. Thus a yogin should penetrate and enter into the non-substantiality of other uncomposite things postulated by Tirthikas, such as Prakṛti, Puruṣa, atoms, Supreme Lord, time, quarters, some living beings and others,

1. Now the advocates of Prakṛti and Puruṣa put this objection. According to our conception, three elements are transformed into sky-flower, so it is not a non-entity. In that case you are denied a homogeneous example because

the sky-flower, a real entity goes in contrast with your *probandum*. The author meets the objection by putting these counter-questions : Do you accept the sky-flower as existent or non-existent ? If you accept the first alternative, your thesis contradicts the common sense. If you accept the latter, your contention that there is no homogeneous example for my thesis is wrong. Nor is it proper to say that because the three elements are real entities, their product, sky-flower is also a real entity. This will show your low-wittedness !

2. The Sāṅkhyas advocate the following : We do not try to prove that Prakṛti or Puruṣa is experienced by senses; yet we can prove it by means of inference thus : The evolutes are caused by some substance, e. g. some pieces of sandal wood. Similarly they are intended for some enjoyer, because they are enjoyable things. All the enjoyable things are intended for some enjoyer, e. g. prepared food and drink. Thus your proposition goes in contradiction to our common experience.

Now the author replies : If you try to establish your proposition in a general manner, and do not particularise that substance, then it evolves a fallacy of *Siddhasādhana*. If you particularise it and say that it is pleasure-element, etc. there will be no homogeneous example for your proposition. And your argument is also constituted of different matters. So your acceptance of Puruṣa as argument falls to the ground.

3. The Vaiśeṣikas argue that the signs, breathing etc. are always concomittant with the possessor of signs, because they are signs, just like the sight of smoke. The author meets this in the same manner as in the previous case. He says : If it is meant to prove the possessor in a general way, it incurs *Siddhasādhana*, and if the possessor is qualified as eternal, pervader, etc., there is the absence of homogeneous example.

By the same method of reasoning time, quarter, ether and others are to be disproved

4 Again the Vaiśeṣikas plead that atoms and mind are uncomposite things. Your argument—the lack of origination, cannot be proved by itself. If you say that these two things are included in the category of composite things, then the reason to prove non substantiality of things, because of their origination through causes and conditions, becomes unproved for us, your opponent, and hence the sphere for applying non substantiality will be limited. The author retorts to these remarks that such defects may be removed, if we accept the mind and atoms as uncomposite things even in the sphere of empirical experience. You may prove the mind but not as an uncomposite thing, because it serves as a factor for effecting knowledge just like the material things. There are also other reasons to prove its composite nature. Similarly atoms are not uncomposite elements, because they serve as productive factors just like any other material cause, e. g. threads.

5 Just as the categories postulated by the Sankhyas and Vaiśeṣikas are refuted, so also those of the Naked-bodied Tīrthikas, etc. are to be understood as non substantial by appropriate reasonings.

IV Thus Yogin should refute all the objections, and by the aid of rightful inference should penetrate and enter into non substantiality of the uncomposite elements postulated by one's own school of thought as well as by others.

Though he has in this manner entered into the principle of non substantiality by virtue of knowledge acquired through learning, he is unable to cut at root the veil of the removables (i. e. *jñeyavarana*), so he should try to develop the strength of meditation of higher type.

1 Then the author explains the method of acquiring the wisdom constituted of meditation

When, again the image of the composite and uncomposite things appears as one aspect before the mind's eye of the yogin, he should suppress it by looking upon it as void of its nature, and thus he enters into its original non substantiality on the plea that all elements of existence are aloof from any nature, and then he gradually enters into the principle of non-duality by dwelling upon things as bereft of any aspect. By process of meditation on this model he is able to suppress the image of either composite or uncomposite things in such a way as it will never arise again.

Though the yogin does not dwell on it, he is not yet absolutely free from flow of consciousness which is stained with a tendency of running towards an object in as much as the discriminative thought of non substantiality, etc are still operating. As he is yet not in the possession of unshakable knowledge, he is removed from supramundane undiscriminative knowledge by persistence of discriminative thought. In order to remove this handicap he should reason thus: when things are void of their own nature, the thought of discriminative of non substantiality is also not a real entity, as it has been conditioned by causes like the magically created things. Meditating in this manner, he suppresses the thought which discriminates non substantiality etc. By suppressing it he avoids the two extreme points of 'void' and 'non void', and no more looks at things in the aspect of voidness etc. Then a long passage is cited from the *Sata sabastrika pratinaparamisa* in support of this statement.

The yogin, when he avoids the two extreme points, moves in the path of moderation. This path is termed 'form

less' as it is free from the grasp of composite and non-composite things ; 'matchless' as there is nothing that may be compared with it , 'supportless' because there is neither supporter nor supported , 'imageless', because there persists no image whatever of either composite things or uncomposite things, etc , and it is named also 'consciousless' since no consciousness of any kind is at work there . Then follow two citations which reveal the true character of this middle path

Yogin who is trained in avoiding the twin extremes and is walking in the concept of non duality, entertains the thought of non-duality concept . Being aware of this also as an obstacle to acquire supramundane indiscriminative knowledge, he suppresses that concept also . Therefore he enters into the realisation of never functioning and running-towards an object, and stays in the flow of knowledge which is now in its own nature

2 . Though he practises meditation on unperverted non substantiality he should not do it with the sole aim of perceiving it with his mind's eye , now his meditation is called 'absolute object meditation' . Then a long passage is cited to substantiate the above idea

3 . The Yogācāras determine that the supramundane indiscriminative knowledge is also free from the grasper and the grasped . Yogin keeping up the idea of reality ( *dharm* ) in it, should take to meditation

Others critically analysing it declare that such type of knowledge cannot be called extra supramundane knowledge in as much as it is still coloured with the thought of some discrimination . A passage is here cited to elicit the true nature of Absolute Truth which forms the wisdom eye, and by this wisdom eye he acquires neither composite nor



uncomposite things. On account of reasoning and scripture yogin should put a stop even to such determination.

The wise men again declare that extra-supramundane knowledge is not in reality an entity, as it is caused by causes like some magically created things. So he should suppress that knowledge too. So also he should suppress that knowledge which destroys the said determination as it is similarly yet defective of its being caught into the idea of an entity.

4. When all such notions are stopped, there arises no further intellection (*pratipatti*) as to the imageless objectivity because of the absence of causes and conditions. No other notion whatever can possibly arise in the absence of intellection. That is called knowledge in accordance with Truth. Some scriptural passages are cited to make the said premises further clear. Then yogin, abiding neither in heart or mind, nor in consciousness or knowledge, is spoken of as a good farer in undiscriminating wisdom. When he fares not being caught in any sphere (of mental activity), he obtains from Tathāgata, well-awakened, the instruction regarding the Truth. A citation from some Sūtra goes to strengthen the statement. Thus wisdom-faring is termed a status of Āryan silence. To make further clear that silence a quotation has been drawn from a Sūtra.

5. (a) When examined through these reasonings and scriptures, all the composite and uncomposite things do not constitute either the mind or wisdom, and again either discriminative thought or undiscriminative thought in its objective nature. For him who knows things in this manner, rays of wisdom-sun dispel all the darkness of ignorance.

(b) The wise, by not grasping the object images of the mind and wisdom, fares in a wisdom undiscriminating, and lacks any sphere of faring, but fares

6 Having explained the above verse in detail, the author describes the nature of the wisdom result : yogin, because of his faring in an undiscriminating wisdom, though not faring fares, and though faring, does not fare. He is aloof from thoughts of all objects whatever and abides in an absolute negation of all things just like the ether. He, just like one entered into the *samādhi* (or *samapatti*) of complete suppression, views all things in their original nature

Dharma body of Buddhas is unthinkable, unlimited, non dual, abodeless, imageless, unperceivable, etc. Thus yogin viewing it, though he sees, does not see in fact ; and though he does not see anything, he sees, and though he is seeing does not see

7 Yogin having taken to a rightful view of things accumulates immense store of merits, and increases the unlimited resultant happiness. He is intent solely on self-purification and puts an end to all unhappiness of all beings, and like the *Bhṛāṅgyaraja* he abounds in multifarious rightful aspirations

Then the author furnishes in the light of above discussion an interpretation of the Aryan eightfold path. It is the rightful view which is correct insight into the norm body of Tathagatas, having no image of *ens* and *non-ens*. To suppress all discursive thoughts is rightful thought. Rightful speech is to realise inwardly saying that all things are beyond speeches. Rightful act is not to commence any act bodily, vocally and mentally. To live on that all things are bereft of origination and destruction which are also devoid of

their nature is rightful living. Not to commit oneself to any effort and device on the plea that all things are not brought up by efforts is rightful effort. The rightful memory is an absence of any brooding or reflection of *ens* or *non-ens*, and that all things lack any objectivity for any intellectual perception. The rightful meditation is not to make any resolve this or that way by not grasping all things in all aspects. The man who views in this manner is said to practise the eightfold Aryan Path.

The man who views things thus fulfils also six perfections. Perfection in charity consists in doing away with all objects (*nimitta*) in all aspects, and in removing all defiling elements. Perfection in observing is to suppress all the supporting things of knowledge, and an attention to the attitude of nonperceiving. Non-forbearing any feeling of the knowledge-supporting things is perfection in forbearance. Perfection in energy consists in expelling all movements by not taking or giving up anything. Perfection in meditation is constituted of an absolute negation of abiding anywhere by virtue of lack of attention whatever towards anything. Perfection in wisdom lies in aloofness from the twin images (of *ens* and *non-ens*) and not giving rise to any description of anything. Further detailed exposition of these six perfections is to be found in the Discourse of *Brahmapariprecchā*.

The author then concludes : Well abiding<sup>1</sup> in the manner just described becomes the source of 'unbound things' (*apramāṇa*) as has been stated by Buddha in the Discourse of Unbound Things : These are a great goal, great benefit and immense advantages. So the wise man knowing things in accordance with Truth and being attentive, should take to the course of training.\*

\* The arrangement into different sections and subsections in this chapter is based on the commentary which will be studied later on in full.

## महायानकरतलरत्नम्

[ ससृष्टपरीक्षा ]

सर्वसत्त्वानामर्थाय समारब्धानुत्तरमहाबोधिप्रणिधानः सन्तत-  
कृतप्रतिधासद्वितर्काचारसक्षुब्धदुद्धेजरप्रवण्डमाकृतसक्षुभितचित्तसन्तानान्  
मिथ्यादृष्टिजालजालतान् ससारपञ्चपञ्जरितानप्रमाणदुखश्रीर्मनस्यसि  
दिग्धशल्यव्यपितान् लोकान् समग्रलाभ्य भयनरितानि<sup>१</sup> सर्वाणि  
प्रहाविनिर्मुक्तानि इत्यत त्रिशुद्धाकाशगत् शान्तसर्वप्रपञ्चं शिव शान्तं सुखं  
परमाथेत्यनयमाश्रये<sup>२</sup> । कथं प्रणिधानं परास्त्वचित्तं तद्वत्समुद्भू-  
द्रष्टुं न क्षमे । स्वपरसन्तानफलेशदृढगन्धमुमुक्षया अनित्यसिपरिभूते अति  
क्रान्तरस्रघनचक्राले<sup>३</sup> अथाशयसुखे विहरन् अपारससारमहाणये वस्तुं  
प्रणिहितं तत्रा [ F 16 ] प्रमाणदुखस्कन्धविपत्तिपक्षयैश्चोपनिर्मोत यज्ञ-  
सदृशममङ्गुरं धोयमारमे ।

सम्बोध्यप्रतिवेधाय ईदृशो परीक्षा । लोकोत्तराविकल्पज्ञानसाक्षत्कारैः  
एव हि अतधिगतपूर्वान् सर्वसत्त्वानामिन्द्रियाधिमुक्तिधातुचर्याभेदान्  
प्रजानाति । स्वपरसन्तानोत्पन्नसर्वसयासननिर्वासनानि दुखसमुद्भू-  
मूलान् फलेशजालानि निमित्तानि । पराथञ्च महापुरुषव्रतचर्याद्वदसमा-  
दानप्रणिधानञ्चोत्पादयति । एवं लोकोत्तराविकल्पज्ञानसाक्षात्काराय सर्व-

1 - *Chu yu so hing* Poussin takes the phrase to mean *dhāra-*  
*caritas* and compares *Kośa* 1 47 See also *Mad vṛtti* ॥ 523, 8-10

2 *Is naya* "principle", law' etc - *Tathāgatagarbhaśāstra*, cf. *Bod.*  
*Pañjikā* ॥ 316 15 This is *phalabhūta prajñā* *Ibid*

3 *Yu* 'to pass over', 'get over' 'exceed' etc

4 *Lat* - *śāntam ākṣat karoti tada* etc

मिथ्यादृष्टि कामलध्वंस्यविपरीतशून्यतादर्शनाञ्जनोपघमप्रत्ययं<sup>5</sup> सञ्चित्य प्रयुज्यात् । एवमविपरीतशून्यतादर्शनाञ्जनोपघमप्रयोगाय सर्वालम्बन-स्वभावापसारिणीं धृतमयीं प्रज्ञामाश्रयेत् ।

ततः<sup>7</sup> केचित् त्रिपुलकनार्थेनिर्धारिव्याख्याद्वारसमाधयेण धर्मता प्रविश्य पुनः पुन विशिष्टं प्रयोगभावनामारभन्ते । विपुलकनार्थेनिर्धारि-व्याख्यायां प्रत्युपग्रमहाधमकोसीयचित्ता भवन्ति । केचित् पुनः अप्रविष्ट-धर्मता अपि तीक्ष्णेन्द्रियाः । तेषां [ f 2<sup>a</sup> ] सुत्वेन शून्यतासाक्षात्कारेणाशु-धर्मताप्रवेशाय इदं करतलरत्नशास्त्रं<sup>8</sup> संक्षिप्तं विरच्यते ॥

तत्स्यतः संस्कृताः शून्या मायायत् प्रत्ययोद्भवात् ।

असंस्कृतास्तत्सद्भूता अनुत्पादाः खपुष्पयत ॥

स्वपरपक्षयोस्तर्कविशेषयो र्यद्यपि यद्वय परिकल्पिता यादा भवन्ति । तथापि प्रमेया विषयाः सक्षिप्य द्विविधाः संस्कृता असंस्कृता इति । मूढाः परमाद्यसत्त्वनयेन संस्कृतासंस्कृतानामविपरीतस्वभावं सम्यग-प्रज्ञानन्तो धर्माणा स्वभावविशेषान् मृषा गृह्यत्वा विविधमिथ्यादृष्टि-जालानि संघर्षयन्ति । यथा लोके पामरश्चित्रकारः<sup>10</sup> भवानकं पक्षपिशाच-विष्यं स्त्रीपुलकविष्यं वा रचयित्वा व्याकीर्णनेत्रः [ सन् ] वस्तुतः अस्तोति संक्षुभितमनस्को भवति । वस्तुत्वेन ग्रहणात् स्ययं चरितो भवति । संसृज्य या तेषु विषयेषु बहूनि गणनातीतानि त्रिपुलानि विरच्य-

5 Or *lāca* = Eye disease

|| The first of three aspects of prayer effected by *āptoparīkṣā*, see *Śthiramati Trīmāikābhāṣya*, p 26 and *Haribhadra Abh Śloka*, p 392 3

7 Lat *anena-asmit*

8. *ya ja* "Having entered"

9 Or *viśeṣaprayogabhāvanā* as Pousin suggested

10 Lat *estrācūrya* Abh Śloka || 392. *māyālāra* ita *Vigrahavyā-* *vartici* 23 27 with *vyti* : the same simile, *māyālāra* Pousin com- *pares* *Mahāyāna-sūtra*, ( *Eastern Bud* 1926, 56, 1927, 163 ).

दृष्टिजालानि उत्पादयति । यदा परमार्थसत्यनयेन संस्कृतासंस्कृतानाम-  
विपरोतस्वभावं सम्पक् जानन्ति । [ f. 2 b ] तदा लोके पण्डितचित्रकार-  
पत् तान् वस्तुस्यमात्रतोऽस्तोति न गृह्णन्ति । नापि यथोक्तः संस्कृता-  
संकृतविषयः विभिन्नमिथ्यादृष्टिजालैः स्वशब्दनेन कौशेशकिमिवत्<sup>11</sup> दध्यन्ते ।  
तदभावात् निरिक्त्वप्रज्ञाप्रवेशः<sup>12</sup> सिध्यति ।

इममर्थं त्रिषादित्त्वं संस्कृतं प्रकाशयितुं लौकिकैः विषयेऽस्मिन्  
विकल्पस्य बहुश उत्पादितत्वाद् इवं वचनमाह ।

तत्ततः संस्कृताः शून्या मायावत् प्रत्ययोद्भवात् । इति ।

तत्र लौकिकाः सर्वे भागमभ्युपगच्छन्ति । अहमपि संवृतिसदभ्युप-  
गच्छामि । सावृतप्रत्यक्षेण प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादस्य चाभ्युपगमात् संवृति-  
सत्यान्तर्गतं चक्षुरादि संसृतं गगजपालादयः सर्वे साधारणं जानन्ति  
चक्षुरादि संसृतं द्रव्यसदिति । अत एव स्वपक्षमभ्युपगमः प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण-  
साधारणज्ञानं मा विरोधीदु इति तत्त्वावच्छिन्ना<sup>13</sup> प्रतिज्ञा । तात्त्विकाथे-  
स्वभावस्तत्त्वमुच्यते । तदेव परमार्थसत्यम् । परमाद्यतः संसृताः शून्या  
न संवृतिर इति प्रतिज्ञा ॥

प्रत्ययसामग्रीसिद्धा मायाः कृतकत्वात्<sup>14</sup> संसृता इत्याख्यायन्ते [तानि]  
एव द्वादशायतनानि त्रिहाय [ f. 3 a ] धर्मायतनैकदेशमानम् । आकाशः  
प्रतिसंख्याऽप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधौ तथता चात्र पुनर्वर्हिष्टताः । परसंमतो  
मिथ्याप्रतिभासो मायादिसंस्कृतः, स शून्य इति चेत् प्रतिज्ञा, सिद्धसाधन-

11. Cf. Lakṣṇavāṇa, 163 ( L V P )

12. Lat *abhiprasaṅgacaryā*

13. So also by Haribhadra, Abh. Śloka, p. 386

14. Or *abhisamskṛtatrāṭi*.

दोषः<sup>15</sup> । यः<sup>16</sup> परपरिकल्पितः संस्कृतः परमार्थतः<sup>17</sup> सत्त्वमावः [स] पक्षः<sup>18</sup> लाप्यते । सद्यथा चक्षुषायननमेकः संस्कृतः परमार्थतो यस्तु वा शून्यं वेति विचार्यते ।

शून्यः नि.खमावःमिथ्याप्रतिभास<sup>19</sup> इति पर्यायाः । इयं प्रतिज्ञा ।

प्रतीत्यसमुत्पत्त्याः स्त्रीपुरुषाजमृगा मायावस्त्वादयोऽप्रकृतितत्त्विकस्वभावा भावाभासाः ।

[ प्रसिद्ध ] साध्यसाधनधर्माणः<sup>20</sup> सर्वे संस्कृता साधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताः । अतो मायावदिति<sup>21</sup> इत्युच्यते [ दृष्टान्तः ] । यथासंभवं<sup>22</sup> साध्यसाधनधर्मसाम्यं<sup>23</sup>

15 Lit *doṣāt*

16 Lit *yadā*

17 Or, *dravyaśāśna*.

18 Vig vyāvartina, 29, *vyāthi yathā trayoktam bhāṣāh, tathā mama syāt* : na mama kācid asti pratiyāh । So also Dharmapāla comment on Śataśāstravaipulya, VIII, 6 : *bharatā abhyupagatatvāt siddhyati mama pakṣaḥ*.

19 Or, *istatha*- or *abhinātapratibhāsa* ; Dharmapāla also takes *śūnya*, *nirastabhāsa* and *natrāstmya* as synonyms by using expression *natrāstmyaśūnya* frequently. Ibid, VIII

20 Here the author seems to hint at the definition of *dṛṣṭānta*, viz. *prasaḍihasādhyaśādhanaadharmavato* which agrees with one given by a later Naiyāyika Dīnakaṛa : *anvaya-dṛṣṭāntaḥ sādhyasāadhanabhaya-tattvānūcaya v Nīlakaṇṭha* Cf Abh Āloka p 395 : *dṛṣṭāntaḥ ubhaya-dharmānugatāh* Bhāmaha, Kāvyaślokaṭkāra, V, 26 : *Sādhyasādhana-dharmābhyām siddho dṛṣṭānta ucyate* । N. Vārtika, 139 ( Cal. ed. ) : *Siddho dṛṣṭānta ityanyo* ।

21 Dharmapāla also uses *māyā* as example in this connection, ( Śata vaipu comm ed2 ) A more logical explanation of *māyopama* is given by Haribhadra Abh Āloka, p 143

22 Lit *yathāyogam*

23 -*dṛṣṭānta* See Upāyaśrdaya Tucci, II 5 *dṛṣṭānto dvividhaḥ । sampūrṇo dṛṣṭānto' amśakār* The author seems to mean the latter variety here, cp Bhāmaha, V, 24 . . . . *sāmānyād upacaryate* । N. Vārtika, p 122 ( Cal. ed. ) . . . *tat tulyaḥ sa eva ityucyate* ।

प्रज्ञाप्यते । प्रज्ञातिसाम्यात्<sup>24</sup> न सर्वे सदृशदृष्टान्तधर्मा दुःसंभवाः<sup>25</sup> संभवेयुः ।  
तद्यथा यदन्ति चन्द्रवत् स्वोमुखं चारु इति । न सर्वे दुःसंभवाश्चन्द्रधर्मा  
मुखे संभवेयुः । श्लोकव्यवसमुत्पत्त्य<sup>26</sup> पतत्सदृशदृष्टान्तकथनस्य पथक्रमः ।  
धनेन श्लोकाद्यैः संक्षिप्य<sup>27</sup> [ कथन ] मूलकमित्यतो न दोषः ॥

24. *Kia shho tong ku*—Poussin remarks : Je ne vois pas le sens des quatre mots que je saute \* *kia chow tong kou* \* parce que nous parlons conventionnellement de similitude . ?? Now as I rendered them, there is no difficulty with regard to these characters.

25. \**nan ling na l sambhavayuk. pu ko yu* The same repeated in the next sentence. Cf. Nāṇyabindu II, 9 with Tīkṣ, where *sapakṣa* is explained almost to this effect.

26. Here Poussin remarks thus : Ici une ligne et demi qui présente des difficultés. On peut traduire: *Ślokanubandhartham sādharmyādṛṣṭānta ucyote | etam kramena ślokaḥ dhena mūlathānāsamkṣepaḥ | na doṣaḥ |* "Pour des raisons métriques, l'exemple pareil est dit [ avant l'argument ] C'est dans cet ordre [ anormal ] que, par la demi-strophe, l'essentiel est résumé, il n'y a donc pas faute"—La règle est de dire l'argument d'abord, l'exemple ensuite, mais la métrique exige un autre ordre.

According to the N Sūtra V, 2, 11 ( *avayavaviparyāto vacanam aprāptakūlam* ) to formulate syllogism in an order other than the fixed one entails a *nigrahasthana* called *aprāptakūla*. This is the reason why the author takes pains to justify it. Note Udyotakara's remarks here : *Śāstravakyāḥ arthasaṅgrahārtham upādīyante |* etc which intend to insist on the necessity of the fixed order of syllogism. Our author appears to refer to some such remarks of an earlier author in the sentence : *anena . . . na doṣaḥ |*

27. *Lit. saṅkṣepamūlāspadam.*



[ f. 1 b ] प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नः साध्यधर्मो । इदं स्थापयितुं हेतुरुच्यते प्रत्ययोद्धराद्<sup>28</sup> इति । हेत्वादिप्रत्ययः सम्भूय जायमानत्वात् , प्रतीत्य-समुत्पन्न इति नाम्ना उच्यते । [ यः ] प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नः [ स ] प्रत्ययाभि-व्यक्तः<sup>29</sup> ।

विपक्षे प्रतिषेधाय<sup>30</sup> बंधम्यद्वयान्तः स्थाप्यते । विपक्षामारात् प्रति-

28 Nāgārjuna establishes *śūnyatā* on the argument of *asrabhātava*, Vig vjāvartini 1 21, 22 Haribhadra uses as reason *elāṅśasvabhā-  
carahitaton*, Abh Āloka, p 394 However on p 556 he adopts a  
similar *prayoga* as herein which may be worth notice here :

ये प्रतीत्यमुदाहृते परमार्थतोऽविचारमणीयाः । तद्यथा मायाकारनिमिताः कर्मादयः ।  
तथा चामी सर्वे रूपादयो भावा इति स्वभावहेतुः । यथादर्शनं प्रतीत्योदराददर्शनासासिद्धो  
हेतुः । सपक्षे भावान्न विरुद्धः । पूर्वप्रबन्धेन ( p. 385 ) विपक्षे बाधकप्रमाणोदर्शनात्  
अनैकान्तिकश्च न भवति ।

29. The author has made some distinction between *abhiṣyakti*  
and *utpatti* of *lārya* on f 13b below. But here we find *utpatti*  
and *abhiṣyakti* as synonyms. I doubt concetness of the Chinese text  
here

III Lit *vipakṣapratishedhāya* of *Pramāṇavārtika* vrtti, III, 18 -  
*caśdharmyavacanena vipakṣe hetvabhāvaḥ lathyate* ! Poussin has  
made these remarks : Le sens de l'expression *tcho yi p'in*, *vipakṣapratī-  
śedha* (?) [ Dans Tucci's Index, *Pre Diñāṅga*, *pratishedha* est traduit  
en Tibétain par l'équivalent de *asattin* ] est déterminé par notre texte,  
269 3,3 Même expression 274.2 1B qui n'est pas clair.

According to Dharmottara *pratishedha* is an equivalent of *abhāta*,  
his comment on *Nyāyabindu*, II, 19 But *vipakṣapratishedha* on f. 6a  
(Chin) below must be taken into *vipakṣe hetupratishedha*, not *pratishedha*  
of *vipakṣa* itself

पेधार्थः सिद्ध इति नोच्यते<sup>31</sup> । त्रिपादकाले<sup>32</sup> प्रज्ञप्त्या त्रिपक्षमुक्त्वा अनुमान-  
व्यवस्थापनेऽपि नास्ति दोषः ।

कथमत्रानुमानं व्यवस्थाप्यते । उच्यते । चक्षुरायतनं तत्त्वतः स्वभाव-  
शून्यम् । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नात् । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नाः सर्वेऽपि तत्त्वतः स्वभाव-  
शून्या इति यथाजपालाङ्गनाजनानामपि<sup>33</sup> ज्ञातम् ।

यथा कश्चिद्विष्टिमन्त्रोपधिग्लानिघ्नः<sup>34</sup> तृणवृक्षमृत्पिण्डादि-  
पदार्थैः प्रत्ययहृश्यानि स्त्रीपुरुषद्वैत्यध्वराजकुलारामजनजलाह्न्यादि-  
लक्षणानि मूढजनमोहनानि नानाभायावस्तूनि सृजति । यदि तेषां स्वभावः  
कश्चिन् पस्तुसन्न, न त्रिपर्ययः स्यात् । अतो भगवानाह । सर्वे धर्माः  
अचक्षुर्दृश्यस्वभावाः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नाः निस्स्वभावाः । यः पण्डितः<sup>35</sup>  
प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नं पश्यति स धर्मतां पश्यति । यः पश्यति धर्मतां [ f 4a ]  
स पश्यति शून्यताम् । यः पश्यति शून्यताम् स पश्यति बुद्धम्<sup>36</sup> ।  
अथाधोचत ।

31. *Dhānōga Nyāyamakha ad 5* : *yadā antya ita pakṣaḥ l*  
*akāśādyaśatva vādinam proti nāsti vipakṣaḥ l* ; *yadā nāsti saḥ l tatra*  
*na vartate ita sūtrāt āsanādigdha ityadoṣaḥ* ( Sanskrit is mine ) Tucci,  
Eng trans p 27 Pra vārtika III 25 *Tadabhāve ca tanneti vacanādapi*  
*ladgaṭaḥ l* Vṛtti *aravāṇaḥ tu vastiśatīḥ āśanādyate nityāḥ tu yuktāḥ l*  
*ataḥ sa dharmīnam anārenāpi āśanātrōtopi gamyate ita l* *Slokavār* ,  
*Nirāṣam* 27 *Vipakṣābhāṣatāśatva vyākṣreko na kathyate l* Haribhadra,  
Abh Āloka p 385 makes clear how the reason is not *āśanādigdha*vyati-  
reka in the absence of *vipakṣa* *Vyaktiviveka* Kasi ed p 395

32. Nāgārjuna distinguishes *vigrahakāla* and *vyākhyānakāla*, *Mād*.  
IV, 89

33. *M Vṛtti* pp 260 14, 418 12 *Mādhyamakavatāra*, my Skt  
text p 22 *Abh Āloka* p 387

34. Read in Chinese *ps* ( R 145 ) for *ps* ( R 60 ) as in p 11b, l 2

35. —*Jñāna*

36. Śāhetambasūtra my Sans text, p 2 cited also in *Vig*  
*vyāvartini*, 22, ad 55, *M vṛtti*, p 160

यः प्रत्ययैर्जायति स ह्यजातो न तस्य उत्पादुः स्वमाद्यतोऽस्ति ।

यः प्रत्ययाधोनु स शून्य उक्तो यः शून्यत्वां पश्यति सोऽप्रमत्तः<sup>87</sup> ॥ इति

अत्र सर्वे अशून्यत्वाद्दो दूषणमाहुः । सर्वे संस्कृताः शून्या इति यदि साध्यते तदा रूपादिर्न स्यात् । शशष्टङ्गालम्बनप्रत्यक्षज्ञानोत्पत्तेर्न्यायतो-  
ऽसिद्धिर्न रूपाद्यालम्बनाकारप्रत्यक्षमुद्धिरपि<sup>88</sup> नोत्पद्येत । अतु वस्तुसन्  
इति प्रत्येकमनुभूयते । तस्मात् तत्र पक्षः धर्मतात्रिलोमकः<sup>89</sup> प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण-  
पाद्यदुष्ट साधारणप्रतीतिपाद्यदुष्टश्च<sup>90</sup> । सर्वगयाजपालादिभिः सर्वमायमानं  
चक्षुरादिरूपं नास्त्योत्पत्त्यहारात् ।

पण्डितैः पक्षपातयिषः<sup>91</sup> मुत्तुस्वयं तदस्यप्रतिभिः सञ्चिन्तनीयम्-मम  
प्रतिष्ठा किं स्वसन्तानोत्पन्नप्रत्यक्षप्रमाणवाधिका किं वा परसन्तानोत्पन्न-  
प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणवाधिका । [f 4b] यदि स्वसन्तानोत्पन्न प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणवाधिका ।  
प्रत्यक्षमुद्धयः परमाद्यतः स्वमाद्यशून्याः, प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात् अद्यस्तुप्रत्यक्ष-  
स्वप्नप्रत्यक्षमुद्धिरत् । अतो मम प्रतिष्ठा न स्वसन्तानोत्पन्नप्रत्यक्षवाधिका ।

87 This semi prakrit verse from the Anavataptahṛdaya ( Nanj'o No 437 ) is cited by Candrakīrti in his M. Vṛtti pp 299, 491, 500 504 ( *śrabhāṣānūpattiṃ sandhāya saccadharmāḥ śūnyāḥ* ) in the M. Avatāra p 229 in Catuṣṣataka ( Viḍhusekhara ) p 294 Bodhi-caryāvatāra IX, 2 and Śai bhāṣita saṅgraha, fol 28 ( Le Muséon ) ( L. V P ). Some similar verse from a Śāstra is also cited by Maitreya in his comment on Bhava Sankrānti, p 37 with notes Poussin further points out that in the above ver second pāda reads according to Tib *utpādaśrabhāvātā* its meaning that which is not originated by causes is *utpattinīśrabhāva*

88 Śru = śbhāsa, also ākara, the latter term is more suitable here

89 Bod pañjikā, p 431 dharmataḥ ca na viślomayati tad Buddha-vacanam

40 Haribhadra also raises some similar three fold *badha* to this proposition - (1) *Pratyakṣabadha*, (2) *Anumānabadha*, (3) *Pratibadha*. Abb Aloka p 397.

41 Lāt pakṣagrahana

यद्युच्यते परसन्तानोत्पन्नप्रत्यक्षवाधिकेति । अविशुद्धबहुष्कस्य<sup>42</sup> त [ स ] बहुप्रतिभासः—[यथा] तैमिरिकस्य दृष्टोऽस्त्येकशोणहुक्कन्त्र [द्वयः] दिग्मिच्छा-  
प्रतिभासः प्रत्यक्षं बाधते इति न्यायतो युज्यते । अतो न मम प्रतिज्ञा पर-  
सन्तानोत्पन्नप्रत्यक्षवाधिकापि ।

यदि सामान्यत उच्यते यथा मूढजनाविसर्गव्यवहारोत्पन्नं प्रत्यक्षमिति ।  
इदं सांवृतं न बाधते इति न बाधप्रसङ्गः<sup>43</sup> । साधारणप्रतोतिबाधदुष्ट  
इति वचनमपि न युक्तम् ।

यद्युच्यते स्वशास्त्रसाधारणज्ञानविरोध इति । [ तदपि ] न न्याय्यम् ।  
स्वशास्त्रसंमतत्वात्, स्वशास्त्रविरोधे स्वप्रतिज्ञाविरोधेऽपि नैव साधारण-  
प्रतीतिविरोधदोषः ।

परशास्त्रसाधारणज्ञानविरोध इत्युच्यते चेत् [ १२ ] न युक्तम् । सर्व-  
शास्त्रार्था परसाधारणज्ञाननिराकरणार्थत्वात् ।

गयाजपालादिसाधारणप्रतोतिविरोध इति चेत् तदपि न न्याय्यम् ।  
जिनौरसाः साधयन्ति क्षणिकाः<sup>44</sup> सर्वसंस्काराः अनात्मका निस्तस्याश्च  
सर्वधर्माः इति । घेशेपिकाः<sup>45</sup>—द्रव्यभिन्नो रूपादिः भावमेवो द्रव्यादिरिति ॥  
साङ्ख्यः—युद्धिरचेतना, निरुद्धमसृष्टञ्च सर्वं द्रव्यसदिति । एवमादिप्रकारेण  
सयिस्तरं स्वपक्षप्रतिपादनं समुक्तिकमपि साधारणज्ञानबाधकं नाम

42 It appears that Poussein's text differs from ours, since he has translated *esismra* for *avibuddha*.

43 The same reply in Abh. Āloka, p. 383. Note on p. 68 the verse :

निर्मासते हि यत् नैव सप्रतिविम्बते । विद्यमानस्य नो युक्तं यत्नं चिरवतिषेपनम् ॥  
इति न्यायात् ।

44. Lit *āṇanāsraddha*.

45 Poussein translates : rūpas etc sont des espèces de dravya. Les dravyas, etc. sont des espèces des bhāva. They say that rūpa is a separate category. So I put it accordingly.

धक्तव्यम् । तथा तु नाभ्युपगम्यते । नह्यत्र परमार्थसत्यत धर्माणां परोक्षा  
आगोपालादिसाधारणानुयन्धिना<sup>46</sup> । प्रतिज्ञायाञ्च परमार्थसत्यावच्छेदस्य  
साधितत्वाच्च यथोक्तविरोधदोषप्रसङ्गः । ततश्च नास्ति स्वप्रतिज्ञा-  
विरोधदोषः<sup>47</sup> ॥

अन्यः पुनराह । परमार्थतत्त्वक्षुरायतनं शून्यमिति स्वभावशून्यतावादिनो  
धर्मो न सिध्यतीति पक्षदोषः । आश्रयो न सिध्यतीति हेतुदोषश्चेति ।  
एतन्न युज्यते । आगोपालादि [ 5b ] [ जन ] साधारणप्रतीतिप्रसिद्ध-  
चक्षुरादिसामान्यस्य पक्षत्वात् तद्धर्मस्य हेतुत्वेनोक्तत्वात् धर्म्यसिद्धिपक्ष-  
दोषाभासोऽयम् । आश्रयासिद्धिहेतुदोषाभासश्च ॥

असन्नेयायिका इदं दूषणं कुर्वन्ति । यदि चक्षुरादि परमार्थतः  
शून्यम्, प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वाद् इति । चक्षुरादीनां शून्यत्वे कथं प्रतीत्यसमु-  
त्पन्नत्वम् । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वे कथं शून्यत्वम् । एष प्रतिज्ञाहेत्यो-  
र्विरोधात् पुनः प्रतिज्ञाविरोधदोषः<sup>48</sup> सिद्धः ।

एतत्प्रतिज्ञादोषव्युत्थाने<sup>49</sup> प्रयोगः हेतोः साधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताभावम् असिद्धि-

46 Op Candrakīrti's remarks : *Tattvacavicāra-kāle tu lokasya apramāṇatvāi na tena bādha lakṣya kartum* । M vṛtti p 153 13

47 Ibid p 27 7ff where this argument has been criticised by Candrakīrti

48 See N Sūtra V 2 4 N Vārtika ad 1 2 6 Kumārila raises this objection against Vijñānavādin Śloka Nirālam 154 5 with comment p 254

49 This is an obvious reference to Dharmakīrti who holds the same view Nyāyamukha ad 1 Tucci p 8 All three commentators on Śloka attribute this *prayoga* to Sāṅkhyas and its criticism to Buddhists i.e. Dharmakīrti See Nirālam 154 5 It is sometimes attributed to Śābdikas Tucci Nyāyamukha n 12 A long discussion on this *prayoga* see Pram Vārtika IV 173 188 with vṛtti pp 475 481

दोषं वा व्यापयति । यथा शब्दः नित्यः सर्वानित्यत्वाद् इति । अयं प्रयोगः  
 “असर्वत्वादिति हेतुं व्यापयन् (न) प्रत्यापयति<sup>50</sup> हेतोरेतद्विदोषम् । शब्दस्य  
 सर्वस्मिन् संप्रदात्<sup>51</sup> । समदृष्टान्तोऽपि [ वा ] नास्ति कतमन् नित्यम-  
 सर्वञ्चेति । इति ।

नेतव्युज्यते । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादिति हेतोः मायावदिति दृष्टान्तस्य च  
 सर्वसाधारणं शातत्वात् हेतुदृष्टान्तौ सिद्धौ । तस्मात् भयतां दूषणं न विदुषां  
 मनस्तर्पयेत् ॥

[ 6a ] स्वभावादिनः पुनर्दूषणमाहुः । भयता प्रत्येतव्यं [ यत् ] बभ्रु-  
 रिन्द्रियं सत्यमात्रं सकारिप्रत्वात् । निःस्वभावा न सकारिणा यथा  
 पत्न्यापुत्रः । बभ्रुश्च सकारिञ्च यच्चभ्रुर्विज्ञानजनकम् । यथोक्तसकारिप्रत्य-  
 हेतुना बभ्रुस्सत्यमात्रं निश्चोयत इति । यदीदं साधयति तं यः विना शिक्षां  
 सिद्धः गयाजपलादिमतिज्ञातः स्वमात्रः, संप्रतितः साधयति बभ्रुरादिसंस्तुतं  
 सत्यमात्रमिति । तत्र सिद्धसाधनम् । यदि परमायेतः, नास्ति साधर्म्य-  
 दृष्टान्तः । फेरलं विपक्षप्रतिपेधेन इष्टार्थसिद्धिर्न युज्यते । यथा नित्य-  
 शब्दवादिनो घटन्ति—शब्दो नित्यः ध्रावणत्वात् । घटादिरनित्यः भ्रावणः ।  
 शब्दस्तु ध्रावणत्वात् नित्यस्वभाव इति । तथापि लोकसाधारण्येन शाते  
 समदृष्टान्ते सन् पृथक्तत्वादिति विरुद्धहेतुः साधयति बभ्रुरादि सर्वं लोक-  
 व्ययहारसंगृहीतस्वभावमिति ॥

50 *ming iao* Poussein says that the phrase is normally *pañ 7. Kośa*,  
 XXII, 363, XX, 10a 2, *Siddhi*, IV, 17b 7, 20b 5. But I have put it  
*pratyāyaya*, or *prakāśaya*, which is also met with a Chin texts. Our  
 Chinese text adds here a negative particle *pu*, before *ming iao*  
 which is unnecessary and incorrect. It appears Poussein's text does  
 not have it.

51 *Diānēga* adds : *sādhyaśakadehetevā asiddher nāma hetudoṣaḥ* ।

अन्ये<sup>52</sup> पुनर्दूषणमाहु । ससृजता शून्या इति हेतुं वा दृष्टान्तं वा [सर्वं]  
 अन्तर्मात्रमिति मुख्यजातायत्वात् [6b] इत्यनुमानन्यूनतादोष<sup>53</sup> इति । श्लोकेऽ-  
 स्मिन् प्रमाणफले<sup>54</sup> सामान्यत उक्ते । परीक्षायां<sup>55</sup> प्रमाणे साध्यमाने च चक्षु-  
 रादि एकैक पक्ष पृथक् स्थाप्यते । अतो नाय दोष । सर्वससृजतस्य पञ्चन्येन  
 सामान्यत स्थापनेऽपि नाय दोष । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादिति हेतुष्वप्यपक्ष-  
 सम्मत इति नासिद्ध । यद्युच्यते चक्षुः शून्यं स्वमात्रशून्यत्वादिति \* [ तदा ]

52 Poussin has noted that the following objections have been put  
 by Buddha himself *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* 166 167 *Le Bodhisattva ne  
 doit pas établir la proposition (pratyākṣ)* Tous les dharmas sont non  
 produits vides sans nature propre (*anutpanna śūnya asrabhāva*)  
 Il y aurait *pratyākṣhāna* car la proposition fait partie de tous les  
 dharmas car la proposition a pour raison d'être les dharmas  
 Le Bodhisattva doit enseigner que les dharmas existent à la manière  
 des mag<sup>52</sup> et des rêves (*māyāsvapnaratā bhāvaopadēśa*) *Op Bod  
 avatāra* IX 139 141 Grousset *Philosophies Indiennes* 263 278  
 298 Garbe *Sāṅhya-philosophie* 203 (ad 1 44 47 refutation des  
*Mādhyanikas*) etc

53 *nyāyātā a nigrahaasthāna* in *Sūtra* V 2 12

54 = *yathādarśanam*

55 An answer to the above objection seems to be this  
 Though the distinction between the source of knowledge and its  
 result is not possible for the advocate of *Sartatūnyatā* yet it may be  
 possible if we take things in general as current in common parlance  
 Such distinction can be made when we are engaged in a logical  
 discussion and in ascertaining the source of knowledge The  
 author has stated more than once that things should be taken into  
 account in their general sense as current in the world when one is to  
 formulate syllogism see p 42 1 above *ad* and 11b 12b below We  
 may read profitably here Kumārila's line *sāmānyasya ca hetutvam  
 na syāt pakṣastādēśāt* 1 (*Śloka* *Nirālam* 27) with *Kāśikā*

55a As stated in *Vig vyāvartini*, see note 28 above

अस्य यथोक्तहेतोरसिद्धिः स्यात् । नापि दृष्टान्तो नास्तीति । मायादे-  
[ दृष्टान्तस्य ] सत्त्वात् । यदि यथोक्तं दृष्टान्ते साधयितुं मायादिः पक्षः  
स्वीक्रियते । तदा सिद्धसाधनदोषगौरवं स्यात् ॥

केचिदल्पमा इदं दूषणमाहुः । सर्वं संस्कृतं स्वभावशून्यमिति यदि  
स्थाप्यते । हेतोः संस्कृतत्वात् तत्स्वभावोऽपि शून्यः । तदा हेतुरसिद्धि-  
दोषयानिति । अयमसिद्ध्याभासः न तात्त्विकासिद्धिः । यथा जिनपुत्राः  
साधयन्ति सर्वसंस्कारा निरात्मकाः सहेतुकत्वादिति<sup>56</sup> । अयं हेतुः संस्कारे-  
ष्वन्तर्भूतः निरात्मकत्वाच्च असिद्धिदोषवान् इति दूषणमस्त्येयम् ।

साध्याः पुनः स्थापयन्ति व्यक्ताः सत्त्वरजस्तमस्त्वमात्राः चेतनमिन्नत्वाद्<sup>56a</sup>  
इति । अयं हेतुर्व्यक्तोऽप्यन्तर्भूतः [ 7a ] सत्त्वादिस्वभाववत्त्वाच्च असिद्धि-  
दोषयानिति अस्त्येयम् दूषणम् ।

घंशेपिका अपि साधयन्ति शब्दः अचित्यः कृतकत्वाद्वात [ अत्रात्राप ]  
अयं हेतुः शब्दप्रयोगात्मकः अनित्यत्वाच्चासिद्धिदोषयानिति दूषणमस्ति ।  
पद्यमादिप्रकारेण प्रतिपादिनः महतापि यत्नेन वादिनि दोषं स्थापयितुं  
यतन्ते । यथोक्तन्यायो नास्ति<sup>57</sup> परवादं भङ्गं च शक्नोति । अस्ति चेदयं न्यायः,  
कुत्र फः स्थापयेदनुमानं स्यामीष्टमुक्तयुक्तिभञ्जकम् ॥

पुन केचिद्दूषणमाहुः । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादित्ययं हेतुर्न साध्यायं साध-  
यितुं शक्नोति । स्वभावशून्यत्वात् । घन्ध्यापुत्रोच्चरितशब्दवद्विद्वत् ।  
अयं हेतुः<sup>57</sup> स्यतोऽसिद्धिदोषवान् । यद्युच्यते परपक्षाभ्युपगतो हेतुर्मयतीति ।  
तदपि न युज्यते । परपक्षत उक्तस्य स्वभावशून्यत्वादित्यस्य<sup>58</sup> फोऽर्थः ।

56. *Nāstha satva ātmā va dharmāstvele sahetukāh* : cited in  
Vimāśikā bhāṣya, p 5, M. vṛtti, ¶ 355, 4

56a. The same prayoga is mentioned in Pram. vār. vṛtti ad III,  
186, p 353.

57. = svapakṣatah.

58. Lok. avasthārtah.



यद्यविद्यमानार्थक इति हेत्वर्थः [ तदा ] नास्ति हेतोरसिद्धिः । [ हेतोरेव ]  
अविद्यमानत्वात् । यदि मिथ्याप्रतिभासमानार्थक इति हेत्वर्थः । तदा  
घन्ध्यापुत्रोच्चरितशब्दस्यात्यन्तमसत्त्वाद् अयं दृष्टान्तः [ 7 b ] साधनधर्म  
विकलः । निर्मितशब्देनानैकान्तिकदोषश्च । स हि अप्रमाणानां सत्त्वानां  
शिक्षकः हितकरत्वात् । किञ्च न परपक्षमात्रसम्मतो<sup>58a</sup> हेतुः परपक्षासंमत-  
हेतुयत् साध्यं साधयति अन्यतरासिद्धत्वात् । विरुद्धानुमानयाधिसत्त्वाद्  
अतिप्रसङ्गदोषानुगतत्वाच्च<sup>59</sup> ।

यथा साध्यते<sup>60</sup> प्रज्ञादयो न चित्संश्रयुक्ताः संस्कारस्कन्धान्तर्भावात्  
नामकायाविष्यत् । आकाशादयोऽनित्या गुणाधयत्वात् पृथिव्याविष्यत् ।  
आत्मा अचेतन अप्रकाशवृत्तित्वात् प्रधानपदं इति । सर्वपक्षघिनाश्रयं  
प्रकारो दोषानुपाती । अतः उभयपक्षसम्मतो<sup>61</sup> हेतुरास्थेय इति स्थितम् ।  
अनेन न्यायेन यद्योक्तो दोषो न प्रसज्यते ॥

अन्यः पुनरसन्नैयायिकः पक्षदोषमाविष्कुर्वन्नाह । यदि स्वभावशून्यं  
साध्यं, साधनं न सिध्यति घन्ध्यापुत्रोच्चरितशब्दयत् । साधनं [ 8 a ]  
संस्तृतेऽन्तर्भूतमिति तत्साध्यसमं स्वभावशून्यम् । सर्वशून्यत्वात् साध्यं  
साधनं सर्वं न सिद्धम् इति । [ यदेव ] साध्यसाधनधर्मनिराकरणं तदेव  
धर्मिस्वलक्षणनिराकरणमिति पक्षदोष आविष्कृतः । अस्य<sup>62</sup> हेतोः स्वपरयो-  
रसिद्धत्वात्, अनेकान्तिकत्वात्, दृष्टान्तदोषात् समनन्तरपूर्वोक्तयश्च न

58a Cf. Pramāṇa vārtika, IV, 1-2 with vṛtti

59. Lat. Mahādōṣa

60. This *prayoga* seems to have been made by Sautrāntikas

61. Theory of Dinnāga. Nyāyamukha ad II, Pramāṇav vṛtti  
p 293, n E. M. vṛtti p 35 n 2

62 This refers to *svabhāvasaṅgattva* mentioned in the previous section.

युज्यते [ इदं दूषणम् ] । इदं [ दूषणम् ] एवमान्तरमपि न स्वपक्षदोषं निगूहते ॥

अन्य. पुनः प्रयोगान्तरमभ्युपगम्य स्वपक्षदोषं निगूहमान एवमाह । परमार्थतः संस्कृताः शून्या इत्युक्तप्रतिपाद्यचनस्य कोऽर्थः<sup>63</sup> । यदि परमार्थतः सर्वेऽपि संस्कृताः अभावद्रव्याणि<sup>64</sup> इति प्रतिशार्थः । इदं वचनमपि पुनः संस्कृतेऽन्तर्भावात् संस्कृतसममभावद्रव्यं स्यात् । इदं वचनं स्वसाध्यार्थं मनसोति स्ववचनविरोधो नाम पक्षदोषः । यथा सर्वमुक्तं मृषा<sup>65</sup> इति साधनम् । यदि तत्त्वतः सर्वे संस्कृता अत्यन्ताभावरूपा<sup>66</sup> [ 8b ] इति पतिशार्थः । तदा सर्वमविद्यमानमित्यपवादः । एवं च साध्यं मिथ्याहृष्टि-पतनम् । इति ।

अत्र यथोक्तम् ।

आत्मा हि आत्मनो नायः को नु नाथः परो भवेत् ।

आत्मना हि सुदान्तेन स्वयं प्राप्नोति पण्डितः<sup>67</sup> ॥ इति ।

तत् व्ययहारतश्चित्तमात्मा<sup>67</sup> इत्युच्यते । परमार्थतस्तु नैरात्म्यं साध्यते

63 *Lat artho na jñātaḥ*

64 *Or asad bhūtāḥ* Some similar objection by Udyotakara, N. vārttika, p 481

65 *Of Nyāyamukha ad ver I.*

66 *Or atyantāvidyamāna pu-wu so-pu*

67 Quoted in *Bod Pañjikā* p 483 (*śāhāyām uktam*) Pousin compares *Dhammapada*, 160, *Udānavagga* XXIII, Kośa, I 74. See M. vṛtti, 354, along with one more verse to the same effect, is proving the existence of an empirical soul even for Buddhists

67 *Op Bod Pañjikā* p 484 *cittam evāhaṅkāraśīlatayā asyāś-mopadeśena uktam*

इति न स्वयचनविरोध प्रतिज्ञादोषः । इदमप्येवम् । सांनृतस्वभावत आक्ष-  
रादिकमस्तीत्युच्यते । परमार्थस्तु तच्छून्यं साध्यते । अतो नास्ति दोषः ।

किञ्च यथोक्तम् । सर्वे उत्पत्तिचर्माणो मरणप्रतिशरणा इति ।  
मुनिनोक्तं न मृषा । आत्म्यन्तरं बाह्य औत्पन्नं मरणप्रतिशरणं युज्यते,  
अव्यभिचारित्वात्<sup>69</sup> । सा साध्यप्रतिज्ञा स्वप्रत्यायिकापि मरणप्रतिशरणा  
इत्यभ्युपगमान् नास्ति स्वयचनविरोधः प्रतिज्ञादोषः । एवमिदमपि ।  
परमार्थतः संस्कृताः शून्याः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादिति प्रतिज्ञायचनं प्रतीत्य-  
समुत्पन्नं सन् स्वभावाशून्यं<sup>70</sup> युज्यते अव्यभिचारित्वात् । इदं प्रतिज्ञायचनं  
स्वप्रत्यायकमपि स्वभावशून्यमित्यभ्युपगमात् न स्वयं [ 92 ] प्रतिज्ञा-  
भङ्गदोषः ॥

यथा ब्राह्मण आह । सर्वं भगवन् मे न क्षमते<sup>71</sup> इति । भगवानाह ।  
इदं वस्तु ब्राह्मण ते क्षमते न वा । अत्र ब्राह्मण आह इदं [ चेत ] वस्तु क्षमते  
[ तदपि ] सर्वं मे न क्षमते इति । तद्वचनं<sup>72</sup> स्वप्रतिज्ञातवस्तुविरोधीति  
स्योक्तगाधदोषो भवेत् । न तु सधर्माय दोषोऽस्ति ।

अन्यत्र आह भगवान् । अनात्मकाः<sup>73</sup> सर्वसंस्कारा इति । पुनरन्यत्राह ।  
अनित्याः सर्वसंस्कारा उत्पादव्यवर्धमिण<sup>74</sup> इति । तथा नो चेन् बुद्धोऽपि  
संस्कारान् "अनात्मका" "अनित्या" इति वदन् यथोक्तदोषवान् स्यात् ।  
न ॥ स दोषोऽस्ति । यथा संस्काराणामात्मत्वानित्यत्वप्रतिषेधकं प्रति-  
ज्ञायचनं<sup>75</sup> तद्वदेवानात्मकमनित्यम् इष्टत्वात् । एवमिदं संस्कृताः शून्या

69 *pu hsiang la* . Poussin has suggested *avyāvṛtta* for this.

69 See Vig vyāvartan, ad 22 for similar answer

70 M Nikāya, Vol I Dighanaka Sutta p 497. ll 8 10.

71 Or abhyupagata = so hsi

72 *Anātmānaḥ sarvadharmaḥ styāgamāt* M vṛtti n 65, 9, M.  
Śāstrāśākhā XVIII. 101

72a Cited in M vṛtti, p. 39 11

73 *tung pa = laisama*

इत्यभिधायकं प्रतिज्ञावचनमपि स्वभावशून्यमिष्टम् । तत्तु स्वाभ्युपगतार्थ-  
मनुकूलयेत्<sup>74</sup> । तस्मात् भवदुक्तः “इदं वचनं स्वसाध्यार्थं भिनत्ति” इत्ययं  
हेतुरसिद्धः ॥

किञ्च यथा सादृश्याः म्यापयन्ति व्यक्ताः सत्त्वादिस्यभावा इति ।  
व्यक्तं सत्त्वादिस्यभावश्चेत्, प्रतिज्ञावचनेना [ 9 b ] पि तत्सत्त्वादिस्यभावेन  
भयितव्यम् । साध्यप्रतिज्ञावचनं न तत्स्यभावश्चेत्, व्यक्तमपि तत्स्यभावं  
न स्यात् । इति दूषणे सत्यपि प्रतिज्ञा नैवं दुष्टा । यथा संस्कृता अनित्या  
भनात्मका इति साधनं न तयोक्तप्रतिज्ञादोषयत् । एवमिदमपि नोक्तदोषयत् ।  
इत्याशयस्य इष्टत्वात् ।

किञ्च स यादी साध्यमप्रसाध्य पुनर्दूषणमाह । यदि परमार्थतः संस्कृता  
अवस्तूनि, उक्तं संस्कृतावस्तुत्ववचनमपि अस्तु स्यात् । इति । इदं  
दूषणं न त्यपक्षदोषमपाकरोति । किन्तु मिथ्या वदसि परपक्षः तथादुष्ट<sup>75</sup>  
इति । यथा लोके कश्चिन्मुग्धस्तेन आवृतसूक्ष्मेक्षिक आत्मशोधनासमर्थः  
परस्मिन् दोषमारोपयितुं युक्तिं स्थापयति त्यमपि स्तेन इति वदति । नायं  
परीक्षोद्धितो ग्रन्थः ॥

अपि चोक्तं तेन । यदि तत्स्यतः सर्वे संस्कृता अत्यन्ताभावरूपा इति  
प्रतिज्ञार्थः । तदा सर्वमविद्यमानमित्यपवादः । एवञ्च साध्यं मिथ्यादृष्टि-  
पतनमिति<sup>76</sup> । तत्र प्रतिज्ञार्थः यथा पूर्वं विस्तरश उक्तः शून्यश्च निस्स्यभावः-  
मिथ्याप्रतिभास इति पर्यायाः<sup>77</sup> इति । न सचथा [ 10a ] पि नास्तीत्यपोगते ।  
तस्मात् भवतेवं दूषणं कार्यम् ॥

अन्ये पुनः केचिदाचार्याः ग्राह्यमन्याः इदं दूषणमाहुः । यदि परमार्थतः

74 Vig. vyāvartanī. p. 11, ad 23

75. This is a kind of *agrahasthāna* called *matanujñā*, N. Sūtra, V, 2, 20, with Bhāṣya. N. Kōśa

76. See p. 48 above, the second alternative under *pratyñārtha*.

77. See p. 36 above.

संस्कृताः मायादिवत् शून्याः निस्स्वभावाः, तदा न सन्ति । असत्त्व-  
स्वीकारात् सुतरामभावद्वष्टि भवति । इति । ते स्वपक्षदोषप्रच्छादनेच्छया  
अपवादं नाटयन्ति उभयोर्दुष्टत्वेऽपि मा शून्यवादिनः साध्यं प्रमाणेन सिध्यतु  
इति । परमार्थसत्यापवादस्य अतिदुष्टत्वात् । इदं नास्तीति घवनं  
प्रसक्तार्थप्रतिषेधकम्<sup>78</sup> । तद्वचनं विधिप्रधानं गृह्णासि । अहन्तु यदामि  
प्रतिषेधप्रधानमिदं घवनम् । अस्य नास्तीति घवनस्य केवलसत्ताप्रतिषेधेन  
शक्तिर्यासिता, मर्थान्तरप्रकाशनव्यापारः । यथा लोक आह । नास्ति  
शुक्लः पट इति । न ग्राह्यमिदं घवनं कृष्णं पटं प्रकाशयतीति । [ येन ] वक्तुः  
प्रतिषेधोप' कुर्यात्<sup>79</sup> । नास्ति शुक्लः पटः इति घवनस्य शुक्लपटप्रतिषेधे-  
नैव शक्तिर्यासिता, नास्ति व्यापारान्तरं कृष्णपटं रक्तपटं नीलपटं वा  
प्रकाशयितुम् ॥

शास्त्रेऽस्मिन् परमाद्येतः संस्कृतघातौ शाश्वतद्वष्टयन्तपरिहाराय [ 10<sup>b</sup> ]  
भावस्यभावः प्रतिपिध्यते । एवमन्यत्र उच्छेदद्वष्टयन्तपरिहाराय<sup>80</sup> अभाव-  
स्वभावस्य प्रतिषेधः । अन्तद्वष्टयपरिहाराय च भावाभावस्यभावौ युगपत्प्रति-  
विध्येते । अथशिष्टमिध्याग्रहदोषपरिहाराय यावत् सर्वचित्तगोचराः प्रति-  
विध्यन्ते । यदा गोचरा निरुद्धाः, चित्तं समनुनिरुध्यते ।

अन्यत्राह [ भगवान् ] आनन्दम् । यदा भावस्यभावग्रहः तदा  
शाश्वतान्तपातः । यदा अभावस्यभावग्रहः तदा उच्छेदान्तपातः । एव-  
मन्यत्राह काश्यपम् । अस्तीति [ काश्यप ] अयमेकोऽन्तः, नास्तीति

78 Or *abhisāpita = prastajyapratishedha* The same is repeated in the Chāp. II, l. 7b, l. 10. Cf. M. vṛtti, p. 393, 10-13 :

na vāyam asyāsattvam prastipādayāmaḥ ।

kim tarhi, paraparikalpitam sattvam asya nirakurmayi eto.

79. Or *raktari prastipādoṣakaram...vacanam.* ।

80. Cf. M. vṛtti, p. 427, 10 : *Tataśca bhāvaabhāvagame sati sa-  
tra lāsatocchedaprasaṅgo durnivāro bhavataḥ...*

[ फाश्यप ] शय<sup>३१</sup> द्वितीयोऽन्तः । एवमाद्यागमात् उक्तबहुन्यायाच्च मम प्रतिज्ञा यथादूषितमभावद्विष्टोपायान्य [ मपि ] न स्पृशति ॥

केचित् [ अन्ये ] स्वपक्षे न्यायदूषणसमुदायमविभाव्य<sup>३२</sup> निपुणमाच्छा-  
दयन्तः पुनरेतद्वदन्ति । स्वमात्रशून्यतायादां नित्यमविकल्पमानं<sup>३३</sup> प्रार्थय-  
मानोऽपि सदा विकल्पयति सवं संसृता असंसृताः स्वभावशून्या इति ।  
एवं परिकल्पितमिष्ट्याधिकन्यस्यापनेन स्वेष्वप्रतिज्ञां दन्तीति । ईदृशस्यापि  
[ दूषणस्य ] प्रतिषेधाच्चायं दोषः ॥

[ ११५ ] अन्ये पुनराहुः उक्तः शून्यहेतुः यदि वा संवृत्तः भयथा  
पत्नार्थतः स्यतः परतश्च हेतुरसिद्धः<sup>३४</sup> । इति । उभयपक्षसाधारणान्युपागतः  
उत्तरेष्टविशेषणसामान्यलक्षणधर्मगुणेन<sup>३५</sup> हेतुरिति नेयापिचैरन्युपागतत्वात्  
भयता साधितं दूषणमसिद्धिदोषामासः<sup>३६</sup> न तात्त्विकमिद्धिः । यथा  
चैशेषिकाः साधयन्ति शब्दोऽनित्यः हनकन्यादिति । शब्दनित्यत्वपादी  
तं दुष्टं यदन् हेत्यर्थं विकल्पयति कण्ठादिना हतः उत दण्डादिना हत इति ।  
एवं विकल्पिता हेत्यसिद्धिः ॥ यथा वा साहूया यदन्ति धोत्रादीनि पञ्च

■ Cf. Sam N. II. p. 17. *sabbam atthiis kho kaccāyana ayam  
eko anto sabbam natthiis ayam duiyo anto, eto M vṛtti, p. 270, 7 and  
Kāṣīyapaparivarta, p. 90, § 60 : atthiis kāṣīyapa ayam ekantaḥ | natthiis  
ayam duiyicantaḥ | ( L. V. P ). Op M vṛtti, p. 353, 10.*

82. *Idi kṣamaya adīyeta*

83. *Or nartikalpikaprajñam.*

84. *ie yadī saricīyetaḥ, parato sīdhaḥ | yadī paramarīhataḥ,  
parato sīddhaḥ |*

85. Candrakīrti refers to what our author intends to convey in  
this passage, M. vṛtti, p. 29-29, where the reference is made in  
connection with the proposition ( *pratyakṣa* ) It is also equally to be  
applied to *sādhana* and *dṛṣṭanta*. Cf. p. 54 with note 95 below.

86. See *Nyāyamukha ad 2.*

सत्त्वानामिन्द्रियाणि न रूपारब्धानि<sup>87</sup> इन्द्रियत्वात् मनइन्द्रियवत् । चक्षुरादि-  
पञ्चेन्द्रियाणां रूपारम्भवादी तं दुष्टं वदति । इन्द्रियत्वादिति हेतुः यदि  
महाभूतस्वभावः उत सत्त्वादित्यभाव इति । पथं विकल्पितो हेतुः स्वतः  
परतश्च असिद्धः । तद्विविधमपि वचनमसिद्धिदोषमासदोषो न तात्त्विका-  
सिद्धिरित्यतो न युज्यते । एवमिदं [ मस्मद्वचन ] मपि ॥

अन्ते पुनराचार्याः ग्राह्यमन्याः स्वपक्षस्नेहान्धीकृतप्रभावशृङ्काः [ 11<sup>b</sup> ]  
सदुपदेशरत्नस्ययाद<sup>88</sup> ह्युद्गवीरणयोर्लामहानिविशेषमविवेचयन्तः मृपाप्रकटित-  
साध्यदृष्टान्तदोषा आहुः । मन्त्रौपधियलाधिष्ठिताः पुष्पफलमृत्पिण्डादि-  
पदार्था विविधहस्त्यभ्रशशादिरूपनिमित्तोपदर्शकाः स्वभावशून्या इति  
भास्मत्पक्षान्मुपगतम् । तदा समदृष्टान्तविकलः [ तव पक्षः ], साध्यामावात् ।  
अथ यदि मायाहस्त्यभादिनिमित्तानि [ तद ] न्यवास्तविकहस्त्यभादि-  
स्वभावयुक्तानि न भवन्ति इत्यतः शून्या उच्यन्त इति । चक्षुरादिकमपि  
तथा अन्यस्वभावरहित्यात् स्वभावशून्यं भवेत् । तदा पक्षदोषः, सिद्ध-  
साधनत्वात् । इति तदूषणं न युज्यते । मन्त्रौपधियलाधिष्ठितान् पुष्पफल-  
मृत्पिण्डादिपदार्थान् प्रतीत्य समुत्पन्नानि हस्त्यभादिनिमित्तानि [ तात्त्विक ]  
हस्त्यादित्यभावशून्यानि दृष्टान्तत्वेन उच्यन्त इत्यतः साधयार्थः सिद्धः ।  
अथ यदि पुनर्यदसि मायाकृतहस्त्यभावदिवस्तूनि यद्यपि अन्यतात्त्विक-  
हस्त्यभादित्यभावानि न भवन्ति, तथापि न वक्तव्यं तत्स्वभावशून्यत्वात्  
एतत्स्वभावोऽपि शून्य<sup>89</sup> इति । [ ये ] तल्लक्षणाकारा<sup>90</sup> दृश्यन्ते [ ते ]  
तथाविधपदार्थस्वभावाः कथं न भवन्ति । यथा भवतामुपगताः पुष्प-  
फलादिपदार्थाः । तथा चेत् मायानिमित्त [ 12<sup>a</sup> ] हस्त्यभादिवस्तूनि

87. *anārambhā*. Penseur suggests, *apārambhā*.

88. Dirty weeds

89. This part of objection is made clear in the next section.

90. More convenient expression : *ye yallakṣaṇakārah* etc.

तात्त्विकतथाभूतहस्त्यश्वादिस्वमानि स्युः । किन्तु न तात्त्विकानि इत्यतः  
सर्वाणि मायाकृतहस्त्यश्वादिवस्तूनि स्वभावशून्यानीति ज्ञायते ।  
तस्माद्यथावद्यथोक्त<sup>91</sup> दृष्टान्तेन साध्यायेः सिध्यति । नापि सिद्धसाधनदोषः ।  
चक्षुरादिसंस्क्रुतानां स्वभावशून्यत्वेन शून्यत्वस्थापनात् ॥

अन्ये पुनः केचित् शून्यान्तरमतयो<sup>92</sup> दृष्टान्तदोषं प्रत्यवस्थापयन्ति ।  
यद्यपि मायापुरुषा न तात्त्विकपुरुषा इत्यतः शून्या उच्यन्ते । तथापि ते  
मायापुरुषा ॥ स्वभावशून्या अभूतप्रतिभासिपुरुषलक्षणरूपेण सत्त्वात् ।  
अतया युक्त्या साध्यपदार्थोसिद्धिः, दृष्टान्तासिद्धेः इति । इदानीं ते प्रष्टव्याः  
किमिमानि अभूतप्रतिभासिमायापुरुषलक्षणरूपाणि प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नानि  
उत ने ति । ते प्रतिपद्येयुः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नानीति । तथा चेत्कस्मात् पुनर-  
भूतानि नाम । यतो यथा प्रतिभासोनि न तथा सन्ति । ॥ चास्ति तनु चक्षुरा-  
दिकमपि प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नं, यथा प्रतिभासि न तथास्ति चेति । [ एषं ]  
समदृष्टान्तस्य सिद्धत्वात् स्वभावशून्य [ 12<sup>b</sup> ] ता सिध्यतीति  
भयतास्थयम् ॥

ते पदन्ति नास्तेय [ मिश्र ] म् । यतो मायापुरुषा न तात्त्विकपुरुषवत्संभा-  
वनीयाः<sup>93</sup> । तान् तात्त्विकपुरुषानपेक्ष्य इमे अभूता इत्यतः शून्या उच्यन्ते ।  
न भयतां सिद्धं पूर्वाक्तचक्षुरादिसंस्क्रुतान् विहाय अन्ये चक्षुरादिसंस्क्रुताः  
सन्ति इति यान्<sup>94</sup> सम्यक् संभावनीयान् अपेक्ष्य इमे चक्षुरादिसंस्क्रुताः

91. *vastubhūta, vastutah or yathāvat śhik-yu.*

92. *-i-kung-hus-che* Or *esparita* Poussin gives *tsao* for *kung* and says that *i-tsao* = *vidagdha* ( *i* = *rs*, *tsao* = *dagdha*, a translation of Tib. word ); and giving a variant *kung* for *tsao*, he suggests to correct into *hoo*, intelligence. But our text has *kung hus* both together making the suggestion inadmissible.

93. I follow here the Chinese punctuation. Poussin has done differently.

94. *Lit. tsu-pi.*



स्वभावशून्या इति वचनमास्योयेत इति । यद्यपि उक्तानिमान् चक्षुरादीन् विहाय अन्ये चक्षुरादयो न सन्ति । तथापि ईदृशस्वभावशून्यत्वप्रतीत्यसमुत्पादयो साध्यसाधनभावो सिद्धौ । केवलमनेनोदाहरणेन उदाहार्यार्थं प्रदर्शयितुमलम् । यदि दृष्टान्तधर्मान्तर विकल्पयसि तदा <sup>95</sup>विषयसमजाति दोष सिध्यति [य] प्रतिधादिन स्वप्रज्ञालाघय प्रदर्शयेत् । यथा वैशेषिक आह शब्द अनित्य कृतकत्वात् घटादिवत् इति । [तत्र] घटादि मृत्पिण्ड-चक्रादिना निष्पादित पक्ष उभयस्येते मुसलनाशयोऽनित्यश्च । शब्दस्तु न तथा, नानित्य इति वचनं न दूषणं स्यात् । [एव] मस्यापि दृष्टान्त धर्मान्तरविकल्पत्वात् विकल्पसमजातिदोष सिध्येत् । अतः [13 a] आस्थेय चक्षुरादयः स्वभावशून्या इति । स्वभावशून्यतायाः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद हेतुव्यभिचारात् । यथा दृष्टलक्षण प्रतिपिद्धपूर्वस्वभावं, तथा इदमपि स्यात् । तस्मात् भवता वचनं न स्वपक्षदोषोपात्तमान्निर्यातितुमलम् ॥

साङ्ख्य एव दूषयन्ति । अस्माभिः स्याच्यते महादिपरिणामा व्यक्ता [अतः] प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वेतोरसिद्धिः । सर्वस्यापि स्वरूपत्वात् इन्द्रियाणां सर्वायतनव्यापित्वात् तस्मिन् मायापुरुषेऽपि <sup>96</sup>एतद्रूपमस्तीति स्वभावशून्यमिदमिति स्थापनस्य नास्ति साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः । इति ॥ अत्र रूपबुद्धिराद्यं परीक्ष्यते । तथाहि रूपबुद्धयः न प्रत्ययामिव्यक्ता तद्वन् प्रत्ययानुसृत्य विवृतत्वात् । यथा मृत्पिण्डवद्वक्त्रकुलमनश्च

95 N Sutra V 1 4 N Kōśa p 630 It is now clear that in setting forth any proposition no particulars should be taken into account of the *sādhya* *sādhana* and *dyūṣanta*. This is what is meant by *utsaṣṭasādhana* stated previously see p 51 above with note 85 Nyāyamukha gives the same example for the *jāti* see ad 32

96 A similar objection viz reality of this example is raised in the Abb Āloka p 386 from the view point of Viśiṣṭavādin Op Pram vārtika III 162 f where the Sāṅkhyas are said to plead for the fact that many exist in the form of one *bhāva* = *pradhāna*

सत्त्वादिभिर्मिश्रप्रत्ययानुसृत्य घटकपालादयो महान्तोऽल्पा वा भवन्ति । एवं [ ये ] चक्षुरादिनानाप्रत्ययाः, ताननुसृत्य रूपवृद्धयो नाना विक्रियन्ते । यतः चक्षुषस्तमःप्रकाशावनुसृत्य बुद्धेस्तैर्दृश्यं मान्यं वा । नीलादिरूप-विषयविशेषाननुसृत्य [ 13 b ] नीलायामासबुद्धिः स्पष्टं विक्रियते<sup>97</sup> । दृश्यते हि लोके यदमिमिव्यक्ताः<sup>98</sup> पदार्थाः न तत्प्रत्ययविशेषविरुद्धाः । यथा विविधाः कङ्कणकुण्डलादिपदार्थाः प्रदीपदीपधिरत्नसूर्याद्यमिव्यक्ताः । न तथा रूपबुद्धिः । यथा रूपबुद्धिः परीक्षिता । तथा चक्षुरादिरपि । भयमर्थं सिद्ध इति वस्तुतो लोकसाधारणं ज्ञायते । अतः उक्तहेतोर्ना-सिद्धिदोषः ।

किञ्च 'भवता उक्तं' सर्वं सर्वरूपामत्यादि । किमामव्यक्तित्वत्वा<sup>99</sup> किंया तिरोहितवृत्त्या । यद्यमिव्यक्तित्वत्वा सर्वं सर्वस्वरूपं गृहीष्यसि । यथा घटप्रदेशे घटमिव्यक्तित्वत्तिरस्ति । तथा कपालप्रदेशेऽपि एतद्वटमिव्यक्तित्वत्तिः स्यात् । विभुस्वरूपत्वात् । योऽयमुक्तो घटः सोऽप्रमाणशत-सहस्रयोजनान्यपि व्याप्नुयात् । घटादिप्रदेशेऽपि कपालाद्यमिव्यक्तिः शुंगपत् स्यात् । न च घटमिव्यक्तेस्तिरोहितत्वात् कपालाद्यमिव्यक्तिरपि तिरोहिता । महत्परिमाणत्वात् । महत्परिमाणं [ या ] तिरोहित-महत्परिमाणं परिणतं स्यात् । घटाद्यमिव्यक्तेः कपालाद्यमिव्यक्तिरिच्छत-त्वात् सर्वदेशकालयोर [ 14 a ] नुपलम्भः स्यात् । तस्मादमिव्यक्ति-घत्वा सर्वं सर्वात्मकमिति भवत्पक्षो न युज्यते ।

यदि तिरोहितवृत्त्या सद्य सर्वात्मकमिति ग्रहीष्यसि । एवं गृहीतं विस्तृतविचारेण<sup>100</sup> परिच्छेयमिदं सत्यमसत्यं वेति । ग्रन्थपरिप्लेशमयेन<sup>101</sup> न विस्तराः परीक्ष्यते ।

97 *Hsien-hsien* : "To become modified perceptibly"

98 *So-hsien*.

99 *Ohn* "According to"

100 *Lit. vicāram apēkṣya*

101. *Wen fang* "Trouble of composition"

भवत्पक्षेऽपि अभ्युपगम्यते मायापुरुषाभिव्यक्तिप्रदेशः तात्त्विकपुरुषाभिव्यक्तिश्च इति । मया स्थापितदृष्टान्तस्य नासिद्धिदोषः । तस्मात्साध्या स्वभावशून्यता सिद्धा ।

भवान् सादृश्याचार्योऽपि नोत्सृष्टाश्रयः,<sup>102</sup> नेन्द्रियाण्यपि सर्वायतनव्यापीनि ।<sup>103</sup> साधिष्ठानत्यहेतोः । यथा इन्द्रियमाश्रयाश्रितम् । तथा सत्त्वरजस्तमोमोहा भ्रमन्ति बुद्धिकारकत्वहेतोः<sup>104</sup> इत्यादिना बहवो विविधनापकहेतवः सविस्तरं वक्तव्याः । इन्द्रियाणां सर्वायतनव्यापित्व-भङ्गात् । मायापुरुषे नेन्द्रियरूपाणि [ इति ] न साध्यशून्यता साध्य-दृष्टान्ताभावाच्च । तस्मादेवं भवान् वितथविकरणं कृत्वा पञ्चावपोदितचेष्टां<sup>105</sup> करोति ॥

<sup>100</sup>योगाचारा एवमाहुः । भवान् साधयति तत्त्वतः संस्कृताः शून्याः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादिति । [ 14 b ] संस्कृतधर्माः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नाः न स्वयंभावाः, उत्पत्तिनिःस्वभावा इति तै शून्याः साध्यन्ते इत्ययमर्थः, तदा प्रसिध्यति योगाचारानामर्थः न्यायसंवादीति । तथा चाह "येन हि शून्यं तदसद्भावात्, यच्च शून्यं तत्सद्भावात् इति<sup>107</sup> । एवं शून्यता शास्त्रा वैधमनुष्याणां यथाभूतमुक्तम् । अस्थोपदेशस्याशयः परिचाटित-

102. *Chu place, tou chī* "to throw and transmit" Poussin connects this sentence along with the previous one My punctuation is according to the Chinese one

103. *Yu so* So is to be taken in the sense of place, *adhīsthāna*

104. Poussin interprets quite differently these sentences

105. *Wang ling* demon à la forme d'un petit enfant de couleur brune, aux yeux rouges et aux longues oreilles ( L. V. P. )

106. *Lā yogaśāstrācārya.*

107. This is from *yogaśāstra*, Wogihāra, ■ 47.—says poussin.

गृहीतः परतन्त्रस्यभावो मूलतोऽसन्, अतस्त्वभावात्वात् । ययामिधान<sup>108</sup> -  
ममिधेयस्यभावाभावात्, ययामिधेयश्चामिधानस्वभावाभावात् परतन्त्र-  
स्वभावे परिकल्पितगृहीतस्यभावः प्रकृतितोऽसन् । येन शून्यं [तत्र] मिथ्या-  
कल्पितं यस्तु तदसत्स्वभावः । यच्च शून्यं प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नं यस्तु तत्स-  
त्स्वभावः । यदीदमसत्, तदा नोच्छेदो निरोधो वा, किं केन <sup>109</sup>शून्यं  
भविष्यति । [ यत् ] प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नं यस्तु तदेव परतन्त्रस्यभावं नाम ।  
ततो रूपेदेनासांशस्यभावाविशेषोपचारात्मिका प्रवृत्तिर्भवति ।<sup>110</sup> यदीद-  
<sup>111</sup>मसत्, प्रवृत्तिर्यतोऽप्यसत् । [ 15 a ] [ तदा ] नास्तिकः अकथ्यो भवति  
असंघात्यः [ सप्रज्ञाचारिणाम् ] । स्वयं दुर्गतौ पतति । परानपि पातयति ।  
एवं परिकल्पितगृहीतस्यभावः शून्यः परतन्त्रस्यभावाच्च सन् इति सिद्धि-  
निपुणं न्याय्या ।

परतन्त्रस्यभावोऽप्यविद्यमानत्वात् शून्यं साध्यते । इति यद्यप्यं  
यवनार्थः, तदा ययोकदोषपाते एतितोऽसि भगवदुपदेशापवादोपश्च  
साधितवानसि । इति ॥

तत्र भन्वयानप्रत्ययानिकैः तीर्थपञ्च सङ्ख्यनाकांक्षिभिः निर्मलरस्सह  
भूयसा त्रिराव । फ पुनर्नाद प्रकृत्याप्रस्थितैराचार्यः । वादस्य प्राप्त काल-

-108 Astitive with regard to paratantra aspect and nāstīva with regard to pārikāipīa aspect M vṛtti p 274 5

109 Lit *kutra kim kanyam ucyea* !

110 *Chia-ki-hsin = ॥pacārātmikā* The phrase is suggested by Pousan

111. Partly identical with these passages of Yogaśāstra (Wojihara p 46) .

तेषां प्रज्ञापयिष्यन्त्यस्तुमात्रस्वभावात् तैव प्रज्ञातिः सङ्गेन सर्वं न भवति ।...  
प्रज्ञातितत्त्वाभावाच्च प्रधाननास्तिक्ये वेदितव्यः । स एव नास्तिकः सन् अकथ्यो भवति,  
असंघात्यो विशावा सप्रज्ञाचारिणाम्... ( cited by Pousan )

त्यादिदं किञ्चित्संग्रहायते । यथा ११२ तच्चामृतावतारे विस्तरेण विकल्पित-  
तत्त्वान्नाधिकं विचार्यते । वचनविस्तारसंज्ञस्तानामप्रोतिकरत्वात्<sup>११३</sup> ।

संस्कृतधर्माः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नाः न स्वयंभावा, उत्पत्तिनि स्वभावा इति ते  
शून्याः साध्यन्ते इति वचनस्यास्य कोऽर्थः । यदि चक्षुरादिसंस्कृताः  
परतन्त्रे अहेतुसमुत्पन्नानां सदा अनिच्छानां चक्षुरादिस्वभावानामत्यन्तम-  
सत्त्वात् शून्या उच्यन्ते इत्ययमर्थः । [ 15 b ] तदा सिद्धसाधनम् ।  
सजातीयसाम्यैशेषिकादिपक्षेऽपि [ तथा ] मम्युपगतत्वात् । उच्यते  
तु चक्षुरादिरूपकः स्वभावशून्यः शून्यत्वात्<sup>११४</sup> इति । यत्कव्यज्ञानुत्पत्ति-  
नि स्वभावात्, शून्य इति । न यत्कव्यमुत्पत्तिनि स्वभावात्, ते शून्या इति ।  
यदि तेषूपगमनेषु<sup>११५</sup> परमार्थतः ११६ उत्पत्तिस्वभावोऽस्ति । कथमुच्यते  
उत्पत्तिनि स्वभाव इति । यदि नास्त्युत्पत्तिर्यस्तुतः । तत्स्य रूप-  
स्वभावाभावात् - यत्कव्या विवक्षिताभ्रता । तथा चैतस्त्वप्रतिज्ञाविरोधदोषः ।  
यदि परतन्त्रं स्वयमुत्पत्तिस्वभावशून्यमविद्यमाभिमित्यतः शून्यमुच्यते ।

112 This seems to be a treatise of this author, Bhavya Poussin remarks the following : Cet ouvrage n'est pas signalé, semble-t-il dans les Catalogues Chinois, mais le Siddhānta de Mañjunahorabhasaśra, II, 107b 1, attribue à Bhavya un *dharmasāra* po rtsa hgral de 'ñid bāud rtsir hyug pa = *Madhymakahrdayarjiti tatvāmrtaśāstra* Je ne pense pas que ce soit un autre nom de Tarkajvala ( Cordier, 300 ) que l'auteur du Siddhānta nomme par son nom, *rtog ge hbar ba*

113 Poussin has included this para in the section of *Pārvapakṣin*. Following the Chinese punctuation I have put it in the section of *Siddhāntin*

114 The sense is understood as being conveyed as in the previous passage : *yadā cakṣurādisamākṛtāḥ* । Poussin interprets otherwise

115 Lat. *utthiteṣu* or *pratyiteṣu*

116 Lat. *svabhāva utpattiḥ* = *svabhāvatāḥ utpattiḥ*

तदा सिद्धसाधनदोषः । तथा परेभ्यः 117 प्रत्ययेभ्य उत्पन्नस्य [ परतन्त्रस्य ]  
वस्तुतः अशून्यत्वात् न शून्यता नाम स्यात् । मम तु न तथा । कथं  
118 प्रलपसि योगाचारणामर्थः 119 सिध्यतीति ।

किञ्च यथोक्तम् । “येन हि शून्यं तदसद्भावात्, यच्च शून्यं तत्सद्भावात्”  
इत्यादि । यदि हेतुप्रत्ययवलेनोत्पन्नाश्चक्षुरादयः सर्वलोकसाधारणं  
वस्तुसन्तः स्योक्तिर्यन्ते । 120 आला बुद्धज्ञानगोचराः स्युः । संवृतं सत्यमावा-  
भासं प्रदृश्यमानं [ 162 ] परमार्थसत्यबुद्धज्ञानपर्येषण्या मायापुरुष-  
वदत्यन्तमसत्त्वभावम् । तस्मादुक्तं “येन शून्यं तदसत्त्वभावात्” इति  
शाश्वतान्तदोषपातप्रतिषेधाधेम् । शाश्वतान्तदोषपरिहाराय तदसत्त्वभाव-  
वचनयत् उच्छेदान्तदोषपातपरिहारायापि वचनं तत्सद्भावात् इति । तथाहि  
हेतुप्रत्ययवलोत्पन्नाश्चक्षुरादयः संवृतिसत्यपरिगृहीताः सत्यभावा न लघुप-  
वदत्यन्तासत्त्वमावपदार्थाः । तत्त्वतः परं तान् शून्यान् साधयामः ।  
तस्मादुक्तं “यच्च शून्यं तत्सद्भावात् । इत्येवं स्वमायशून्यता शास्त्रा  
देयमनुष्याणां यथाभूतमुक्तं” मिति । एतदर्थकं परतन्त्रः सत्त्वभाव इति  
यदि यदसि तदा साधूक्तं भवति । ईदृशसमायस्य मयापि स्योक्ततयात् ।  
121 लोकानुवर्तनवचनसंगृहीतत्वात् पुण्यज्ञानसंमाच्छ्रयस्य, संवृत्युपचारे

117. Op. M. vṛtti, p 444. Viṣṇūśaṅkara's *kalpitavākyasya*  
*śūnyatvam, apratītyasamutpannatvāt, tasmīrshakadācandrādīdarśa-*  
*navat* ।

118. Shu Shanghai ed reads *ms = dhrūṃgast*, which is adopted  
in Taisho ed. = Poussin says.

119. This is the remark of *Siddhāntin* against *Pervapakṣin*,  
repeating the latter's own words expressed at the commencement of  
*pervapakṣa*, see p. 56, para 3 above. So there is no need of un-  
necessary assumption as done by Poussin

120. *Chino = Buddha = Pratyabuddha*.

121. Cp. *Lokānuvartanagāthās* in *Mad. Avatāra*, my Skt. text,  
p. 40, and M. vṛtti, p. 548.

आधयस्य सत्त्वस्थापनात् प्रवृत्तिधर्मोऽपि सन् । तथा च "यदीदमसन्,  
प्रवृत्तिधर्मोऽप्यसन् तदा नास्तिकः अकथ्य" इत्येवमादिदोषः सर्वो न  
सिध्यति ।

किञ्च यदि साधयसि परतन्त्रं [ 16 b ] संवृत्त्या सत्त्वभावम्,  
तदा सिद्धसाधनम् । यदि तं परमार्थतः सत्त्वभावं साधयसि, साधर्म्य-  
दृष्टान्तहानिः । यथा ऐकान्तिकसत्त्वभावप्रदः प्रतिषिद्धः [ तथा ] ऐका-  
न्तिकासत्त्वभावोऽपि प्रतिषेधयितव्यः । तस्मात् नोत्कर्षापकर्षाभ्यामुक्त-<sup>122</sup>  
परतन्त्रस्वभावस्यापवादः स्यात् ।

यदि वदसि अनमिलाप्यस्वभावानां भावादीनां समदृष्टान्तत्वाभावात्  
मम प्रतिज्ञा न साधयेत् [ साध्यम् ] इति । अनमिलाप्यस्वभाव[त्वे ]  
युक्त्यसिद्धया नास्ति दोषः । तथा चेत् तीर्थिकः परिगृहीतमनमिलाप्य-  
स्वभावमात्मादिकं कः प्रतिषेद्धं शक्नुयात् । यतः तेऽपि वदन्ति सत्त्वभाव  
भात्मादि, न युद्धे नापि घवसो गोचर<sup>123</sup> इति ।

यदि प्रत्ययबलोत्पन्नः सर्वः परतन्त्रस्वभावः परमार्थतः सत्त्वभाव इति ।

122 Poussin compares this with two passages, one from the Bodhi-  
sattvabbūmi, Wogihara, p 48 - *na bhūtam aparadati nādhikam larcis*  
*na nyūnīharoti na utkṣipati na prakṣipati* and the other from  
Nāgārjuna - *Nāpāneyam atah līṅ cit nīkṣeptaṇyam na kiñcana*  
(*Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*, I, p 887, 394) This verse is also  
cited in the Buddhagottra of Vasubandhu, see his ad notes, p 145  
The source of this verse is now found to be Abh Alankāra of Maitreya,  
V, 21, cited in the Āloka, p 499

123 This is a plain reference to the Advaitic doctrine of the soul  
of ineffable character. It follows that the Yogācāras hold things  
magically created to be of ineffable nature (cp M Sūtrālaṅkāra, XI,  
15-30), which theory appears to be similar to the *anirvacanīyākhyātī*  
theory of Advaitins. Haribhadra says that the conception of *Śūnyatā*  
has been extended even to the Nirvāṇa, lest it should incur a *prade-*  
*śikāśūnyatā* like that of the Tīrthikas, Abh Āloka, 144. Cf passages of  
Prajñāpāramitās cited in Bod pañjālā, p 379.

मायापुरयस्तात्त्रिकपुण्यस्वभावः स्यात् । [ स ] अन्यस्वभाव इति चेन्न च युज्यते । गवि गदमस्वभावायोगात् । कृत्कारुतकस्वभावाः सद्भावासद्भावौ सस्वभावनिःस्वभावाौ चोभौ युगपत्संगृह्यताम् । एवं [ भवतः ] साध्यं साधर्म्यद्वष्टान्तविहीनं सिद्धसाधनं वा इति दोषद्वयोपलक्षणम् । अतो न युज्यते ।

किञ्च [ 17 a ] प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नान् संस्कृतधर्मान् परमार्थतः सस्वभावान् यद्यभ्युपगच्छसि । कृतकत्वहेतुः तान् स्वभावशून्यान् प्रदर्शयेन् तैर्पा सस्वभावं निराकरोति । अतः साध्यप्रतिज्ञाविरोधोऽनुमान-दोषः । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नाः संवृतितः सस्वभावाः सर्वसाधारणं ज्ञाताः, यदि परमाधेसन्तः परिगृह्यन्ते । अनेन न्यायेन तत्प्रतिज्ञाभङ्गः स्यात् । नैमं वाधं ते परिगृह्योयुः । परमाधेतो द्विविधस्यापि विकल्पस्यान्याप्यत्यात् ।

किञ्च यथामिधानमभिधेयस्वभावाभावः यथामिधेयमभिधानस्वभावाभाव इति यथोक्तम्, अत्र न विचिकित्सन्ते प्रतिवादिनः । अतः प्रतिषेध-वचनस्य सिद्धसाधनदोषः । यथोक्तत्वात्परतन्त्रस्वभावे परिकल्पित-गृहीतस्वभावः प्रवृत्तितोऽसन् इत्यत्रापि परवादिनो न विचिकित्सन्ते । अतः प्रतिषेधवचनस्यापि सिद्धसाधनदोषः । अभिधानाभिधेयपरिकल्पित-स्वभावप्रवृत्त्यात् संकलेश जायन्ते । अतः प्रतिषेध आवश्यक इति चेत् तदपि न युक्तम् । न हि पशुपश्यादयो जानन्त्यभिधानाभिधेयसंसर्गम् । विषयस्य योनिशोऽग्रहणमेव<sup>124</sup> हि [ 17 b ] संकलेशजननम् । अतः सन्ति विविधा अतिमनोरमाः [ न्यायाः ] । सन्ति च विविधानि सूक्ष्मा-पर्यवचनानि । [ तेषु ] परिकल्पितस्वभावशून्यतोपदेशः ब्रह्मपाशेन हितकरः न सव्यंशः । अतो न केवलमहं तं शून्यं साधयामि । किन्तु

124. — *Ayamślo manaskāra*, cf. *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* cited in *M. vṛtti*, p 452, 7.



परतन्त्रमपि । ] इत्यलं प्रासङ्गिकेन ।<sup>125</sup> प्रकृतं विचारयामः ।<sup>126</sup> एवं यथोक्तव्यायेन साधितं चक्षुः स्वभावशून्यमिति ॥

अन्ये पुनराचार्या भावस्वभावप्रतिषेधस्यास्यैवं दूषणमापादयन्त आहुः । यदीदं [ चक्षुः ] वस्तुसत्, प्रतिज्ञाहानिः, हेतोरनैकान्तिकासिद्धिः । यद्यस्तुसत् निःस्वभावमेव, असिद्धं दूषणम् । इति । तदपि न युक्तम् । यथा भगवानाह । जानीहि सर्वं ब्राह्मण यथोक्तं सत्यमसत्यमिति । अहं वदामि न सत्यं<sup>127</sup> न मृषा इति । अनेन वक्षनेन उक्तवक्ष्यमाणयुक्तिमिश्र परमार्थतः सत्यमसत्यमिति न व्यवस्थितम् । अतो नैवं यथोक्तदोषः । [ 182 ] किञ्च भगदाशयेन उक्तयुक्तिप्रतिषेध्याभावात् प्रतिषेधोऽपि नास्ति ।<sup>128</sup> न च प्रतिषेधेऽसति प्रतिषेध्यं पुनरस्ति । किन्तु प्रतिषेध्यस्य प्रकृतितो निःस्वभावत्वात् प्रतिषेधोऽपि नास्ति । प्रतिषेधः केवलं विचार्य ज्ञापयति<sup>129</sup> प्रतिषेध्यं प्रकृतितो निःस्वभावमिति । न नाशयति प्रतिषेध्यस्य स्वभावम् । यथाह । न बोधिसत्त्वः शून्यतया सर्वधर्मान् शून्यान्<sup>130</sup> करोति । अपितु सर्वधर्माः प्रकृतितः स्वभावशून्याः । इति यावद्विस्तरः ।

125 Lat *tiryagvāda*

126 Lat *visūtrayema prakṛtā* ( or *ṛṣu* ) *vādam* The expression is repeated in the second chap on f 7b, 1,7 ( Chin. text )

127. Cf. *Vajraschedika*, 37. *na satyam na mṛṣā*, *Raināvali* in *M. vṛtti*, p 359 • *Dṛṣṭaśrutādyam muninā na satyam na mṛṣoditam* ( L V P ).

128 Cf the line in *Abh. Āloka*, p. 51 : *Niṣedhyābhāratah spaṣṭam na niṣedhyo'sti tatpratītiḥ* ( L V. P. ) Cf also *Vig. vyākṛtina*, 64.

129 *Ibid*, *vṛtti* ad 65

130 *Kāśyapaparivarta*, p. 94, § 63 *na śūnyatayā sarvadharmān śūnyān karoṣi, dharmā eva śūnyā*, cited in *M. vṛtti*, p 248, ( L V. P. ), *M. Avatāra* ad VI 34 Cp. *Prajñāpāramitā • Bodhisattva....evam pratyavekṣate* *na rūpaśūnyatayā rūpam śūnyam* *rūpam eva śūnyam* *l* cited in *Bod. pañjika*, p 416, f

किञ्च यथा प्रकाशयित्रा प्रकाशयानां प्रकाशने न वक्तुं युक्तं प्रकाशयानां घटपटादीनामभावात् प्रकाशयितापि नास्त्येति । [ तथा ] न च वक्तुं युक्तं प्रकाशयपदार्थाः प्रकृतितोऽसन्तः इदानीं सन्तीति ।<sup>181</sup> मम च साध्यं प्रतिषेधः प्रतिषेध्यं साधनं दूषणं<sup>182</sup> सविपर्यासमविपर्यासं सर्वं संवृत्तिसत् । यदि साध्यं साधनञ्च प्रतिषेधयसि, तदा स्वप्रतिज्ञायाघः ।

इदं प्रतिषेधरचनमसाधनं युज्यते असत्त्वभावात्वात् धन्यापुत्रो-  
च्चरितशब्दवत् । [ इति चेत् ] भजनेवानुमानं साधनमिति स्वीकरोति ।  
ममापि तथा स्यात् संवृत्तिसत्त्वात् । पूर्वोक्तरीत्या विपुलवित्रादा निराकृताः ।  
विपुलस्तार्था दुर्ग्रहत्वात् भयसंज्ञासकाः ।

[ 18 b ] एवं पूर्वोक्तानुमानस्य न दूषणायरणानि सन्तीत्यतः प्रतिज्ञा  
सत्यतश्चक्षुरायतनं स्वमायशून्यमिति न्यायसंसिद्धा । प्रनीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात्  
इति साध्यहेतुः संक्षेपोपलक्षणम् । चक्षुरादीनां वक्तव्यस्वमायप्रतिषेधाय  
अन्येऽपि हेतयः सन्ति यदुत विनाशित्वात् अनुप्रत्ययं विभक्तत्वात् अभिनिर्घृ-  
त्वात् भावे सति मृपाङ्गानोरथापत्त्वात् इति । एभिर्हेतुभिः यथायोगं  
प्रतिषेधमनुसृत्य निपुणं प्रतिषेद्धव्यम् ।

अन्यः कश्चिदाह । चक्षुः वस्तुतः सत्यमायम्, तद्वक्षणेहेतुफलानां  
दृष्टत्वात् न स्वमायशून्यम् । [ यत् ] प्रत्यक्षलक्षणादिकं, [ तत् ] प्रत्यक्षं  
दृष्टम् । चक्षुरादीनां लक्षणादीनि च प्रत्यक्षं सन्ति । तस्मात् चक्षुरादीनि  
न स्वमायशून्यानि । इति । अस्य परमार्थतः समदृष्टान्ताभावात् सत्यमाय-  
[ ता ]<sup>183</sup> सिध्यति । यदि सांवृत्तज्ञानतः सत्त्वमायम्, तदा सिद्ध-

181 Cp. Udyotakara's remarks : *na hyayam vyākhyāṣya dharmo  
yad vyangyam vastu karyāt I apīn anyato bhūtam hetuṃ vyanakti I na  
hi pradīpo' santam artham janayitoḥ prakāśayati I N' Vṛtika, ॥ 519*

182 Or khaṇḍana.

183 Similar objection and answer have already been made on  
p. 43, para 3

साधनम् । समदृष्टान्ते हेतुसिद्धिर्विरद्धा । समदृष्टान्तस्य संवृतिमात्र-  
स्वभावत्वात् ।

यथा तत्त्वतश्चक्षुरायतनं स्वभावशून्यम्, तथा श्रावणघ्राणजिह्वाकायमनो-  
रूपशब्दगन्धरस [192] स्पर्शायतनधर्मायतनानि च स्वभावशून्यानि । इत्येवं  
योगाचारी स्वभावशून्यतां प्रविशेत् ।<sup>184</sup> सामान्यविशेषाभ्यां तत्त्वतः  
सिद्धानि स्कन्धधातुप्रतीत्यसमुत्पादस्मृत्युपस्थानसम्यक्प्रहाणश्रुदिपाद-  
इन्द्रियफलबोध्यङ्गपरमितासरसमाधिधारणोमुपसवप्रतिसंविद्दशबल्येशार-  
द्यावेणिकधर्मादीनि सर्वज्ञानानि<sup>185</sup> च स्वभावशून्यानि इत्येवं योगी  
स्वभावशून्यतां प्रविशेत् ।

तीर्थिकपरिकल्पिताः महद्बहुद्वारतन्मात्रेन्द्रियमहाभूत<sup>186</sup> द्रव्यगुण-  
कर्मादयः संस्कृतपदार्थाः सर्वेऽपि द्वावशायतनान्तर्गताः, बहुक्षणत्वात् । इत्येवं  
योगी स्वभावशून्यतां प्रविशेत् ॥

एवं [ योगी ] चिन्ताबलात्<sup>187</sup> स्वभावशून्यतां प्रविष्टोऽपि भावना-  
बलधिकलः<sup>188</sup> । यथा पक्षिणः जन्मारम्भे पक्षं प्रयोक्तुमसमर्थाः  
इत्यतः पुनस्त्वरितं प्रयोगबलमभ्यस्यन्ति<sup>189</sup> । यथा वा तैमिरिकः तिमिरनि-

181. *Wu-yu* = *pratēśa* Poussin has rendered it "pénétrer—comprendre" ( *avakram, pratiskand* )

185. Cf. Bod panykā, p 379 : ( *Bhagavatyaṁ uktam* ) ... *sa cet nirodānādaḥ kaścā dharma viśiṣṭataraḥ syāt, tam api aham māyopamam śrapnopamam vadāmi* ! with note thereon

186. *Ken shsh* = *Indriya, dravya* Poussin is wrong in taking these terms for *mēlabhūta* and *tattva* respectively

187. Second aspect of the *Prajñā*, *cintāmayi* effected by *yukti-nidhyāsi* ( = *anumāna* ), *Sthiramati*, *Tramēkābhāṣya*, p 26

188. Third aspect, *bhāvanāmayi* effected by *saṁādhi*, *Ibid.* Poussin refers to the *Kośa* VI, 143

189. Or *bhāvanābalaṁ abhyāsyais* [ *yogi* ]

राकारि मेव ज्यात् प्रतिपक्षात् लब्धचक्षुःप्रसादः महास्यूलकेशमशकादौ-<sup>140</sup>  
पोष [ 19 b ] विषयान् सम्यक् पश्यति । तथा त्वरितं भावनायलाभ्यांसात्  
संस्मृतनिमित्तप्रहमलविचित्सामिथ्याज्ञानानि निराकरोति ।

तत्त्वयोगी<sup>141</sup> अमिमुख्यारम्भे<sup>142</sup> अपरप्रत्ययं परमप्रीतिमुखं वेदयमानः  
सप्रेमंरुतनिमित्तप्रहविरहात् सर्वदेयदायकप्रतिप्राहकप्रहविरहात् सर्व-  
दायकप्रतिप्राहकदानफलप्रदायरहाच्च द्विविधप्रिमण्डलपरिशुद्धः<sup>143</sup> अप्रमाण-  
द्विविधपुण्यदानसंभार<sup>144</sup> भारत्संग्रहं समात्मते । ईष्टादृष्टफलानध्यवसितः  
हृष्ययस्तु भायिकलानभिरतः पुण्यान् इष्टान् गुणिनो नानादेवांश्च निपेयमाणः  
गुणःकर्ता, आत्मा कर्ता मद्भरः परमाणुः स्वभावादि [ वां कर्ता ] इति  
मिथ्याग्रहरहितः सदा अभ्यस्यति महात्यागम् । ईदृशादि यस्तु सः  
उत्तरक्ष्यमाणयुक्तिभिः साक्षात्करोति सर्वसंस्मृतासंस्मृतवर्णयवर्णन-  
धर्माणां स्वभावाद्यून्यत्वात् ।

140 Lit *kṣa māla pataṅga*, cf. M vṛtti p 350, 8; *tamirsko-  
palabdhakṣamajakūḍa*

141. Or *Tattvayogacārin*

142 The sixth stage of the ten bhūmis to which the whole 6th  
Chap of Mādhyamika has been devoted

143. Siddhi, 626, 629 Abh. Āloka, p 198, Prajñā in 100 000,  
p 92: *anupālambhāyogena dānasya, dāyakaśya pratigrāhakaśya ca  
trīmaṇḍalaparīśuddhyā dānapāramitā paripūrītā bhavati*, Lalita, p 217  
( Dib. Ind ), Śikṣāsāmuca 183 Bodhicaryāvatāra p 45 With  
regard to second triad, it is not found as such in any text but it might  
be meant by *ad* in this passage *dāyadāyapratigrāhakaśyāstīrānupālamb-  
bhena* Bod. Pañjikā, p 445 ( L. V. P. ) Op. M. Sūtrālaṅkāra ad  
XIII, 100: *pratipattitva pratipattivṛttasya pratipattitva evaikalpaṇa trī-  
maṇḍalaparīśuddhyā vedāvyā* 1

144 Dāna, śīla and kṣānti constitute *pūnyasambhāra* and dhyāna  
etc. jñāna- which are characterised as *saukatapadaśūddhanopayābhāra*,  
Bod. Pañjikā, pp 344-5 and 343

यथाह भगवान् । न भवितव्यं बोधिसत्त्वेन दानप्रतिषत्तो सुप्रतिष्ठितेन<sup>145</sup>  
अत्यन्ताभावप्रतिष्ठितेन दानं दातव्यम् । [ 20<sup>a</sup> ] इति यावद्विस्तरः । किञ्च  
भगवानाह । [ येषां ] बोधिसत्त्वानां सत्त्वसंज्ञा प्रवर्तते न [ ते ] तात्त्विक-  
बोधिसत्त्वव्यपेक्षया । इति । आह च भगवान् । यत्किञ्चनभावधर्म-  
विगतः<sup>146</sup> बोधिसत्त्वयानप्रस्थानकुशलो नाम । बोधिसत्त्वाः पुनर्न  
परिनिर्वाणाकांक्षया ग्रह्यत्रयं चरन्ति । परं प्रीताः खलु<sup>147</sup> त्रैधानुके संसारे ।  
इति ।

एवं सर्वे संस्कृताः स्यमावशून्या इति सम्यक् भावनां भाषयित्वा  
पुनः सम्यक् भाषयेत् यस्य<sup>148</sup> नास्ति स्यमावः तस्य नास्त्युत्पादः । यस्य  
नास्त्युत्पादः सत्तातीतानागतप्रत्युत्पन्नम् त्रिपिण्ड्यसु अप्रतिघम् इति ।  
[ एवं ] श्रव्यविशुद्धलक्षणं<sup>149</sup> सम्यक् भाषयित्वा, पूर्वोक्ताविपरीतयुक्त्या-  
धयेण त्रिमण्डलपरिशुद्धो महाबोधिमभिगच्छति । यथा पृच्छति । कथं  
मञ्जुध्रीः बोधिसत्त्वो महाबोधिमभिगच्छति । उत्तरमाह । यथा ब्राह्मण  
बोधिः<sup>150</sup> स्यात् । पुनराह । कथं नाम बोधिर्भवति । उत्तरमाह । इयं ब्राह्मण  
नातीता नानागता याचत्युत्पन्ना । इति । तस्मात् बोधिसत्त्वः श्रव्य-  
विशुद्धलक्षणं भाषयित्वा त्रिमण्डलपरिशुद्धो महाबोधिमभिगच्छेत् ॥

[ 20<sup>b</sup> ] महायानकस्तलरत्ने प्रथमखण्डः ॥

145 Vajracchedikā na vastupratisthita dānam dātavyam  
( L V P ) Cp M Sūtrālaṅkāra, extract in the note 143 above

146 Well pointed out in Prajñāpāramitā cited in Bod Paṅjikā  
pp 427-428, M vṛtti p 289 3 and Samādhirāja Sūtra Ibid II 5 14

147 Cp M Sūtrālaṅkāra, XVII, 49

148 This is an abridged statement of Kāśyapaparivarta, § 102.  
p 149 Cp Ratnacūḍa cited in the Śik Sam p 234, l. 16-17

149 Lat trā adhvano vśuddhalakṣaṇa or nṛmatān

150 Bodhi is given as simile in this line yathā bodhī tathā hyeṣā  
kanta buddhā prabhāsvatī I Bod Paṅjikā II 522, cp. Abh Āloka  
p 430

# महायानकरतलरत्नम्

## II

### [ असंस्कृतपरीक्षा ]

पयमुक्तं योगी सामान्यतः संस्कृतान् स्वभावशून्यान् प्रविशेत् इति । न तु असंस्कृतान् स्वभावशून्यान् प्रविशेदिति । अप्रदर्शिते प्रवेशो न संभवेत् । अप्रवेशो निर्विकल्पप्रज्ञाप्रवेशो नैव सिध्येत् । प्रदर्शनार्थं पुनराह ।

असंस्कृतास्त्वसद्गुता अनुत्पादाः क्षपुष्यवत् ॥

अत्र प्रतिपाद्यचनव्ययच्छेदकं पूर्वोक्तं तत्त्वत इत्येव । व्यवच्छेदावश्यकता-  
त्तात्पर्यञ्च यथापूर्वं ज्ञेयम् । तत्त्वतः असंस्कृताः शून्याः साध्यन्ते, न संवृतिनः ।  
न संस्कृता असंस्कृताः, संस्कृतविपरीता असंस्कृतपदार्थाः । न एवाकाशं  
प्रतिसंख्याननिरोधोऽप्रतिसंख्याननिरोधस्तथता च । यदुत निराकृतपूर्वधर्मा-  
यतनेकदेशः ।

आकाशास्य स्वभावशून्यताप्रवेशः पूर्वप्रदर्श्यते । [ 16 ] प्रदर्शनस्य सुकर-  
त्वात्, १प्रतिघट्टव्याभावमात्रस्याकाशनाम्ना लोकसाधारणं स्थापितत्वाच्च ।  
२एतद्वशिष्टासंस्कृतस्वभावशून्यताप्रवेशस्य द्वारं भवेत् । लोकज्ञातः  
आकाशस्तस्यतः शून्यः असत्स्वभाव इतीयं प्रतिज्ञा । एतत्साध्यं तस्यत

1. Lit. yade apradarshitam, jo-pu-kas-sha

2. Cp. Note 23 below. The theory of Sarvāstivādians on Ākāśa, Poussin's Document d' Abhidharma, BEFO, 1930, p. 274, 2. & 4. Note also Yaśomitra's remark : svamātan tu sapratighadravyābhāvamūtram ākāśam ityabhisprāyo lakṣyate I, 28.

3. Lit. anena.

असदुभूत आकाश इति । अपक्षद्वयान्युपगतः अनुत्पादात्, प्रवृत्तिसिद्धानुत्पाद-  
धर्मत्वाद्वा इति हेतुः । खपुष्पमसदुभूतमनुत्पन्नञ्चेति समद्वष्टान्तः सिद्धः ।  
विपक्षे प्रतिषेधाय धैर्धर्मद्वष्टान्तः स्थाप्यते इत्यतो नोच्यते इति यथा-  
पूर्वक्षेयम् ।

कथमत्रानुमानं व्यवस्थाप्यते । तथाहि आकाशस्तत्त्वतोऽसदुभूतः,  
अनुत्पादात् । [ ये ] अनुत्पन्ना [ स्ते सर्वेऽपि ] असत्त्वमावाः खपुष्पयत्  
इति मूढा विद्वंसश्च समं जानन्ति । अनुत्पादादित्यर्थं साध्यहेतुरपलक्षणम्<sup>४</sup> ।  
अन्येऽपि हेतवः सन्ति अद्वैतकत्वात् अकारित्रत्वात् अनिरुद्धयिनाशित्वात्  
इति । यवमादयो हेतवः असंस्मृतस्वभावं व्यवहियमाणं प्रतिषेधयन्ति ।  
तस्माद्यथायोगं हेतुस्थेन लभ्यन्ते । यथा [ २९ ] कावेभ्यो<sup>५</sup> दधि रक्ष्यता-  
मिति वचनं रक्षणीयस्य [ वध्नः ] अनुपधातत्वात् तज्जातीयविहाल-  
मृषिकादौनपि प्रतिषिध्यात् ।

यैमापिकाः सर्वे इदं दूषयन्ति । असंस्मृतोऽसत्त्वमाधोऽमायपदार्थ  
इति यदि प्रतिज्ञा साध्या । तदा आकाशायतनसमापत्तिर्निरालम्बना<sup>६</sup> सतो  
कथमस्तीति लभ्येत । तथा “आकाशमनावृत्तिः”<sup>७</sup> इति तु लक्षणमस्ति । इति ।  
यद्ययमनुमानप्रयोगः आकाशायतनसमापत्तिं वस्त्यलम्बना द्रव्यसत्ति-

4. Poussin wrongly construes this phrase along with Ākāśa II  
Sādhyā is admitted by both parties, there is nothing to be proved Such  
proving will incur Siddhasādhana-doṣa

5. *Luch chū ming-hsiang.* ( Lat *Saṅkṣpya nāmalakṣaṇa uddha-  
rana* ) The same expression is used in the first chap in the same  
context. v p 63. para 3, above

6. This is the well-known example for *upalakṣaṇa* given in the  
fastale literature ~ Chinese will read literally thus - *bhavatu kara*  
[ *atha* ] *madam dadhe rakṣyatām kūko mā upasarpasu it i*

7. The first of the *Krūpyas*, v Kośa viii, 143, 209, 213 ( L. V. P.)

8. Kośa, Tib I. 61 *Tatra ākāśam anāvṛtiḥ.*

यथा वा । यस्तत्समापत्तित्वात्, यस्तत्समापत्तेरालम्बनविषयत्वाद्वा, यथान्याः समापत्तयः, यथा वा तदालम्बनम् इति । अन्याः समापत्तयः तदालम्बनञ्च संसृजतत्वात् स्वभावशून्या विचारिता एव, तदा समदृष्टान्तविरहः ।

अयं परमार्थत आकाशालक्षणविचारः । यदि संवृत्त्यापि साध्यम् आकाश-मसद्भूतम्, अनुत्पादात् खपुष्पवत् इति । अनेनानुमानेन श्वेतद्वयस्थापितः-सद्भावो न सिध्यति । अनेन च मधुकहेतुना मधुदुक्तः समापत्तेराग्नयनविषय-त्वादिति हेतुः धिरुद्धाव्यभिचारि [ 2 b ] दुष्टः । तस्मान्नमया पूर्वं साधि-तोऽयं सिद्धः । बाधकामाधात् ।

स्यपरनिकायिनं इदमाहुः । यदि तस्यत आकाशमसद्भूतमनुत्पादात् इति । अनेन घञनेन उत्पन्नं सत्यं सद्भूतम् इत्यर्थादापद्यते<sup>10</sup> । यदि चदसि उत्पन्नमप्यसद्भूतमिति । तदार्थं हेतुर्न सत्यसपक्षव्यापोति हेतुत्वा-सिद्धिः । इति ॥ अयमर्थापत्तिसमजातिदोषो [ नाम ] असिद्धिदोषा-भासः । अनुत्पन्नानि सर्वाणि असद्भूतानि इतोदं निर्धारितम्, न तु निर्धारितम् असद्भूतानि सर्वाणि अनुत्पन्नानिति । अयत्नानन्तरीयत्वं सर्वसपक्षव्याप्यपि<sup>11</sup> हेतुः स्वीक्रियते । तस्मादययदोषः ॥

अन्यः<sup>12</sup> काश्चिद्दूषयति । आकाशं सत्यभावम्, लोकसाधारणं ज्ञातत्वात् ।

9. = Vaibhāṣika

10. = arthāpatti : chun

11. It does not exist in the *vidyut*, lightning, which is *sapakya* to the *pat*, *ghaṭa*. Similarly composite thing is non substance, yet it is originated through causes and conditions

12. Some philosophers like Sabarasyāmin and Kumārila, etc who hold the realistic view of the Universe, v. Śabarabhāṣya I, (*airāṇambava vāda*) and Kumārila's *Tantravārtaka*, ad *yāgyadāhikarāna*, *Udyotakara*, *Nyāyavārtika*, p 340



पुष्पमपि सस्यमाधम् उत्पलादेर्लोके<sup>13</sup> प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । आकाशं पुष्पञ्चोमे  
असंयुक्तेऽपि न निःस्यभावे । अतः खपुष्पदृष्टान्तेन न साध्यं सिध्यति ।  
इति । इदं दूषणं न युज्यते । अयं खपुष्पदृष्टान्तः पृष्ठोत्तपुरुषाश्रयेण  
व्याख्यायते [ 3 a ] अस्य पुष्पं खपुष्पमिति । तस्यासत्त्वात् न दृष्टान्तस्या-  
भायः ॥ अनया युक्त्या योगी आकाशस्यमावशून्यतामयतरेत् । [ तथा ]  
प्रतिसंख्याननिरोधादिविधिधासंस्कृतानां स्वभावशून्यतानयोऽप्ययतार्यः ॥

यंभाषिकाः प्रतिसंख्याननिरोधासंस्कृतस्य [शून्यता] मशममाणा इदं दूषणं  
पुनः कुर्वन्ति । भगवानवोचत् । अस्ति प्रतिसंख्याननिरोधः संस्कृतप्रतिपक्षः ।  
अतो निस्सरणं नाम । यद्यप्यदर्शनास्तीति, तदा भवता समयविरोधः ।  
किञ्च भगवतोक्तम् । भन्दिरागसहगतायाः तृष्णायाः<sup>14</sup> क्षयो निरोधः शान्तं  
प्रणीतं<sup>15</sup> निर्वाणं नाम । इति । कथं पदार्थनास्तीति ॥

तत्र भगवता संस्कृतविषये चिनेयानामुद्भवावनां<sup>16</sup> प्रयतोपतुं  
असंस्कृतविषये प्रीतिमनुकूलयितुं च संवृत्तित उक्तम् । अस्ति प्रतिसंख्या-  
निरोधो निस्सरणं<sup>17</sup> शान्तं प्रणीतं निर्वाणमिति । यथा भगवानाह सन्ति  
निर्मितसत्त्वा<sup>18</sup> इति । तथैवाह अस्यसंस्कृतं निर्याणमिति । [ परं ]  
तदस्तित्वस्वाकारात् न प्रतिज्ञाविरोधद्वयः ।

तस्यतस्तु प्रतिसंख्याननिरोधः प्रतिषिध्यते । अतो भगवानाह । [ 3 b ]  
[ ये ] सत्त्वा निर्वाणं भावतः पश्यन्ते [ तान् ] अहं वदामि मोहपुरुषान्

13. *Wen. po. lo.* 2 .

14. *Taisho ed. reads : vedany ( L. V. P. ).* So also reads Shan-  
ghai Ed.

15. = Wei. (= miao). *Op. M. vrtti, p. 525 : yo 'sya nāndirāgasaka-*  
*janīryatē śymāyātē śpyanē, vōo, śōa*. I, (64) p. 436, 3.

16. Or nirveda.

17. = *visamyoga* of Kośa, I.

18. Kośa, IX, 258 ( L. V. P. ).

तोर्यिकपुत्रान्<sup>19</sup> इति । पेयालम् । किञ्चाह । संसारं तथागत न निर्वाण-  
पर्यवसन्नं<sup>20</sup> पश्येत् । निर्वाणवचनं प्राप्तव्या स्थापितम् । तत्रात्यन्तं नास्ति  
निर्वाणस्यमायः इति । पेयालम् । नाप्यार्यसत्यापवादोपः । सुखदुःख-  
योस्त्यन्तानुत्पादेन निःसरणं निर्वाणं शान्तं प्रणीतमधिपरीतमिति संवृतिर  
उक्तत्वात् । न तु परमार्थतो वचनं सुखदुःखयोस्त्यन्तानुत्पादेन प्रकृतशान्तं  
निरुद्धं निरोधसत्यं नाम इति । अनेनागमेन<sup>21</sup> उक्त्युक्त्या च नास्ति परमार्थतः  
प्रतिसंख्याननिरोधः इति वचनस्य नास्त्ययं दोषः<sup>22</sup> ॥

अन्येऽसन्नेयायिका एवं दूषयन्ति । असंस्कृतास्त्यसदुभूता इति साध्य-  
प्रतिज्ञा । असंस्कृतं असदिति साध्यासिद्धिः, आश्रयासिद्धिः, यपुषस्या-  
सत्त्वात् [ दृष्टान्त ] धर्म्यसिद्धिश्च । इति साध्यहेतुदृष्टान्ताः सर्वेऽपि  
दुष्टाः । इति । एवं दूषणं न युक्तम् । संज्ञाप्रज्ञापिलेन सप्रतिघट्टव्या-  
भायमात्रं<sup>23</sup> [ 4<sup>a</sup> ] माफाशं स्थापयामः । प्रज्ञया प्रतिसंख्यया उत्पन्नयलेशा-  
मायमात्रं प्रतिसंख्याननिरोधं स्थापयामः । सर्वप्रत्ययवैकल्येन उत्पत्ति-  
धर्माणाममायमात्रमप्रतिसंख्याननिरोधम् । सर्वप्रज्ञामायमात्रं<sup>24</sup> तथताम् ।  
संज्ञाप्रज्ञापिलेन आफाशादयः संवृतिसिद्धाः<sup>25</sup> सन्ति इत्यभ्युपगमात्<sup>26</sup> ॥

19 Cf. Sutra cited in M. vṛtti, 541 *Tad ime bhagavaṇ mohapurusaḥ*  
[ ye ] *śākhyaḥ dharmavinaye pravrajya śrīḥkadyetau nipaśitāḥ nir-*  
*vānaṁ bhāvataḥ paripreṣante । tad yathā śīlebhyaḥ tathā kṣīrā sarpaḥ ।*  
*atyantaparipreṣeṣe sarvadharmāṇa ye nirvānaṁ mārganti tān ahaṁ*  
*abhiśamānskān śrīḥkīkān ete vadāmi ।*

20 Poussin : "Le Tathāgata ne voit pas le Samsāra et le Nirvāṇa."

21 Shen-chiao = Āryasāṅgā = āgama

22 = Saṁnyavirodha

23 Cf. Note B above

24 Poussin suggests with query : *sarvopalābhyānāstīva*

25 = Chia-Is : Or *auspaticā*.

26 My punctuation is according to the Chinese text Poussin connects this sentence with the following one

अप्रकाशितविशेष साधारणाम्युपगमबलेन सामान्यतः सिद्धो धर्मो । विशेषप्रतिषेधः साधारणाप्रतीतः प्रतिज्ञाधर्मः<sup>27</sup> । अनुत्पादादयः साधारणं प्रतीताः पक्षधर्माः । तस्माद्भास्ति प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदोषः । उक्तं खपुष्यं असदपि अनुत्पादादिधर्मको धर्मो । निःस्वभावत्वात् । अनेन साध्यसाधनभावः सिध्यति । अतो नास्ति धर्म्यसिद्धिदोषः ॥

यैमापिकाः पुनरेवं वदन्ति । इदमप्ययुक्तम् । प्रतिसंख्याननिरोधः घस्तुसन्<sup>28</sup> मार्गालम्बनत्वेन बलेश्चिरोधित्वात् । नावस्तुधर्मा एतद्भास्तिः स्यात् । इति । मायमात्ररचनमिदं, विपक्षप्रतिषेधात्<sup>29</sup> [ 4<sup>b</sup> ] आकाशस्य सत्त्वमायहेतु<sup>30</sup> प्रतिषेधरत् पूर्णमेव खण्डितमिति न युक्ततरं ग्राह्यम् ॥

सौशान्तिकाः सघर्ष<sup>31</sup> आकाशादयोऽसत्त्वमाया इति स्थापने इदं वदन्ति । ईदृशानुमानं सिद्धसाधनदुष्टम् । सप्रतिषेधपापमायस्वभावात्मका इति यदि पचनम्<sup>32</sup> । न सिद्धसाधनम् । [तदभावस्य विनादात्<sup>33</sup> इति । असंस्कृता असदुभूता इति [ यम ] प्रतिज्ञावचनमिदं सत्त्वमायग्रहं सम्यग्निराकरोति असत्त्वमायग्रहमपि निराकृत्यापवादति ॥

27. = *Sādhyadharmā*, lit *paljadharmā*

28. Or *dravyasaṃ* Op Kośa, V. 8a 1 (L. V. P.)

29. In criticising the *prayoga* of *Ākāśa* being a reality, lack of *Samaśreṣṭānta* was pointed out (v p 69 para 1 above), but here in criticising the reality of *pratisaṅkhyānirodha* lack of *vipakṣa* has been revealed. When *probandum* is *sad* *vipakṣa* will be *asad*, viz. *nirmisṛṣṭa* which has a specific function even though it is *asad*.

30. Ku which I have taken in the sense of *hetu*

31. This clearly shows that there are some minor divisions amongst the *Sautrāntikas*. Poussin refers their opinions to Kośa, I, 279

32. Lit *vacanārthah*

33. *Prem* to argue', "quarrel about".

ताम्रशाटीयाः पुनरेवं वदन्ति । छिद्ररूपमाकाशमुच्यते । तदस्ति संसृतम्<sup>34</sup> अतो भवतोऽसंसृतनिराकरणं सिद्धसाधनदुष्टम् । इति । संसृत-  
स्वभावस्य यथापूर्वं निराकृतत्वात् न युक्तम् ॥

वात्सीपुत्रीया धैमापिकेः सह बहुषु वादेषु<sup>35</sup> समानाः त इव निराकरणीयाः ॥

योगाचारा इदं वदन्ति । परमार्थे न पुनः परमार्थोऽस्ति । तथैव  
[ 5\* ] धर्माणं परमार्थ इत्यतः परमार्थतत्त्वयतां शून्यमिति<sup>36</sup> वक्तुं न्याय्यम् ।  
नतु पुनस्तथता न सत्स्वभाव इति । कथं लोकोत्तरनिर्विकल्पज्ञानं  
३७ तत्पुष्टलम्बविशुद्धलौकिकज्ञानज्ञासंसृतविषयालम्बनं युज्येत । इति । नैदं  
वस्तुतो न्याय्यम् । यथोच्यते<sup>38</sup> इदं ज्ञानमसंसृतविषयालम्बनं न युज्यत  
इति । तथा इदं ज्ञानं संसृतविषयालम्बनमपि न युज्यते । न तथता  
द्रव्यसती इति ब्रह्मो युक्तः । अस्या वस्तुसत्तायाः दुस्ताधनत्वात् । तथता-

34 See Kōśa, I, 49. ( L V. P. )

35 Lit *grāha*, or *grāhya* Of Kōśavyākhyā, I, 5 : *Nirodha* is only an *asamskṛta* for *Vātsīpatīyaa*

36 Poussin remarks : "Dans une étoffe, il n'y a pas une second étoffe". Le sens paraît être : "on peut dire que le Paramārtha (=Tathatā) est vide, parce qu'il n'y a pas une Tathatā de la Tathatā". Les Yogācāras expliquent tout autrement la vacuité du Pariniṣpanna ( ou Tathatā ), Siddhi, 543, Yogācāra, 76, p. 710, 3.

37. On the two jñānas and their objects, Siddhi, 583-590, Dharmaśāstra on Centuries, 247, 1, 18, 248, 3. 8. ( L V. P. ).

38. Shenghai ed. and probably Taisho ed. also read : 'śhā, -laukika for tzu = idam.

लम्बनं ज्ञानं न तत्त्वतो लोकोत्तरनिर्विकल्पज्ञानं, सालम्बनत्वेन<sup>39</sup> संसृत-  
त्वात् । एतदालम्बनज्ञानवत्<sup>40</sup> ।

तस्मात् सूत्रमाह । किं मञ्जुश्रोः प्रज्ञाचक्षुः पश्यति । आह । अत्यन्ता-  
भाव [रूपं] प्रज्ञाचक्षुर्येन<sup>41</sup> पश्येत् । पुनराह । कतमन्मञ्जुश्रोः परमार्थ-  
सत्यम् । आह । यत्र<sup>42</sup> ज्ञानस्याप्यप्रचारः । कः पुनर्वादोऽक्षराणाम् ।  
पुनराह । स्यागतो ब्राह्मण न बोधिममिसमेति । किञ्चाह सूत्रम् ।  
कतमन्मञ्जुश्रोः सत्यदर्शनम् । आह । यत्र धर्मस्यादर्शनम्<sup>43</sup> । एतज्जातीय-  
सूत्राणामाशयगृहोत्तारो [ ५० ] न स्वीकुर्युर्दिदं निर्विकल्पकं ज्ञानममिसमेति  
तथतालम्बनञ्चेति ।

किञ्च सा तथता न परमार्थः आलम्बनत्वात्, रूपादियत् ।

यदुक्तं भवता परमार्थे न पुनः परमार्थोऽस्ति इति । यद्यनेन ध्वनेन  
अस्मिन् तदभावात् [ इदं ] शून्यमिति<sup>44</sup> शून्यसमाख्या, एते न पुनः  
पटोऽस्तीति गवाजपालादयोऽपि सामान्यतो जानन्ति । तेऽपि तस्य-  
दर्शिनः स्युः<sup>45</sup> । किञ्च मिथ्यादृष्टिविपक्षत्वात् एवं शून्य[ तो ]पदेशः ।  
परमार्थे न पुनः परमार्थोऽस्तीति तज्जातीयमिथ्यादृष्टिसमायोगस्यासंभवात्

39 Or *Sālabhanatvat*

40 Same difference of reading as noted in the note 38 above. Poussin says that he would translate the phrase into Skt. *lokālam-  
banayāñnatat* I would, however, suggest a more idiomatic Skt  
*laukikālabhāna*

41 — So *ch’an* ! See *Satasāhasrikā*, § 295 ( L. V. P )

42 Lit *atra*

43 See the discourse of Bhagavān to Mañjuśrī in *Āryadharmasū-  
tra*, M. viii, 295-298 in what manner one should see the  
truths ( L. V. P )

44 Poussin suggests the phrase : *tatra tadabhāvāt* [ *tat* ] *śūnyarū-  
pate* . i. ‘Mais la premier Kōng fait difficulté’.

45 *Lañkāv. sūtra*, 282 : *Sarve syuḥ tattvadarśinaḥ* !

तत्प्रतिषेधको न स्यात् एवं शून्य[ तो ]पदेशः । सा तथता च न सत्त्वमाया पूर्वोक्तानुमानविरोधात् ॥

न तथागतः पश्यति संसारं यावन्निर्वाणम् । संप्रजानाति च भाव-  
विपर्ययोत्पन्नकलेशविगतं प्रष्टव्योत्पन्ताजातिस्वभावम्<sup>46</sup> । एवं संप्रज्ञानस्वरूपं  
प्रष्टव्यात्यन्तमसंप्रज्ञानं नचासंप्रज्ञानमिति । अनेनागमेन तथता सर्वविकल्पो-  
पशममात्रं<sup>47</sup> [ 6<sup>a</sup> ] न सत्त्वमाया इति श्रेयम् । नान्ययतो<sup>48</sup> न च्यतिरेकतः  
सत्त्वमायस्तथता आश्रयपरावृत्तिलक्षणो धर्मकायः<sup>49</sup> सिद्ध्यति । शून्यता-  
दर्शनं<sup>50</sup> प्रतिपक्षमार्गलाभात् सर्वाविकल्पपरिकल्पितयोजाश्रये विपाकविज्ञाने<sup>51</sup>  
विकल्पादिबीजानि निश्शेषमुपशान्यन्ति । हेतुप्रत्ययामायादत्यन्तानुत्पादः

46. Cp. Satyadvayaśāstra, M vṛtti, p. 374 Mañjuśrī explains to Devaputra : *yatsamā paramārthatah tathatā dhārmadhātuh atyantā jñātsica tatsamāni paramārthatah paścānantaryāni...*

47. Or nirodhamūtram

48. *fei-ls-fei-yu. shih-hen* Poussin translates the first part, *fei ls fei yeou* "Tathatā—non pas à part d'être, non pas être" and connecting the second part che sing along with the next word reads *shih-tatathatā*. I have rendered it as above following the Chinese punctuation. Further his rendering *fei ls (=fei ls yeou)* into "non pas à part d'être" is far from correct. *ls* means simply separation, 'absence of anything', not 'partly separation', etc. since *ls* is used in contrast with *yu*, I have put them *vyatireka* and *anvaya* respectively

49. Siddhi, 606. *Āśrayaparavṛttim anūtpādam vādāni aham—* Latkāvatāra, 202 ( comp 265, 275, 284, 322, 338, L. V. P. ).

50. Poussin remarks : "Dans Abhidharma, le chemin "contreca-  
rrant" qui est la vue des quatre vérités, expulse la passion ; il est suivi  
d'un chemin de délivrance, *vismuktimārga* : délivrance qui résulte de l'  
expulsion, Kośa, Index, p. 84.

51. Another name of *Ālayavijñāna*, Siddhi, 166.

प्रवृत्त्यानुत्पादं प्रवृत्त्या सदास्थितिः<sup>62</sup> नाम तथागतः आश्रयपरावृत्तिः धर्मकाय इति । यथोक्तं सूत्रे<sup>63</sup> । तथागत इति मञ्जुश्रीः अत्यन्तं प्रवृत्त्याजातिपदम् । नित्यमनुत्पत्तिधर्म इदमुच्यते तथागत इति ॥

यदि यदसि तथता व्यवहारविनिर्मुक्तापि सत्स्वभावा इति । तदा तीर्थिकानामात्मानमेव तथता इति संज्ञाविशेषेण व्यवहरसि<sup>64</sup> । यथा सा तथता सत्स्वभावाऽपि परमार्थतोऽसिद्धसदादिविकल्पा । तथात्मापि । तेऽपि हि मन्यन्ते-आत्मा यिमुर्नित्यं कर्ता मोक्षापि विकल्पमुक्तं, अभिलाष-भोचरानास्त्वत्वात् विकल्पपुद्गलानामनन्तत्वाच्च विकल्पमुक्त इत्याख्यायते । इति । उक्तं हि सदागमे<sup>65</sup> । [ 6b ] [ यत्र ] वाक् न प्रवरति चित्तं मनश्च न पश्यति स आत्मा इति । तल्लक्षणे आत्मनि पुनर्यदसि तथतालम्बन-ज्ञानान्मुक्तिं लभते मात्मात्मन्यल्लानात् केन विशेषेणेदम् । सर्वथा<sup>66</sup> नास्तीत्युच्यते । [ उभयोः ] सत्स्वभावत्वात् । केवलं पक्षपातेन एवं यदसि । अतो नाहं सध्वं स्वीकरोमि । एवं तथता आत्मसरूपा यस्तुसती नास्तीत्यलं विवादेन । सस्या यिपुल्यतार्थोद्विग्रा दुर्महत्वात् ।<sup>67</sup> तत्त्वामृता-यतारै ॥<sup>68</sup> यिचारितपूर्वम् [ इदम् ] ।

62 = *Prakṛtisūtya of Siddhi*, 701 ( L V P )

63 Comp *Vajracchedikā - Tathatā ite subhūte bhūtatathatāyāh. anutpādadharmatāyāh. dharmocchedasya. aliyantānutpannasya etada-dhivacanam* !

64 Cp, *Laṅkāvatāra* 77, where one sees that 'the doctrine of Tathāgatagarbha is similar to Ātmavāda ( L V P )'.

65 Cp *Kaṭha up VI 12* *Naiva vācā na manasā prāptum śakyah*, etc *Kena I, 4 8*, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka III, 7, 17, 20*

66 = *Pin wu* Shanghai ed roads *ping wu*

67 This work is already mentioned by the author, see note 112 in the first chapt p 58.

68 Lat *vikalpitam*

केचित्स्ययूष्याः होनयानिनः पुनरेवं वदन्ति । द्वादशायतनसंगृहीताः संस्कृतासंस्कृता नियमेन सस्वभावाः । यस्मात् कश्चित् दुःखादिषोडशाकारकचतुरार्यसत्यै दर्शनभाष्यनामार्गद्वयं प्रयोगेनाभ्यसन् दर्शनभाष्यनाद्वयान् सर्वत्रैधातुकसंगृहीतान् क्लेशाप्रहोन् निरुद्धानः उपशमितसर्वत्रैधातुकदुःखो मयति । इति । सर्वधर्माः स्वभावशून्या इति यदि न संदर्शयेयम् । कस्त्वजेदिमं<sup>60</sup> श्लेषम् । को वा पुनरभ्यसेदिमं गुणम् ।

यानत्रये संभारेन्द्रियस्यमावा- [ 7<sup>a</sup> ] धिमुक्तिविमिन्नेऽपि धमिसमयः धार्यमार्गश्चामिन्नः<sup>60</sup> इति तु सर्वे ययं श्रद्धाप्रदे । क्लेशावरणप्रहाणस्येष्टत्वात्<sup>61</sup> । संवृत्तिनयेन स मार्गो विमिन्नः । यदि धर्मनैराहम्याथतारमपाकरोपि शोयावरणस्याप्रहाणात् शास्ता प्रादेशिकविमुक्तः<sup>62</sup> स्यात् ।

ननु<sup>63</sup> मुक्तिमुक्तेरिमिन्नेति किं नोपदिष्टम् । सत्यमुपदिष्टम् । क्लेशावरणविमुक्तिसाध्यादैयमुक्तम् । न तु सर्वप्रकारेण । यथा रोमकूपो महाकाशेन तुलितोऽपि नामिन्नः<sup>64</sup> । तथा नो चेत्<sup>65</sup> विशिष्टफलक्रियानारम्भिका .

60 Lit. even.

60 This is the remark of Hinayānists, Vasumitra, *Traité des sectes*, Masuda, V, 37, IX, 22, X, 3, Siddhi, 702 (L V P.)

61 On the two āvarāṇas see Siddhi, 564 (L V P.)

62 Poussin translates "Dans ce cas, le Grand Maître devrait enseigner une délivrance partielle" But *Ok ang* means 'to accomplish', not 'to teach' etc

63 Poussin puts this and the previous sentence in one paragraph under the remarks of Hinayānists. My punctuation is based on the Chinese one in the present edition of the text

64 Cp. Varpaṇārthavaruṇa F W Thomas, Ind. Ant 1903, (vol 33), 346 at Hoernle, MSS Remains, 78 —

शेयकूपजुर्द्धच्छ्रेणद्वय प्रतिविम्बयेत्, etc.

65 See Kośa VI, 197, 277, on *viśeṣamārga*.—Ascetic obtains *vimuktis* successively. (L. V. P.)



प्रकृत्यभिहा<sup>66</sup> स्यात् । साक्षात्कृतञ्च न तत्त्वपर्यन्तः स्यात् इत्यलं प्राप्तङ्गिकेन ।  
प्रकृतं विचारयामः ॥

योगी स्वसमयकल्पितमाकाशादिकं शून्यं प्रविष्ट इव परसमयकल्पितान्  
प्रकृतिपुरुषपरमाणीभवरफालदिग्जीवादिपदार्थान् शून्यान् प्रविशेत् ।

तत्र ७<sup>67</sup> प्रकृतिपुरुषवादिन इदं दूषणमाहुः । अस्मत्पक्षे त्रिधातुः सव  
[ 7 b ] ७<sup>68</sup> तपुष्पवत्परिणता [ इति ] नास्तत्त्वपुष्पम् । तस्य सत्त्वेन सम-  
द्वष्टान्तो न सिध्यति साध्यविरोधात् । इति । इदानीं ७<sup>69</sup> पर्यनुयोक्तव्यम्  
[ यत् ] त्ययोक्तं त्रिधातव सर्वे तपुष्पवत्परिणता इति । किमेकं त्रिधातु  
[ मयं ] तपुष्पमस्तोति । , तव पक्षस्य साधारणप्रतीतिवाधात् न  
युज्यते । यदि घदसि त्रिधातु [ मयं ] तपुष्पं नास्तोति । तदा न सिध्यति  
समद्वष्टान्त इति तव मूलपक्षस्य हानिः ।

यदि घदसि न हानिः । तपुष्पमसच्छब्दः<sup>70</sup> । उक्तत्रिधातूनां

66 Poussin construes this along with the next word and translates *Ce qui est réalisé par jddhi abhiṣā ne serait pas vraiment définitif*. He further remarks the translation is doubtful. He refers to *Anguttara* II, 274 'la riyā- [ na ] et vimuktī sont sacchikatavva par i abhiṣā', My translation is based on Chinese punctuation and syntax

67 Note this is an early Sankhya school prior to the classical Sankhyas mentioned in the next section

Or kṣepuṣākāram, or — ābhāsam

69 Or paryanuyoga Poussin refers to *Kośa* XXV, 5a 8, *Nyāya-bindu*, 74, N *Kośa*

70 See additional Notes for explanation. Poussin taking this word along with the next one translates "parce que la fleur du ciel a la nature des trois dhātus désignées par le mot *abhāra*, inexistence". This interpretation stands unconnected with *paryanuyoga* raised in the next sentence. So following the Chinese punctuation I have interpreted ॥ so as to suit with the context.

सस्वभावत्वात् । तदापि विचारणीयम् । किमाह भवान् अहं वदामि  
 खपुष्पं नास्ति साधर्म्यद्वष्टान्त इति । किं वा खपुष्पमस्ति  
 साधर्म्यद्वष्टान्त इति । यदि आह भवान् अहं वदामि खपुष्पं नास्ति  
 साधर्म्यद्वष्टान्त इति । दुष्टो विचारः<sup>71</sup> । खपुष्पस्य साधर्म्यद्वष्टान्तत्वेन  
 फथनात् । यदि वा वदामि खपुष्पमस्ति साधर्म्यद्वष्टान्त इति । तदा न  
 त्रिधातु [ मयम् ]<sup>72</sup> । न वक्तव्यं त्रिधातुर्ना भावत्वात् तदपि नाह इति ।  
 इदं वचनं तव स्वप्रज्ञालाघवं प्रकाशयति । 72 असकप्रतिषेधः प्रतिषेधप्रधानः  
 प्रतिषेध्यं प्रतिषिध्य चरितार्थः<sup>73</sup> । [ 8 a ] न पुनः प्रतिषेध्यव्यतिरिक्तं  
 शापयितुं समर्थः<sup>74</sup> । अयं वचनदूषणं<sup>75</sup> पूर्वमेव व्याख्यातम् । अतः प्राप्तेनै  
 ध्रुवेयम् ॥

साङ्ख्याः पुनरेवं घटन्ति । न वयं यद्यपि साधयामः प्रधानं पुरुषं वा  
<sup>76</sup>साक्षात्प्रत्यक्षेण । तथापि साधारणप्रतीत्या विकारमणप्रयोगेन<sup>77</sup> । तं

71. Or *parikṣa*. The sense requires a word which would suggest the idea of *anvāda*

72. = *prasaṅgapratiśedha*, see N. Kōśa, 1st chap n. 78 above, p. 50.

73. Lit. *Kṣāṇalaktika* !

74. Cf. *Premāpavārtika*, III, *Na cāpi śabdō doṣayakṛt*, with *vṛtti*.  
 Tīppaṇī: *na tu ekaḥ śabdah viśvapratiśedhakṛt*. See *Ibid*, II 350 the  
 distinction between *paryuḍḍha* and *pratiśedha*.

75. See chap. I, p. 50, para 1.

76. *Ch'ān-hsien* = Intimately showing, etc. *chin* means sometimes  
 'one's own self = *sva* : in this case it may be put as *svapratiśakṣa*.

77. See *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, *Suvarṇasaptatī*, ver. 15, five *prayogas*  
 with regard to *Pradhāna*, ver 17 another five *prayogas* for *Puruṣa*.

यस्तु सन्त साधयाम । तथा हि । व्यक्ता ७८ सहेतुका सजात्यात् । सर्वे सजातीया भावा सत्ताहेतुका दृष्टा । यथा चन्दनखण्डादय ७९ । व्यक्ताश्च सजातीया इति सत्ताहेतुका । एव व्यक्तानि समोक्तृकानि । उपभोग्यत्वात् । उपभोग्यानि सर्वाणि समोक्तृकानि दृष्टानि । यथा ब्राह्मणोपभोग्यमन्नपानव्यक्तम् उपभोग्यत्वात् समोक्तृकम्<sup>८०</sup> । इति पूर्वोक्तानुमान<sup>८१</sup> प्रतिप्रमाणवाधितम् । इति ।

इदं रुद्ध्या<sup>८२</sup> यदि सामान्यरूपेण व्यक्तानि सत्ताहेतुकानि साधयसि । न विशेष विचारयसि । तदा सिद्धसाधनम्<sup>८३</sup> । यदि व्यक्तानि [8 b] ८४ सुखादिहेतुकानि साधयसि । तदा नास्ति समदृष्टान्त<sup>८५</sup> । हेतुरपि न सिध्यति ।

78 *Satta pradhānākhyā* see *Pramāṇavārtika vṛtti ad III 186 c d* Pousin gives reference to *Siddhi I 27* (Theory of *Vaśeṣikas*) He also suggests for *sāṃsṭya satprakāra* with query Here *sāṃsṭya* is the same as *samanvaya* of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā 15*

79 This whole *prayoga* including the example is the same as *bhedaṇām samanvayāt* (= *samasambhāvatāt*) in the *Suvarṇasaptati* ver 15 ¶ 21

80 The same *prayoga* is intended in *sāṃghāṭasya parārthatāt* *Suvarṇasaptati* ver 17 with comment where the same example is given *Ibid p 25*

81 Pousin has included this sentence in the section of *siddhānta* which fact is due to wrong punctuation in his text

82 Lit *Idem sāmyam* or *Sameyitatā* etc

83 *Sattāsāmānyasya anisiddhatvāt* Cf *Pramāṇavārtika vṛtti III 189 c-d*

84 *Sattādiviśeṣitasattā* Cf *Pram vār vṛtti III 188 c d 189 a b*

85 - *Hetuḥ anantayaḥ* *Ibid also ¶ 353 Tippani 6 Atha satīyāḥ sāmānye sādhye siddhasādhyatā ato viśeṣaḥ sādhyāḥ । tatra anantayāt sādhyatānyo rīṣṭantā ato na satta ।* The same is the opinion of *Yasubandhu* and *Dīnāṅga*, *Ibid IV 32 39 pp 426 429*

सुखादिजाते<sup>86</sup>रुभयानम्युपगमात् । यद्यनुमानेन<sup>87</sup> हेतुं साधयसि । चत्वारः  
स्कन्धाः सुखदुःखमोहात्मकाः<sup>88</sup> । एतत्स्कन्धस्वभावत्वात्, वेदनास्कन्धवत् ।  
इति । उक्तो मोहो न वेदनास्कन्धान्तर्गत इति समदृष्टान्तासिद्धिः ।

किञ्च तत्र पुरुषो नानारूपाणां सञ्चितार्थ एव [ स ] एव सद्भाताथः ।  
अनेन पुरुषहेतुसिद्धिरनेकान्तिको ।

तत्र सुखादिः प्रत्येकमुभयपक्षयो र्न <sup>89</sup>संभवति । एतत्स्कन्धस्वभाव-  
त्वादिति हेतुता न सिध्यति ।

<sup>90</sup>यथा परमार्थतोऽस्ति चन्द्रमण्डः सत्ताहेतुक इति । [ तत् ]  
न साधारणान्मुपगतमित्यतो दृष्टान्तासिद्धिः ।

किञ्च संवृत्या सामान्यरूपेण व्यक्तानि सोपभोक्तृकानि साधयसि । न  
विशेषं विचारयसि । तदा सिद्धसाधनम् । भोक्तृभावस्य लोकप्रतीतत्वात् ।  
यदि साधयसि व्यक्तानि नित्यविमुचेतनस्वभावभोक्तृकानि साधयसि ।  
समदृष्टान्तासिद्धिः । एवंरूपग्राहणानां साधारणानम्युपगमात् । यदि  
परमार्थतः, समदृष्टान्तोऽसिद्धः । भक्षणमोक्तुः सत्स्वभावस्य [ 9a ]  
साधारणानम्युपगमात् । [ अतः ] पुरोक्तानुमानं न सबाधकप्रति-  
प्रमाणकम् ॥

86 *Is Sukhādyātmakasāṅgītyahetuḥ* This remark is also intended  
in the *heturanantavāḥ* of Dharmakīrti, see previous note

87 *Pram vār vṛtti ad III 18 b c d* where *acetanatoḥ* is to be  
employed for the same purpose

88. = *Saṁvṛtavarajastamas* in the terminology of Sāṅkhya.

89 *Wu neng* Pousset has interpreted in a slightly different manner :  
"ils ( Sukha, etc. ) ne peuvent pas, pris à part. [ être le sujet de ] pro-  
position distinctes, parce qu' ils sont des skandhas" He seems to ignore  
er "two". The author intends to point out the said reason, *etatskan-*  
*dhasvabhāvatva* is not proved because the character, sukha, etc. can  
not be existent individually for both parties.

90 *Lat yad*

घेदोपिका पुनरेवं घटन्ति । प्राणापाननिमेषोन्मेषमनोगतीन्द्रियविकारा-  
दिलिङ्गानि<sup>91</sup> नियतलिङ्गोनि । लिङ्गत्वात् धूमदर्शनादि[लिङ्ग]घत् । इति ।  
संवृत्या यदि सामान्यरूपेण तानि लिङ्गानि लिङ्गिनियतानि साधयसि ।  
न विदोषं विचारयसि । तदा सिद्धसाधनम् । संवृत्तौ साधारणप्रतीतात्मा-  
<sup>92</sup>भाषस्या भावात् । यदि साधयसि तानिलिङ्गानि नित्यविभुसुखाद्या-  
ध्यात्मलिङ्गीनि । तदा नास्ति समदृष्टान्तः । साध्यस्य बाधात् । यदि  
परमार्थतः । तदापि दृष्टान्तासिद्धिदोषः । अनेनैव न्यायेन कालदिगा-  
काशादयः प्रतिषेध्याः ॥

पुनर्वेदोपिका एवं दूषयन्ति । परमाणून्<sup>93</sup> मनश्चासंस्कृतान् साधयामः ।  
शून्यसाधनहेतुः अनुत्पादादिति <sup>94</sup>स्वतीऽसिद्धः । यथाह इमाधुमी  
संस्कृतान्तर्गतादिति । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादिति शून्यसाधनहेतुः <sup>95</sup>परतो-  
ऽसिद्धहेतुः । इति शून्यतायतारः प्रादेशिकः<sup>96</sup> स्यात् । इति ॥

यदि मनः परमाणुश्च संवृतावपि अभ्युपगम्यते असंस्कृत इति ।

91. See Vaiśeṣika Sūtras, III, 2, 4, Abb. Kośavyākhyā I, 6, U, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, p 48 n 1, where he points out this portion of our text. Poussin says that editions, Sung, Yuan, and Ming have *ming, jivana* for *ling* of our text, of Taisho and Shenghai eds.

92. It is worth noticing of Vijñānabhikṣu's remark to the same effect in his Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya I, 138: *Naivam puruṣasya sūḍhanam apekṣitam । Cetanūpalāpe jagadāndhyaprasaṅgato bhoktara āhampādārihe sāmānyato Bauddhānām api artoḍḍat । dharma ita । dharmo h sāmānyato Bauddhāirapi svikṛyate ।* ( BI. p. 93 )

93. See U, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, pp. 140, 147.

94. *Scatah* by itself.

95. *Paratah* from the Vaiśeṣikas' point of view.

96. Poussin suggests *mandabhāgtya* which is improbable. The phrase has already been found twice : see, pp. 61. l 21. and 77, l. 3.

भवेदिदं दूषणम् । साध्यतां मनः तथापि नासंस्कृतम् । ज्ञानजनकहेतुत्वात्  
रूपादिवत् । एवं पदार्थसामान्यस्यभावत्वात् स्मृतिजनकहेतुत्वात् इत्याद-  
योऽन्येऽपि हेतवो यथोचितं वक्तव्याः । परमाणवोऽपि नासंस्कृताः बारम्भ  
कहेतुत्वात् तन्त्यादिवत् । एवमन्येऽपि संयोगवियोगसंख्यासामान्यादि-  
हेतवो यथोचितं [ हेतुत्वेन ] वक्तव्याः । द्व्यणुकं<sup>97</sup> जन्यं वा स्थूलपदार्थः न  
नित्यहेतुः । जन्यत्वात् घटादिवत् । एवमन्येऽपि कृतकत्वात् विनाशित्वात्  
सहेतुकत्वादित्यादिहेतवो यथायोगं वक्तव्याः । अनेन न्यायेन परेण मिथ्या-  
कल्पिता मनःपरमाणवश्च स्वभावशून्याः । तस्माप्नास्ति यथोक्तदोषः ॥

पूर्वोक्तसोऽप्येवैशेषिकशास्त्रपदार्थप्रतिषेधकनानुक्तिरत् अचेलत्वादि<sup>98</sup>  
शास्त्रकल्पितपदार्था अपि यथायोगं शून्याः साध्ययितव्याः ॥

[ 10<sup>9</sup> ] एवं दूषणानि निराकृत्य योगी सम्यगनुमानबलेन स्वपरोमद-  
सम्यकल्पितानसंस्कृतान् स्वभावशून्यान् प्रविशेत् ।

श्रुतसिद्धज्ञानद्वारबलेन स्वभावशून्यतां प्रविष्टोऽपि विशिष्टमायनायल-  
पिकलो न हेयावरणं समुच्छेत् शङ्कुपात । मतः पुनस्त्यरितं विशिष्ट-  
मायनायलमन्यसेत्<sup>100</sup> ॥

यद्यत्र संस्कृतासंस्कृतनिमित्त<sup>100</sup> मेकाकारयत् सान्तरनिरन्तरं वा पुनः

97. Or it may read syntactically *dvyanukārabdhās sthūlapadārtho na nityaheṭukaḥ* ! But I do not think that it is the probable sense intended to be conveyed by the author. It appears that the author tries to prove impermanent the binary atoms which are maintained as permanent by some philosophers, cp Dharmapāla's Comment on *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, pp. 23, 180 with note 10, U. Vaīśeṣika Philosophy, pp. 129, 131.

98. The commentary says: The naked-bodied Tīrthika is Nirgrantha.

99. The same on p. 64, para 4 of the chap. I.

100. Or. *lakṣaṇa*.

चंशेषिका पुनरेवं यदन्ति । प्राणापाननिमेषोन्मेषमनोगतीन्द्रियविकारा-  
दिलिङ्गानि<sup>91</sup> नियतलिङ्गानि । लिङ्गत्वात् धूमदर्शनादि[लिङ्ग]वत् । इति ।  
संवृत्त्या यदि सामान्यरूपेण तान् लिङ्गानि लिङ्गिनियतानि साधयसि ।  
न विशेषं विचारयसि । तदा सिद्धसाधनम् । संवृत्तौ साधारणप्रतीतात्मा-  
<sup>92</sup>भावस्या भावात् । यदि साधयसि तानिलिङ्गानि नित्यविमुखाया-  
ध्यात्मलिङ्गानि । तदा नास्ति समदृष्टान्तः । साध्यस्य याधात् । यदि  
परमार्थतः । तदापि दृष्टान्तासिद्धिदोषः । अनेनैव न्यायेन कालदिगा-  
काशादयः प्रतिपेक्ष्याः ॥

पुनर्वेशेषिका एवं दूषयन्ति । परमाणून्<sup>93</sup> मनश्चासंस्कृतान् साधयामः ।  
शून्यसाधनहेतुः अनुत्पादादिति <sup>94</sup>स्यतीऽसिद्धः । यथाह इमाद्युर्गो  
संस्कृतान्तर्गततादिति । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादिति शून्यसाधनहेतुः <sup>95</sup>परतो-  
ऽसिद्धहेतुः । इति शून्यतावतारः प्रादेशिकः<sup>96</sup> स्यात् । इति ॥

यदि मनः परमाणुश्च संवृतावपि अभ्युपगम्यते असंस्कृत इति ।

91 See Vaiśeṣika Sūtras, III 2, 4, Abh Kośavyākhyā I, 5, U, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, p 48 n 1, where he points out this portion of our text - Poussin says that editions Sung, Yuan, and Ming have ming, jivana for ling of our text, of Taisho and Shenghai eds

III It is worth noticing of Viṣṇūnābhikṣu's remark to the same effect in his Śāṅkhyapravācanabhāṣya I 138. *Nāsoam puruṣasya sūadhanam apekṣitam । Cetanāpalāpe jagadāndhyaprasaṅgato bhoktari ahampadārthe samānyato Bauddhānām api avatādāt । dharma eva । dharmo hi samānyato Bauddhasvapī svikṛtyate ।* { BI p. 93 }

, 93 See U, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, pp 140, 147

III Scatah by itself

95. Paratah from the Vaiśeṣikas' point of view

96 Poussin suggests *mandabhāgiya* which is improbable The phrase has already been found twice see, pp III 1 21 and 77, 1 3.

भवेदिदं दूषणम् । साध्यतां मनः तथापि नासंसृष्टम् । हानजनकहेतुत्वात्  
रूपादिवत् । एवं पदार्थसामान्यस्वभावत्वात् स्मृतिजनकहेतुत्वात् इत्याद-  
योऽन्येऽपि हेतवो यथोचितं वक्तव्याः । परमाण्वोऽपि नासंसृष्टाः आरम्भ-  
कहेतुत्वात् तन्त्यादिवत् । एवमन्येऽपि संयोगवियोगसंस्थासामान्यादि-  
हेतवो यथोचितं [ हेतुत्वेन ] वक्तव्याः । द्व्यणुं<sup>97</sup> जन्यं वा स्थूलपदार्थः न  
नित्यहेतुः । जन्यत्वात् घटादिवत् । एवमन्येऽपि कृतकत्वात् विनाशित्वात्  
सहेतुफलत्वादित्यादिहेतवो यथायोगं वक्तव्याः । अनेन न्यायेन परेण मिथ्या-  
कल्पिता मनःपरमाण्वश्च स्वभावशून्याः । तस्मान्नास्ति यथोक्तदोषः ॥

पूर्वोक्तसांख्यैरोपिकृशास्त्रपदार्थप्रतिषेधकनानायुक्तिवत् अचेलकादि<sup>99</sup>  
शास्त्रकल्पितपदार्था अपि यथायोगं शून्याः साधयितव्याः ॥

[ 10<sup>3</sup> ] एवं दूषणानि निरारुह्य योगी सम्यगनुमानयलेन स्वपरोमय-  
समयकल्पितानसंसृष्टान् स्वभावशून्यान् प्रविशेत् ।

श्रुतसिद्धान्तद्वारयलेन स्वभावशून्यतां प्रविष्टोऽपि विशिष्टभावनायल-  
विकलो न ह्येवावरणं समुच्छेत्<sup>100</sup> शक्नुयात् । अतः पुनस्त्यरितं विशिष्ट-  
भावनायलमन्यसेत्<sup>100</sup> ॥

यद्यत्र संसृष्टासंसृष्टनिमित्त<sup>100</sup> मेकाकारवत् सान्तरनिरन्तरं वा पुनः

97. Or it may read syntactically *deyanukārabdhāsthalapadārtho na nityahetukah* ! But I do not think that it is the probable sense intended to be conveyed by the author. It appears that the author tries to prove impermanent the binary atoms which are maintained as permanent by some philosophers, cp Dharmapāla's Comment on *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, pp. 23, 60 with note 10. U<sub>1</sub>, *Valśeṣika Philosophy*, pp 129, 131.

98. The commentary says : The naked-bodied Tirthika in Nirgrantha.

99. The same on p. 64, para 4 of the chap. I.

100. Or, *lakṣana*.



समुदाचरति । तदा तन् स्वभावशून्यं योनिशो भावयित्वा तन्निमित्तं निराकृत्यानभिष्यत्तं कुर्यात् । धर्माणां विविक्तस्वभावत्वात् तत्प्रकृतिशून्य- [ता] प्रविशति । प्रकृतिशून्यत्वात् असिद्धनिमित्ता अनिमित्ता भवन्ति । अनिमित्तत्वात् अप्रणिहिताः सन्तोऽप्रणिधाना भवन्ति । विविक्तनिमित्तमलत्वात् विविक्ताः । विविक्तनिमित्तत्वात् तत्प्रतीत्य जातानां बलेशानामत्यन्तमजातत्वात् शान्ताः । अनुत्पन्नस्वभावत्वा- दनुत्पन्नाः । अनुत्पादात् नानित्या न दुःखा नापि निरात्मकाः । [ 10<sup>b</sup> ] अनुत्पादाच्च न सनिमित्ताः । अनिमित्तत्वात् अनिमित्तैकलक्षणचर्यया सर्वधर्मान् भावयित्वा अद्वयेऽप्यतरति । एतल्लक्षणचर्यया 101 भावनाविशेष- मभ्यसन् एवमभिषुद्धभावनाविशेषबलत्वात् स्थूलनिमित्तं निराकृत्य अनभिष्यक्तं करोति । अनेन अनाद्यस्तित्वाकारं करोति यदुत संस्कृतस्या- संस्कृतस्य वाकारग्रहः । यथा तैमिरिकः स्थूलतिमिरमपहाय विशुद्धनेत्रः आगतपूर्वान् ग्राह्याकारान् न पश्यति ॥

यद्यपि अत्र लब्धाप्रतिष्ठानो [ योनी ] । तथापि शून्यतादिधिकल्प- समुदाचारेण 102 सामो गचित्तसन्तानं पुनर्वर्तते । अलम्बाबलजानः 103 शून्यतादिविकल्पसमुदाचारावृतलोकोत्तरनिर्विकल्पप्रज्ञो भवति । सतिपुणं सम्यक्प्रज्ञाणं प्रहातुमेवं प्रत्ययेक्षेत । परमार्थतः स्वभावशून्येऽर्थे शून्यता-

101 Similar expression on pp 34, l 5 83, l 13.

102 Functioning and running toward an object

103 *Wu tungiao-chih* The first two characters are *akṣobhya*, *amṛtya* in the *M Vyntpatti*. The sense is that the ascetic has not yet obtained the eighth stage, *asāṅka bhūmī* *Siddhi*, 616 ( L V P. ) But Poussin leaves untranslated the last two characters. Ascetic has not yet obtained the motionless state of mind, because it is still *sāṅhoga*, running towards an object.

दिविकल्पोऽपि न वस्तुसन् । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात् मायादिवत् । एवं भावनया पुनः शून्यतादिविकल्पं निराकरोति । तन्निराकरणात् शून्याशून्यताद्यन्तद्वयविविक्तः<sup>104</sup> न पुनः शून्यताद्याकारेण [ 11<sup>a</sup> ] धर्मान् प्रत्यवेक्षते ।

यथोक्तम्, <sup>105</sup>प्रज्ञापारमितायाम् समुदाचरन् रूपं<sup>106</sup> न समनुपश्यति नित्यमिति नानित्यमिति, न समनुपश्यति सुखमिति न दुःखमिति । न समनुपश्यति आत्मेति न अनात्मेति । न समनुपश्यति शान्तमिति नाशान्तमिति । न समनुपश्यति शून्यमिति नाशून्यमिति । न समनुपश्यति निमित्तमिति नानिमित्तमिति । न समनुपश्यति प्रणिहितमिति नाप्रणिहितमिति । न समनुपश्यति विधिकमिति नाविधिकमिति । पर्यं... वेदानासंज्ञासंस्कारविमानानि सर्वं रूपशब्दगन्धरसस्पर्शधर्माः सर्वाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणजिह्वाकायमनांसि, <sup>107</sup>दानशीलक्षमायीयेध्यानप्रज्ञापारमितास्मृत्युपस्थान<sup>108</sup> सम्यक् प्रज्ञापदिपादेन्द्रियबलबोधद्वयमार्गाङ्ग<sup>109</sup>

104. See Kośa, VIII, 188, *Śūnyatāśūnyatā-samādhi* succeeding to *Śūnyatā-samādhi* ( L. V P )

105 See *Śatasāhasrikā*, pp 765-872 where the formula goes : *Prajñāpāramitāyām caran arūpe carati | na rūpaṇa nimitta carati | na rūpam nityam itī carati | na rūpam anityam itī carati | na rūpam sukham itī carati | na rūpam dukkham itī carati |* etc. The formula is repeated with regard to each of the following items - *vedanā, saṃjñā*, etc upto *mahākaraṇā*. Cp passages cited in the *Bodhicar. pañjikā*, p 427 : *Prajñāpāramitāyām caran rūpam bhāva itī na bhāvayati |* etc. Cp. *Bhūtapratyavekṣā* described in *Kāśyapa* pp 83-85

106. Lat *Rūpe*.

107. *Prajñāp* has also included 18 dhātus, 11 dhātus, *prithivī-dhātu*, etc. and 12 *nidānas*.

108 Ibid. After this 18 *Śūnyatas* are mentioned.

109. Ibid. Mentioned as *aṣṭāṅgamārga*... After this 4 truths are mentioned.

ध्याना<sup>110</sup> रूप्यसमापत्त्य<sup>111</sup> मित्रा<sup>112</sup> दशव<sup>113</sup> छवेशारद्यसर्वप्रतिसंघि-  
<sup>114</sup>दावेणिकाबुद्धयर्मसर्वसमाधिधारणीमुखसर्वज्ञानानि<sup>115</sup> न समनुपश्यति  
 नित्यमिति नानित्यमिति । इति विस्तरः ।

य एवमन्तद्वयविविक्तं चिरं मध्यमार्गा [ प्रतिपदि ] साधु चरति ।  
 अयमन्तद्वयरहितो [ 11 b ] मध्यममार्गनयः—यथापूर्वमुक्तानुमानद्वयेन  
 संस्कृतासंस्कृतरूपराश्यभावात् अरूपो नामोच्यते । अरूपित्वेन भावादि-  
 सर्वविकल्पानामभावात् नास्ति कश्चिदर्धः यादृशः स, तादृशोऽयमपीति  
 मिथो निदर्शनार्हः । अतोऽनिदर्शनो नाम । अभापस्वभावत्यादा-  
 धयाध्यायिभावाप्रसिद्धया प्रतिष्ठा नास्तीत्यतोऽप्रतिष्ठो नाम । यदि  
 संस्कृतलक्षणमसंस्कृतलक्षणं वा, यदि विकल्पितमविकल्पितं वा, यदि  
 विकल्पकमविकल्पकं वा इत्येवमादिनिमित्तप्रज्ञानं न समाचरतीति  
 अवाभासो नाम । सर्वभाषनिमित्ताभाषनिमित्तविविक्कविषयकविज्ञान-  
 स्यानुत्पन्नत्वात् अविज्ञप्तिको नाम । अरूपत्वादमूर्तत्वाद्भिन्नागनिकेताभावाद्-  
 निवेतो नाम<sup>116</sup> ।

यथा भगवान् काश्यपमाह । नित्यमिति [ काश्यप ] अयमेको-  
 ऽन्तः । अनित्यमिति [ काश्यप ] अयं द्वितीयोऽन्तः । यदेतयोर्द्वयो-

110 Ibid After this come *apramāṣas*

111. Ibid After this come 2 more items : *na vimokṣeṣu carati . . .*  
*nānupāraṇaviśārasamāpattiṣu carati ....* | *na śūnyatānimittapraṇiṣṭa*  
*vimokṣeṣu carati . . .* !

112 Ibid After this come *samādhis* and *dhāraṇīmukhas*

113 Ibid Mentioned as *Tathāgatabala*.

114 Ibid After comes *na mahākaruṇāyām carati.....* !

115 Ibid This is not included in the list

116 Poussin draws attention to the last passage in the text not  
 identified in the Appendix to *Mah Sūtrālaṅkāra* ( ed S Lévi ) where  
 the *nirvikalpayāna* is so qualified as *madhyamā pratipat* here  
 Cp Ratnakṛta cited in the *Sikṣā* p 234 c 2. *Cittam hi Kāśyapa*  
*arūpam anidarśanam apratiṣṭham avijñaptikam apratiṣṭhitam aniketam* |

[ नित्यानित्ययो ] मध्यं तदरूपि अनिदर्शनमनाभासमविहितिरुमप्रतिष्ठ-  
मनिकेतम् । इयमुच्यते [ काश्यप ] मध्यमा प्रतिपद् घर्माणां भूतप्रत्यवेक्षा ।  
[ 122 ] यायत् अस्ताति [ काश्यप ] अयमेकोऽन्तः । नास्तोत्तर्य  
द्वितीयोऽन्त इति विस्तरः<sup>117</sup> ।

किञ्चाह भगवान् काश्यपम् । विद्याविद्या च द्वे न स्तः, द्वयविशेषेऽत्र  
न संप्रज्ञानम् । इयमुच्यते [ काश्यप ] मध्यमा प्रतिपत्<sup>118</sup> ।

[ य ] एवमन्तद्वयविवेकशुद्धालः [ तस्य ] अद्वयसंज्ञायां विहरमाणस्य  
समुत्पन्नोऽद्वयसंज्ञाविकल्पः । [ त ] मपि जानाति लोकोत्तरनिर्गिकल्प-  
ज्ञानस्य शान्तिविहारस्याग्ररणमिति । [ अतो ] यथोक्तहेतुमाशु समुच्छेदयति ।  
तत्समुच्छेदात्<sup>119</sup> अद्वयमिति नास्ति विकल्पः, सर्वो द्वयवचनमनोजल्पश्च  
शाम्यति । साक्षात्करोति घर्माणां भूतस्यमायमनाभोगमनाभासमनिमित्तं  
प्रपञ्चविनिर्मुक्तम् । एतदालम्ब्येऽनाभोगसाक्षात्कारं प्रविश्य स्थलक्षण-  
<sup>120</sup>ज्ञानस्रोतसि विहरति ॥

अविपरीतशून्यतामायनामन्यसन्नपि नैव शून्यतां साक्षात्कुर्यात् ।  
तदा परमार्थध्यानं<sup>121</sup> नामोच्यते ।

117. Kāśyapa-parivarta ed Stael-Holstein, pp 86-90.

118 This passage is not traceable in the Kāśyapa-paṭ, as such. I  
however, suppose that this may be an adaptation of § 58 : *Bhūtaśāntam*  
*it..... ! abhūtaśāntam it..... ! yatra Kāśyapa na cetana na mano na*  
*vijñānam ! iyaṁ ucyate..... !*

119. Lit. *evam* *evam*.

120. Or *jñānasrotasvalakṣaṇa viharati or pratisthitaḥ !*

121. Aṣṭasāhasikā, p 370. *na Bodhisattvena Mahāsattvena*  
*sūnyatā sākṣāt kartavyā* Op Daśabhūmika, Rahder, 61. ( L V. P. )  
Op. also passages in the Aṣṭasāhasikā, p 379 : *Bodhisattvo...na*  
*sūnyatām sākṣātkaroti !*  
*nānimitam sākṣātkaroti..... !*

एवमादिग्रहे 193 निरुद्धे, 194 ज्ञातव्यानिमित्तविषयतापि 195 प्रतिपत्ति-  
विहीना । हेतुप्रत्ययवैकल्यात् । अन्यद् ज्ञान [मपि] न जायते प्रतिपत्त्य-  
भावात् । तस्मात् 196 यथाभूतप्रतिपत्तिरित्युच्यते ।

[14<sup>a</sup>] यथाह भगवान् । कतमा यथाभूतप्रतिपत्तिः । यदर्माणाम-  
त्यन्ताप्रतिपत्तिः इयमुच्यते यथाभूतप्रतिपत्तिः । किञ्च यथाह सूत्रम् ।  
तथागतो बोधिमत्यन्तं नाभिसमेति 197 । यथा [ह] मञ्जुश्रोपरिपृच्छा ।  
सत्यदर्शिमिः कतमद्द्रव्यम् । आह । न को ऽपि धर्मो द्रव्यः ।  
कस्मात् । पृथग्जनदृश्यं सर्वं मृषा । 198 यददर्शनं तत् सत्यदर्शनम् । यथा

193 Poussin construes this phrase along with the, previous sentence : This is not admissible

194 See above p 89, l 2

195 *Hsing chieh* The exact equivalent of this phrase in Sanskrit is not known I have done it 'pratipatti in the sense of *karitra* according to the explanation given in the Chinese Ency Dictionary (Chinese edition) p 1081, col 1 The Dictionary explains by quoting some authority "It is some sort of functioning of the mind," etc (*citta-kriyāśleṣa*, this Skt phrase is mine) It goes further : "Function is called *hsing chieh*" Image is called aspect (*pratibimbam ākaraḥ*) Cp Pram vār vṛtti, IV, 160, § 467 *arthānām apratipattiḥ* Poussin makes these remarks : Mouvement—intellection, *hsing-kias*—Expliqué et dessous comme synonyme de *satyadarsana*, *abhisamaya*, figure dans deux lexiques de Rosenberg, associé aux dix *braddhas* (state préliminaire aux terres), glose de Siddhi, X, 14b 15a : "Avant l'entrée dans les terres le pense fait *hsing kias*, par conséquent distingue le deux vides, à la suit de *hsing-kias*, les images apparaissent. .."—Ci dessous *kias* se place entre *samādhi prajñā*, et *jñāna-sākṣātkāra*—*kias* *hsing*, *adhimuktis caryā*, *che-kias*, *nirūpana*, *cheng kias*, *pratipādana*, *kias* ou, *sampratipatti*

196 *Cheng-shih bhūta*, *satya tattva*, etc

197 Same quotation on p 74, l 6

198. Ist. *dyāmaṇa* See p 74, 3 7, the same idea emphasized

पुनः पृच्छति । कथमभिसमये<sup>139</sup> योगः करणीय । आह । यद्वा नान्ति कोऽपि धर्मः चेतना<sup>140</sup> विकल्पः इति । एवमभिसमये योगः करणीयः । पुनः पृच्छति । कतम्<sup>141</sup> साक्षात्कृतमभिसमयः । आह । <sup>142</sup>यः सर्वधर्मसमतां पश्यति । पुनः पृच्छति । किमस्ति सर्वधर्मसमतादर्शः । आह । नास्ति सर्वधर्मसमतादर्शः । यद्यस्ति <sup>143</sup>यद्दर्शनम् तदसमतादर्शनं स्यात् । यथाभूतप्रतिपत्तिः सत्यदर्शनमभिसमयश्च सर्वं समानार्थकम् । इति ।

योगी सस्मिन् समये चित्ते मनसि विज्ञाने ज्ञाने[वा] अक्षरम् त्रिविकल्प-  
फप्रज्ञां सम्यक्<sup>144</sup>चरतोऽप्युच्यते ।

[ 14<sup>b</sup> ] यदेव <sup>145</sup>भगोच्चरं चरति तदा तयागतावर्हतः सम्यक्संयुक्तात्  
तत्त्वव्याकरणं लभते । यथाह सूत्रम् । कथं भगवन् बोधिसत्त्वः अनुत्तमां  
सम्यक् संबोधिं प्रापयित्वा तयागतेभ्योऽर्हत्सम्यक्संयुक्तेभ्यस्तत्त्व-  
व्याकरणं लभते । बोधिसत्त्वो ब्राह्मण यदस्थिन् समये न जातौ चरति  
न निरोधे चरति । न कुशले चरति नाकुशले चरति । न लोके चरति न  
लोकोत्तरे चरति । न साक्ष्ये चरति नासाक्ष्ये चरति । न सावधे  
चरति न निरवधे चरति । न संभृते चरति नासंभृते चरति । न योगे

139 No case ending in Chinese.

140. *Szu-wet = cetanā*

141. *It may be done . katham* But the sense requires *kathamāh*

142 *Lit Yade*

143 *Lit Yade asti dhyam tadā asamatādarśanam idhyet.*

144 Poussin suggests , *samyakpratiṣṭhāna*.

145. Poussin notes that *so hsa* is normally *gocara*, *Vyutpathi*, 19, 8, *Kōśa*, XVIII, 13 a 8 *grāhya* XXVI, 12bl 'On atrait : " Il se ment sans avoir de lieu où il se mouve" Comp. *Prajñā* en 8000, p 363 : *Yo bhagavan evam carati sa na kvacit carati*—Māla dans *Laṅkāvatāra*, 158 (Suzuki, *Studies*, 404) le *jaṇasamudācāra-vāryata*, est dit "debarassé de *sou hsa*, et cet traduction de *sou hsa* "mouvement" *samudācāra*, *pracāra* convient mieux peut être au texte, ci-dessus p 133'.

सम्यक् प्रज्ञाणदिपादेन्द्रियबलबोध्यङ्गमार्गाङ्गपारमितासर्धमिज्ञादशबलवैशा-  
रद्यावेणिकबुद्धधर्म [ 16<sup>a</sup> ] समाधिधारणीमुखानि स्रोतापत्रं सृष्टागा-  
म्यनागामो यदि घाहन्, यानि विद्यन्ते मार्गफलानि [ तानि ] सामान्यतो  
विशेषतो वा एकजातीयानि । इति विस्तरो यावत्सर्वज्ञानम् ।

सर्वधर्माणामविपरोतस्वमाधं सम्यक् प्रजानातीति प्राज्ञः । 158 पञ्चम्या  
निमित्तपरित्यागो हेतुप्रत्यय उच्यते । अपरिग्रह इति अपरिग्रहणमदर्शनम् ।  
सैव शुद्धप्रज्ञा परि 159 कल्परहितेत्यथः । अनुपादानहेतुना किं साक्षा-  
त्क्रियते ।

प्रज्ञाचारो निर्विकल्पमचरित्या चरत्ययम् ॥

प्रज्ञेति । सैव निर्विकल्पकज्ञानम् । सदा सर्वविकल्पयितुकोऽपि  
शुद्धप्रज्ञा 160 प्रकर्षं प्रज्ञप्त्या ज्ञानमिति नाम । अनङ्कारनिमित्तानभिधानाद्य-  
भासी । 161 विषयसमुत्पत्तिनिमित्त 162 स्वभावविकल्पस्याप्यभावात् निर्विकल्प  
इत्याख्या । अप्रतिष्ठितोऽपि अयस्यान्तरेण प्रज्ञप्त्या नाम व्यवस्थाप्यते ।

158 This explanation of the suffix must come after the explana-  
tion of *prātipadika* according to the Sanskrit text This is it appears  
due to the order in the Chinese translation

159 Or *arthaparikalaparāhita*

160 Poussin suggests *sarvavikalpabuddhi-samāropa-vivikta*  
This is based on wrong punctuation

161 The passage is ill understood by Poussin on account of wrong  
punctuation

162 According to *Vaiśbhāṣikas* three *vikalpā* *svabhāvatī*,  
*abhinirūpanatī* *anusmaranatī* See *Kośavyākhyā* p 67 and the  
note 129 above

यथा निष्कृतो दीपः निष्कृतोऽर्धेन<sup>163</sup> इति । बुद्ध<sup>164</sup>प्रज्ञाप्रकर्षः व्यपदास्त  
उक्तः । सन्तानस्यास्य निर्विकल्पक इत्याद्या यथा विकल्पज्ञानं सविषयक-  
मिति । तत्र मान<sup>165</sup>सज्ञानमनुत्पन्नगतिं चयैत्युच्यते । [ 16<sup>b</sup> ] अनया  
ज्ञानवयेया बृहस्पत्यपस्थमस्यमाधमर्गाकारनिमित्तन्यान् नाप्या पश्यतोनि ।  
तदेयादर्शनं तत्त्वदर्शनमित्युच्यते । यथायन् साक्षात्कृतन्यान् ।

नरादर्शनप्रियादृश्यलक्षणं, सविषयकं निर्विकल्पकं वा - तत्त्वदर्शनं  
सिध्यति<sup>166</sup> । तथा यदि दृश्यस्यमाया, न यत्तद्व्यमदृश्य<sup>167</sup>स्यमापेति ।  
यद्यपि संवृत्तः समनादृष्टितत्त्वदृष्टिरित्युच्यते, तथापि गृहीतव्यमिय-  
मसमदृष्टितत्त्वदृष्टिरित्युच्यन् इति ।

न सर्वाणि, दृश्यानि तस्यानि । <sup>168</sup>संविदुत्पत्तिहेतुन्यात्, यथा

163 "Le sens ne paraît pas douteux. C'est par métaphore qu'on parle de l'extinction de la lampe, du Nirvāṇa du saint - puisque extinction et Nirvāṇa n'ont aucun rapport avec quoi on soit ( comp Kośa, II, 284 ) De même on ne peut attribuer la Prajñā à quelque ce soit ( L. V P ) This is rather an imposed interpretation. According to the just previous line it is to be interpreted that a *dīpa* does not exist after extinction, yet it is said that *dīpa* is extinguished, so also Arhan

164 Ponson suggests with query *Buddhasamāropa* "Les identifications adventices, etc" He has not probably well understood the Chinese phrase *chiao-hui tseng* : The first two characters mean *buddha* + *śāna*, buddha in the sense of *prabuddha* "enlighten-er one" cf Kośayākyā, p 3, 8. This phrase is already used twice I p 16b last line and II, p 16a line 6 ( Chinese text ) The last two characters I have taken for *prākṛiya* here. Rosenberg Dict. gives *prākṛika* So *Samāropa* is not only an equivalent for them

165. Lit *manasyānta* ( or *apīdāna* ) *śāna*

166 This is an objection by Yogācāras

167. *Ka-chien dyiā* In the previous clauses it is *so-chien*

168 *Ch' k'ai-gan k'u*. Here *ka* is for *sarvīd*. Note *ka* for *vid* in *lokavīd*.



मरीचिकासु जलम् । [ अतः ] सर्वाणि दृश्यानि न तत्त्वानि । तथता  
यदि दृश्यस्यमाया, न दृश्यनिमित्तग्रहस्तत्त्वदृष्टिः सिध्यति । यद्यदृश्या,  
न पक्षव्यं तथता साक्षाद्दर्शनमिति । दर्शनादर्शनयो<sup>169</sup> कथं नाम साम्यम् ।  
ज्ञानं<sup>170</sup> संस्कृतम् तथता चासंस्कृता इति स्वभाववैषम्यम् । यदि दर्शनम्,  
विषमदर्शनं<sup>171</sup> [ मेव ] सिध्येत् ।

सर्वान् धर्मस्वभावान् पश्यतीति दर्शनमपि, सर्वथा तदा अजाति-  
स्वभावकम् । अत एवमदर्शनमेव प्रकृत्या [ 17 a ] दर्शनमुच्यते । इति<sup>172</sup>  
न वैषम्यम् । सर्वधर्मो अनभिसमया इत्येकक्षणसाक्षात्कार एव सत्या-  
भिसमयो नाम । न दूषयितव्यं<sup>173</sup> मात्मसंवेदनमिति । दु साधनत्वात् ।  
ज्ञानं ज्ञानस्य<sup>174</sup> तत्त्वासाक्षात्कारकं स्यात् । द्विविधमपि<sup>175</sup> न दृश्य-  
विषयस्वभावम् । अभिन्नत्वाद् युगपत्सर्वसाक्षात्कारः । यदि परमार्थतः,  
विषयनिमित्तावभासो ज्ञानञ्च प्रकृतितोऽजातिस्वभावम् । अतो नाभिसमयो  
न च प्रतिलान<sup>176</sup> ।

यथाह सूत्रम् । न त्वया अभिसमयेनाधिगमेन वा तथागते दर्शनं  
कार्यम् । अयं कायः सर्वचक्षुर्निपयातीत<sup>177</sup> इति हि ब्राह्मण तथागतो  
बोधिमूले सुनिपण्णः साक्षात्करोति सर्वधर्मान् अधिगम्यान् सर्वमिध्या-

169 Lat *adśya* Poussin renders this passage thus : "Voir ce qui n'est pas visible, est-ce-là ce que vous nommez adequet ? But this is not the sense intended in the sentence

170 Is derived from *darkana*

171. See question to this effect on p. 91, 5

172 Or *prakāśana*, *darśana*

173 This is not clear even from the comment which introduces it simply *wei, tatha* he Poussin puts it "Le savoir ne peut pas réaliser la vraie nature du savoir". My rendering is strictly according to the Chinese syntax

174. *Jñāna* and *viśaya*, according to the comment

175 . Or *adhigama*

176 M. vṛtti p. 541, 3 6 na Yogācārah ... kasyacit dharmasya prāptim icchati na abhisamayaṃ ।

विपर्याससमुत्पन्नफलेशसमुच्छेदम् । एवमादि सूत्रमपि सर्वथा अनुसर्तव्यम् ।  
इत्यलं प्राप्तिकेन । प्रवृत्तं विचारयामः ॥

चरणं<sup>177</sup> नाम भ्रमणम् । चरणं नास्तीति अचरितम् । प्रतिपत्ति-  
विहीनम् नार्थमिनिवृत्तम् । निर्विकल्पकप्रज्ञोऽनिमित्तं चरन्नेव चरति<sup>178</sup>  
इत्यतोऽचरित एव चरतीत्युच्यते । अनेन<sup>179</sup> तु संक्षिप्तोक्तं पूर्णम् [ 17b ]  
प्रहाणसंसिद्धफलम् ॥

योगाचार एवमधिकल्पप्रज्ञाचारित्वात् अचरन्नपि चरति, चरन्नेव न  
चरति । सर्वालम्बनमनस्कारविधिकः सर्वधर्माजामत्यन्ताभावप्रतिष्ठितः  
सद्यथाकाशः<sup>180</sup> । सर्वपरिकल्पापगतो विशुद्धः शान्तो निरोधसमाप्ति  
प्रपिष्ट इव सर्वधर्मस्यभावात् पश्यति ।

युद्धानां धर्मकायोऽचिन्त्यः अपरिच्छिन्नः<sup>181</sup> अद्वयः अनालयः अलक्षणः  
अदृश्यः अविशसिकः अनुत्पादः अनिरुद्धः, अनुदयव्ययः<sup>182</sup> परिशुद्धः शान्तः  
निर्विशेषः<sup>183</sup> अप्रियः<sup>184</sup> अनाभासः सर्वमल्यीरणविगतः<sup>185</sup> । सर्वयुद्धि-  
प्रज्ञामिलापविषयमार्गातीतः<sup>186</sup> । एवं पश्यन्नपि न पश्यति यत् किञ्चन ।  
अपश्यन्नपि पश्यति पश्यन्नेव न पश्यति ॥

177. *yā* ls. Poussin - "déplacer-fouler"

178. *Śataśhasrikā*, p. 765 - *na carati rūpe rūpanimittā l na rūpam nityam itī carati l yo rūpe carati sa nimitta carati ... l*  
*Aṣṭaśhasrikā*, p. 401, *asya samudheda na pravartante l ya evam carati sa na kvaśit carati l*

179. Lit. *īdam*.

180. Poussin : *Tadyatha-kāle*.

181. *Kośa*, V, 1 b 10, *Siddhī*, X, 16b 5 ( L. V. P. ).

182. *Nirutpatti kṣaya* ( L. V. P. ).

183. Omitted by Poussin.

184. Another reading : *animitta*—Shanghai and Taisho eds.  
This reading is supported by the comment.

185. "Défaut-souillure" ( L. V. P. ).

186. Or *Buddhaprajñā* as on p. 95, 1.

एवं सम्यग्दर्शनपरिशुद्धीतत्वात् अप्रमाणपुण्यराशिमभिनर्धयति अनन्तः प्रणीतसुखफलमुपचिनोति । <sup>187</sup>विशुद्ध्यैकरसः परदुःखं नाशयति भैषज्य- राज इव सर्वं [ 182 ] सम्यक्प्रार्थना<sup>189</sup> प्रणिधानबहुलः ।

एवं तथागतधर्मकायसम्यगवलोकनं सर्वधर्माणां भावाभावनिमित्ता- दर्शित्वात् सम्यग्दृष्टिरित्युच्यते । सर्वपरिकल्पानामुपशमः सम्यक् संकल्पः । सर्वधर्मा निष्पद्यन्ताः सर्वाभिलाषसंग्रशान्ता इति साक्षात्कारः सम्यग्वाक् । सर्वधर्मा अद्वैतकस्वभावा इति कायवाङ्मनोभिस्तद्देतुकर्माकरणं सम्यक् कर्मान्तः । सर्वधर्मा <sup>189</sup>अनुदया अव्ययाः, यश्च धर्मस्वभाव उदयो व्ययश्च [ स ] सदानुत्पन्नः [ इति ] सम्यगाजीवः । सर्वधर्मा अनारम्भा इति <sup>190</sup>अर्थोपायानभिसंस्कारः सम्यग्व्यायामः । सर्वधर्माणामत्यन्तासाक्षा- दर्शनविषयता भावाभावमननधिगमो यत्किञ्चन निश्चयाभावः सम्यग् ध्यानम् । एवं सम्यक् पश्यन् तथा भार्याष्टाङ्गिकमार्गमभ्यस्यति । अर्थोऽयं विस्तरेण यथा बोधिसत्त्वपिटके तत्र तत्र देशितः ॥

एवं सम्यक् पश्यन् न केवलभार्याष्टाङ्गमार्गमभ्यस्यति [ 186 ] संक्षिप्योक्ता परंपारमिता अपि परिपूरयति । <sup>191</sup>अप्रयोगेऽपि यस्त्यस्ति । कथमयमर्थः । <sup>191</sup>तथा हि । सर्वप्रकारनिमित्तानि विसृजति सर्वबलेशांक्षोत्सृजति इतीयं नाम दानपारमिता ॥ सर्वालम्बनानि व्युपशमयति । अनुपलम्भभावनां मनसिफरोति । इयं शीलपारमिता ॥ सर्वालम्बनानां वेदानां न क्षमते ।

187. Poussin takes this compound as adjective to *phala*. But, I have done it otherwise according to the comment

188. Lit *prārthita*

189. *Tseng, t'iddhs, upacaya, chien, hrāsa āpachya* Poussin's rendering of this passage does not accord with the Chinese syntax

190. *yong mong—vira* according to Rosenberg. Poussin puts it "energie"—*vīrya*

191—191. This portion is left out by Poussin

इयं क्षान्तिपारमिता ॥ अनुपादानमनुत्सर्गञ्च सर्वचर्या निस्सरति । इयं  
 वीर्यपारमिता ॥ सर्वमनस्कारासमुदाचारेणात्यन्ताप्रतिष्ठानम् । इयं  
 ध्यानपारमिता ॥ सर्वधर्माणां प्रपञ्चानुत्थानं द्वयनिमित्तविविक्त[ता] इयं  
 प्रज्ञापारमिता ॥ अयमर्थो विस्तरशो यथा प्रज्ञपरि<sup>102</sup>पृच्छासूत्रादौ तत्र  
 तत्र वैशितः ।

एवं<sup>196</sup> सुविहारोऽप्रमाणद्वारं भवति । अपरिमितसूत्रे भगवता पिस्त-  
 रेणोक्तम् । महार्थैर्हितयद्बलैः<sup>194</sup> समृद्धो भवति । [इति] । शान्तिनो यथातत्त्वं  
 जानीयु प्रमादविरहिताश्च शिक्षामारमेन्<sup>195</sup> ॥

[ इति ] महायानकरतलरत्नशास्त्रम्

[ समाप्तम् ]

— [०]:—

192 Śikṣāsamuccaya 125, Mdo (Osoma) 18 — Compare la  
 pratique des Śāramitas dans Śraddhotpāda 3, 2 13b (L. V. P.)

193—199. Left out by Poussin

194 Jac : I have suggested samyaddhā tentatively

एवं सम्यग्दर्शनपरिगृहीतत्वात् अप्रमाणपुण्यराशिमभिवर्धयति अनन्तः  
प्रणीतसुखफलमुपचिनोति । 187 विशुद्ध्येकरसः परदुःखं नाशयति भैषज्य-  
राज इव सर्व [ 18 a ] सम्यक्प्रार्थना<sup>188</sup> प्रणिधानबहुलः ।

एवं तथागतधर्मकायसम्यगवलोकनं सर्वधर्माणां भावाभावनिमित्ता-  
दर्शित्वात् सम्यग्दृष्टिरित्युच्यते । सर्वपरिकल्पानामुपशमः सम्यक् संकल्पः ।  
सर्वधर्मा निष्पपञ्चाः सर्वाभिलाषसंप्रशान्ता इति साक्षात्कारः सम्यग्वाक् ।  
सर्वधर्मा अवृत्तकस्वभावा इति कायवाङ्मनोमिस्त्वदेतुकर्माकरणं सम्यक्  
कर्मान्तः । सर्वधर्मा 189 अनुदया अन्यथाः, यश्च धर्मस्वभावा उदयो व्ययश्च  
[ १८ ] सदानुत्पन्नः [ इति ] सम्यगाजीवः । सर्वधर्मा अनारम्भा इति  
190 वीर्योपायानभिसंस्कारः सम्यग्व्यायामः । सर्वधर्माणामत्यन्तासाक्षा-  
दर्शनविषयता भावाभावमननविगमो यत्किञ्चन निश्चयाभावः सम्यग्  
ध्यानम् । एवं सम्यक् पश्यन् तथा भार्याष्टाङ्गिकमार्गमभ्यस्यति । अर्थोऽयं  
विस्तरैण यथा बोधिसत्त्वपिटके तत्र तत्र वैशितः ॥

एवं सम्यक् पश्यन् न केवलभार्याष्टाङ्गिकमार्गमभ्यस्यति [ 18 b ] संक्षिप्तोक्ता  
पदपारमिता अपि परिपूरयति । 191 अप्रयोगेऽपि यस्त्यस्ति । कथमयमर्थः ।  
191 तथा हि । सर्वप्रकारनिमित्तानि विसृजति सर्वकलेशाञ्चोत्सृजति इतीयं  
नाम दानपारमिता ॥ सर्वालम्बनानि व्युपशमयति । अनुपलम्भभायनां  
मनसिकरोति । इयं शीलपारमिता ॥ सर्वालम्बनानां वेदनां न क्षमते ।

187. Poussin takes this compound as adjective to *phala*. But, I have done it otherwise according to the comment.

188. Lat. *prāritā*

189. *Tseng, vyādhī, upacaya, chien, hrāsa āpachya*. Poussin's rendering of this passage does not accord with the Chinese syntax.

190 *yang mong—vira* according to Rosenberg Poussin puts it "energie" ~ *vīrya*.

191—191. This portion is left out by Poussin.

इयं क्षान्तिपारमिता ॥ अनुपादानमनुत्सर्गञ्च सर्वचर्या निस्तरति । इयं  
वीर्यपारमिता ॥ सर्वमनस्कारासमुदाचारेणात्यन्ताप्रतिष्ठानम् । इयं  
ध्यानपारमिता ॥ सर्वधर्माणां प्रपञ्चाजुल्यानं द्वयनिमित्तविविक्त[ता] इयं  
प्रेहापारमिता ॥ अयमर्थो विस्तृष्टो यथा ब्रह्मपरि<sup>192</sup>पृच्छासूत्रादौ तत्र  
तत्र देशितः ।

एवं <sup>190</sup>सुविहारोऽप्रमाणद्वारं भवति । अपरिमितसूत्रे भगवता विस्त-  
रेणोक्तम् । महार्थहितप्रदुल्लेः <sup>191</sup>समृद्धो भवति । [इति] । शान्तिनो यथातथ्यं  
जानीयुः प्रमादविरहिताश्च शिक्षामारमेन्<sup>193</sup> ॥

[ इति ] महायानकरतलरत्नशास्त्रम्

[ समाप्तम् ]

—:[०]:—

192 Śikṣasamuccaya, 125, Mdo (Csoma), 18.—Compare la pratique des Pāramitās dans Śraddhotpāda, 3, 2, 13b ( L. V. P. )

193—193. Left out by Poussin

194. Jaco-t. I have suggested samyādhi tentatively.

## ADDITIONAL NOTES

P. 34, n. 6 Kośavyākhyā, I, p 2, 1 23 :

ध्वयं प्रमेण श्रुतचिन्ताभावनामयप्रहोत्पादनार्थम् । तदुत्पादनं  
फलेशप्रदानार्थम् । तत्पुनः सर्वदुःखोपशमलक्षणनिर्वाणार्थम् ।  
इति प्रयोजननिष्ठा ॥

Ibid, p 9, 1 14 :

तत्र श्रुतप्रयोगजा श्रुतमयी । शुक्तिनिध्यानप्रयोगजा चिन्तामयी ।  
भायनाप्रयोगजा भायनामयी । etc.

P 39, 5 Cp Pramāṇavārtika, II, 365 .

मन्त्राद्युपप्लुताक्षाणां यथा मृच्छकलादयः । अन्यथैवाय-  
भासन्ते सद्रूपरहिता अपि ॥ वृत्ति—अन्यथा सुवर्णादित्येन ।

P. 39, 10-12. Read in Maj. 28, Mahāsatthipadōpama Sutta .

युक्तं पनेतं भगवता :— यो पटिच्चसमुप्पादं पस्सति । स धम्मं  
पस्सति । यो धम्मं पस्सति सो पटिच्चसमुप्पादं पस्सति । p. 190

P. 44 2 Anumānanyūnata is explained differently in the Pramāṇa-  
vārtika

P. 47, 14 n. 67. The same in the Kośavyākhyā, I, p. 28, 8 :

आत्मशब्दो हि चित्तमात्मेत्युपचर्यते इति वक्ष्यते ।

Cp Ibid, p 77, 20

( भा- ) अहङ्कारसंनिभयत्वात् चित्तमात्मेत्युपचर्यते । ( व्या- )  
अहङ्कारसंनिभय आत्मेत्यात्मवादिनः संकल्पयन्ति ।

• Cp this statement in the Kathopanishad, III Bāṅkhyā doctrine

P. 48, 15-16. Cp Maj Vol I, p 227

P. 67, 10 Cp Sthiramati's Trisāṅkhyāśāstra :

विज्ञानं पुन प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात् द्रव्यतोऽस्तीत्यन्युपेयम् ।

p 2 1 16

P. 61, 19. Abb Kośa, Bhāṣya III, 27, p 43, 15 .

अयोनिशो मनस्फारहेतुका अविद्योक्ता सूत्रान्तरे इति । and p 44,  
15. अन्यः पुनराह ( =मदन्तर्धीलाम् ) अयोनिशो मनस्फारो  
हेतुरविद्याया उक्तः सूत्रान्तरे ।

P. 62, 2 This idea is well expressed in the Suttampāṭi 843 :

सद्यंति खो ग्राहणं किं वदेय्य, मुसाति वा सो विवदेय्य केन ।

यस्मिं समं विसमञ्चापि नत्थि स केन वादं पटिसंयुजेय्य ॥

P. 69, 14 Cp Nyāyamukha ad ver. 7. Tucci, Translation, 2 30.

2 71, 2 Cf —

निर्वाणस्य महायाने प्रतिपिद्धत्वात्—

—Abhis. Āloka, p 57.

P 71, 14 —

तथताभावस्तथता इत्यत एव निर्देशस्य हस्तत्वमित्याचार्यवसुधन्वुः ।

Abhis. Āloka, p 369

P. 77, 10 Cp. another explanation in Abh. Kōśāryākhya II, 44, p. 83

(भा-) कथं पुनर्भगवानुभयतो भागविमुक्तः । (ध्या-) वलेशा-  
घरणं समापत्वाघरणञ्चोभयतो भागः । ततो विमुक्तः ।

P 77, 12, n 23 It will be interesting to note the whole context here :

निर्वाणसामान्यगतेस्ततोऽन्यैरपि पुद्गलैः ।

तवातुलैर्बुद्धधर्मन्तरं सुमहामहम् ॥

शून्यतामात्रसादृश्यात् यदि नाधिक्यता भवेत् ।

रोमकूपाणुकच्छिद्रेणाकाशं प्रतिबिम्बयेत् ॥

P. 78, 12 The Statement : *Khapuspa* etc. is rather ambiguous as it stands in the Chinese. The commentary explains it as follows : "If you say it is not lost," etc purports to refute the supporting factor. "If you say it is not lost" is stated towards the Vādin's ( = *Sāstra* *Acārya* ) former statement of "the existence of sky-flower being lost " So [ *Prativedāin* ] now says it is not lost. "Sky-flower-non-existent term" etc explains the factor of its not being lost "The term" ( *Śabda* ) means the statement of the term That is to say [ my ] statement of non existent sky-flower can combat the statement of the non-existent sky flower of the Vādin, by explaining that it is the same as the *tridhātū* of the real nature Then the nature ( *stabhāva* ) of sky-flower is not non existent The Vādin's *samādṛṣṭānta* cannot be established



So my original pakṣa is not lost. This is the re-statement of the supporting factor of the Prativādin by the Vādin.

It appears now that we may construe the sentence here in the Skt. text thus :

अस्तत्पुण्यमिति शब्दोक्तिघातूनां सस्यमावत्यात् ।

If this my reading is accepted, the stop put after *Śabda*, *Sheng* in the Chinese text must be omitted. The commentary also appears to support this conjecture.

P. 83, 8. n 97. Op. Pram. Vār vṛtti ad IV, 157 : *Dvyanukādī-*  
*kramena karyadrayasamyogaparamparayā ca dravyam utpadyate* .

*Dvyanuka* ॥ sometimes called parent atom. Though it is product, yet it is the same as the original atom in quality, there is nothing newly added and created in the combination of two atoms (Op. the extract from Kwei-chi's commentary on the *Vijñaptimātratā-vimāśikā* of Vasubandhu in the *Vaisesika Philosophy*, p 129, with note 2 ) According to Sridhara "a single atom and three atoms have no productiveness, and a *dvyanuka* must conjoin with another *dvyanuka* to produce any of the things in the world" Ibid p. 130 It appears that our author, Bhāṣavivēka wants to disprove some such view of the *dvyanuka* atoms in this passage Dr H. U. draws attention to the fact that Bhāṣavivēka does not call single atoms *dravya*, but two atoms and three atoms are so called, (Op Nanjo, No 1085, *Prāṣadipā*, Pp. 60a, 91 'b ) Ibid 181 According to Dharmapāla *dvyanuka* is perceptible, but Śāntarakṣita—Kamalaśīla take ॥ to be imperceptible, see *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, p 60 with Note, 10 One may refer profitably to my paper : *Śaṅkarācārya on Bud. Idealism*, in the *Jour. of S V. O Institute, Tirupati*, Vol I, part 2, for some discussion on atomic theory

P. 88, 12 n 123 J Masuda points out that the *samyaktva-niyāma* is the first stage of the *Darśanamārga* The word *niyāma* has been analysed into *nis+āma āma* meaning "rawness", is the passion or that *indriya* which did not ripe The Āryan path can transcend this rawness, therefore it is called *niyāma* And he says that the *samyaktva* is interpreted to mean *sivāna* or Āryan path, see his translation of Vasumitra's *Bud. Sects*, pp. 27, n 3, and 40 n 9.

P. 89, 8, P. 90, ॥ There ॥ only one quotation as far from this Sūtra, namely in the M. vṛtti, p 516, 1—4. Some Sūtra of this name

in Nanjio's Catalogue No 264—265 = No 172 in the Cat the Tib Bud Canons Japan

P 91, 10 Cp Haribhadra's remark :

धर्मतया सम्यक् प्रतिपन्नसमाधे. योगिनो बुद्धैर्व्याकरणं क्रियत इति ।

Abb Āloka p 62 and see Aṣṭasāhasrikā p 13 1<sup>st</sup>

P 97, 1 Doubtful passages of the Sūtras should be interpreted in the light of the other passages whose imports could not at all be doubtful, this is one of the principles adopted in the science of interpretation Haribhadra informs us that the same has been sanctioned by Buddha himself .

प्रदेशान्तरे भगवतामिहितम्—सूत्रं मिश्रं सूत्रान्तरेण व्याख्या-  
तव्यम् इति । Ibid p. 45.

P 97 5 Cp Similar expression in Brhadāraṇyaka IV, 3 23

यद्यै तन्न पश्यति, पश्यन् घै तन्न पश्यति । नहि द्रष्टुः दृष्टे  
विपरिलोपो विद्यते । अविनाशित्वात् ।

This appears to be the same as the ekakṣapaeṣkṣātkāra ( p 96 ) of our author

P 98 13 Nothing is known about the Bodhisattvapitaka only reference to it is in Rosenberg's Vocabulary p 399, = 3, and the Dictionary of Ohin Bud terms by W E Southill and L Hodous where it is simply mentioned

P 99 4 No 158 in the Catalogue of the Tib Bud Canons Sendai Japan 1934 There is No Chinese version known to us

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APPENDIX  
KARATALARATNA

Chap. I

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33.	2, 理	53.	94, 彼
33.	3, 喻	55.	97, 顯現異
34.	8, 已入	55.	98, 所顯
37.	24, 假說同故	55.	99, 據
37.	25, 難令…不可…有	55.	101, 文煩
39.	34, 被 <sup>for</sup> 彼	58.	102, 處投寄
40.	88, 似	59.	103, 有所
43.	50, 明了	56.	105, 翹翹
47.	65, 都無所有	57.	110, 假立性
48.	68, 不相離	59.	118, 述……述
48.	71, 所許	59.	120, 覺
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52.	87, 所遺色	61.	136, 根實
53.	91, 實有		

APPENDIX  
KARATALARATNA

Chap. II

P.	N.	P.	N.
67.	1, 若不開示	81.	89, 無能
68.	5, 略舉名相	84.	103, 無動了知
69.	10, 義準	88.	123, 正性離生
70.	13, 囉鉢羅	90.	135, 行解
70.	15, 微妙(妙)	90.	136, 真實
71.	21, 聖教	91.	140, 思惟
71.	25, 假立	93.	153, 慧
72.	30, 故	95.	161, 覺慧增益
72.	33, 辯	95.	167, 可見……所見
73.	38, 世 for 此	95.	168, 起解因故
74.	41, 所見	96.	173, 謂
75.	48, 非離非有實性…	97.	177, (遊履)
	…有……	98.	189, 增……減
76.	56, 豈無……並無	98.	190, 勇猛
79.	76, 親現	99.	194, 饒益

# ADDITIONS AND ALTERATIONS

Page line

- 32, 29 Read "innumerable discourses".
- 41, 2. " वेशमशक as on p. 65, l. 1.
- 47, 6. After स्यात्, add : यदि उक्तं वचनं नाभावद्वयमिति, संस्कृता अपि नाभाव-  
द्वयाणि इति.....
- 49, 13. Read परिचोदित for आहृत—
- 52, 6. Or स्वपक्षरागवृत्त्या—
- 56, 14. Lit. इति चेदयमर्थः .
- 57, 1. Read परिकल्पितः परतन्त्रसमावे.....
- " 3, 10. " परिकल्पितसमावः
- 59, 1. " तदा पुनः सिद्ध—
- 64, 13. " चिन्ताप्रविचय—
- " 15. }
- 83, 14. } " यत्नेन for हवितं.
- 65, 8. Note some observations on the Buddhist conception of  
gods by E. J. Thomas, Life of Buddha, p. 208.
- 66, 6. The Chinese may syntactically read : कथम् for परम्
- 76, 3. Add विस्तर : after इति ।
- 77, 11. Read विमुक्ति and note Maj. II, 90, p. 129 : एत्थ.....न विधि  
नाताकरण वदामि यदिदं विमुक्तिया विमुक्तिम् ।
- 78, 9. After—मयं add : सपुण्यमस्ति उत न । यदि वदसि
- 84, 17. }
- 97, 6. } सम्यक्प्रदान = सम्मावधान in Pali.
- 96, 11. साधुत्कार = Anubhava of Advaitins, v. S. Radhakṛṣṇan,  
Indian Philosophy, II, p. 510-11.
- 97, 4. Lit. निमित्तमचरन्.....
- 98, 11. After यत्किञ्चन add : चिन्तनाभावः सम्यक्प्रमृतिः । सर्वाकारसर्वधर्मानुपादानेन  
यत्किञ्चन
- 97, 7. Read conveniently यथाभूत

# ERRATA

P. L.

- |         |                                |         |                         |                |
|---------|--------------------------------|---------|-------------------------|----------------|
| 2. 32.  | Read 'enveloped'               | 39. 6.  | „                       | 'वधिद्वि—'     |
| 4. 19.  | „ 'converse'                   | 43. 12. | „                       | 'पाल'          |
| 8. 26.  | „ ' <i>pratikya</i> '          | 48. 7.  | „                       | 'वधुः'         |
| 9. 26.  | „ ' <i>svavatanavirodha</i> '  | 51. 1.  | „                       | 'द्वितीय'      |
| 11. 28. | „ 'undiscriminative'           | 52. 13. | „                       | 'वदित'         |
| 12. 24. | „ 'gem like'                   | 54. 1.  | „                       | 'आरणीवेत'      |
| 14. 16. | „ 'of' before 'the<br>nature.' | 54. 13. | „                       | 'वदित'         |
| 16. 20. | „ 'is' for 'in'                | 55. 13. | „                       | 'एक' for दक    |
| 20. 9.  | „ ' <i>Abhinvebi</i> '         | 60. 13. | „                       | 'आरमादि'       |
| 23. 17. | „ 'consider'                   | 61. 3.  | „                       | 'सद्व्येयताम्' |
| „ 32.   | „ 'concomitance'               | 70. 12. | „                       | 'वद्वेग'       |
| 34. 13. | „ 'परमार्थस्य'                 | 80. 1.  | „                       | 'सत्ताहेतुक'   |
| „ 7.    | „ 'साध्याय'                    | 82. 13. | Insert [ 9 b ] before   |                |
| 35. 10. | „ 'सोत'                        |         |                         | सद्व्ये-       |
| 38. 2.  | „ ' <i>pramāṇa</i> '           | 88.     | Read everywhere निधिस्य |                |
|         |                                |         | for निधिस्य             |                |